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ABSTRACT
T he pu rpose  of th is  s tudy is to c o m p are  the re la t iv e  ab i l i ty  of Con­
g r e s s  and the P re s id e n c y  to r e f le c t  the  public will .  It takes  a s  i t s  
poin t  of d e p a r tu re  the long s tanding  a rg u m e n t  tha t  e i th e r  the P r e s i ­
dency, on the one hand, o r  the C o n g res s ,  on the o the r ,  i s  the 
s u p e r io r  inst i tu t ion  fo r  popula r  rep re se n ta t io n .
A c o r re la t io n  des ign  w as  dev ised  in which C o n g re s s  and the  P r e s i ­
dency w ere  co m p ared  acco rd ing  to  th e i r  r e la t iv e  a g r e e m e n t  o r  d i s ­
a g re e m e n t  with the m a jo r i ty  pos i t ion  of public opinion po l ls ,  on a  
r a n g e  of i s s u e s  over  which C o n g re s s  and the P re s id e n c y  d isa g reed ,  
in  the p e r io d  1947 th rough 1969.
O v er  the whole s e r i e s  of i s s u e s ,  the  P re s id e n c y  was found to 
r e f l e c t  public opinion m o r e  often than  C o n g re s s  by  a  s ign if ican t  m a r ­
gin. D if fe rences  w ere  a l so  found in the d e g re e  to which C o n g re s s  o r  
the  P re s id e n c y  r e f le c ted  public opinion in r e f e r e n c e  to (1) p a r t i c u l a r  
i s s u e  a r e a s ,  and (2) s i z e s  of opinion poll  m a jo r i ty .
The r e s u l t s  su g g es t  tha t  the re la t ionsh ip  between C o n g re s s  and 
the P re s id en c y ,  and the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion is  m o r e  com plex  
than  conventional a rg u m e n ts  indicate,  and v a r i e s  acco rd ing  to  i s su e  
a r e a  and s iz e  of majori ty7 opinion.
I t  is  suggested  tha t  e f fo r ts  f o r  c o n g res s io n a l  and p r e s id e n t ia l  
r e f o r m  take into account  the finding tha t  C o n g re s s  cons is ten t ly  
th w a r t s  the public will  in spec if ic  i s s u e  a r e a s .
CONGRESS, PRESIDENTS, AND PUBLIC OPINION:
A STUDY OF CONGRESSIONAL-PRESIDENTIAL DISAGREEMENTS 
CORRELATED WITH THE MAJORITIES OF NATIONAL 
PUBLIC OPINION POLLS, 1947-1969
INTRODUCTION
Between 1947 and 1969, slightly over half of p res iden t ia l  reques ts  
for  congress ional  legisla tion were denied by C ongress  (v. F igure  1). * 
Assuming that the m ajor i ty  of public opinion a g re e s  with e i ther  Con­
g r e s s  or  the P re s idency  when the la t te r  two d isag ree ,  it follows that 
(1) e i ther  Congress  or the P res idency  opposes the public will equally 
as  often, or (2) e i ther  Congress  or the P re s idency  opposes the public 
will m ore  often.than not. If national public opinion polls substantia te
| sy *
Approximately 53/o of p res iden t ia l  reques ts  for  congress iona l  le g ­
is lation were denied by C ongress  between 1947 and 1969.
’'Only specific r eq u es ts  for legislative action submitted to Congress  
by the P re s iden t  were tabulated for the Boxscore .  Excluded f rom  the 
lis t  of legislative r eq u es ts  were proposa ls  advocated by officials of the 
Executive Branch, but not specif ically by the P re s iden t ;  m e a su re s  that 
the P re s iden t  endorsed but did not reques t ;  suggestions that Congress  
cons ider  or study p a r t ic u la r  topics,  if no legis la tive action was 
reques ted;  nominations.
"Almost all appropria t ion  reques ts  were  excluded because  they a re  
a yearly  occurrence  and provide the funds n e c e ssa ry  to c a r r y  out r e g ­
u la r  functions of the Government.  But CQ, included se v e ra l  a p p ro p r i ­
ate reques ts  the P re s id e n t  designed at key points of ce r ta in  p ro g ra m s ,  
and which were submitted in specia l  m essages .
"The number of r eq u es ts  is a fa ir ,  but n ec essa r i ly  somewhat a r b i ­
t r a ry ,  count of the P re s id en t ia l  p roposals .  Requests  can be totaled in 
many ways. Though not al l  the P re s id e n t ' s  p roposa ls  were  equally 
important,  CQ makes no at tempt to weigh them. But a rough, au to ­
matic  weighting re su l t s  f rom  m ajor  reques ts  usually having sev e ra l  
points .
"Congress  does not always vote "yes"  or "no" on a P re s id en t ia l  
proposal .  CQ evaluates com prom ise  to de te rm ine  if the reques t  is 
c lo se r  to approval or to re jec t ion  of the P re s id e n t ' s  reques t .  "
2
Figure 1. Presidential Requests and Congressional Approvals, 1947-1969 
i (Source: "Presidential  Boxscore , tT Congressional Quarterly Almanac)
Number of P resid en  
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that identifiable m a jo r i t ie s  of public opinion ex is t  on enough public 
i s su es ,  it should be possible  to de te rm ine  whether Congress  or the 
P res idency  b e t te r  implements  the fundamental dem ocra t ic  pr inciple  of 
m ajori ty  rule .  ^
The cen tra l  question cons idered  by this study is whether Congress  
o r  the P res idency  a g re e s  m ore  often with the m ajor i ty  of public opin­
ion. The question is important,  for  it is c losely a s soc ia ted  with d e t e r ­
mining the need for  congress ional  and p res iden t ia l  r e fo rm .  If it can be 
shown that P re s id en ts  a r e  m ore  often in ag reem en t  with public opinion
Congress iona l  Q uar te r ly  Service ,  Congress ional  Q uar te r ly  Almanac 
XVII (Washington, D .C. : Congress ional  Q uar te r ly  Service),  p. 94.
T’Two generations ago, Henry Lee McBain observed that the P r e s i ­
dent had em erged  as  ’Chief L e g is la to r ’; now, ’the P r e s i d e n t ’s p r o g r a m ’ 
is insti tutionalized as a point cf depar tu re  for the legis la tive p ro cess .
” . . .  [Tjhe important  function of sett ing the agenda has largely been 
passed  on by Congress  to the P re s id en t  and his staff. ” v. Roger  H. 
Davidson, David M. Kovenock, and Michael K. O ’L eary ,  C ongress  in 
C r i s i s :  Polit ics  and C ongress ional  Reform (New York: Hawthorn 
Books, Inc . ,  196CJ)7 p. 13. v ."R ichard  N eustad t’s two a r t ic le s ,  
’’P re s idency  and Legislation: The Growth of C en tra l  C learance ,  ” 
A m er ican  Poli t ical  Science Review, 48 (September 1954), pp. 641-671, 
and P res idency  and Legislation: Planning the P r e s i d e n t ’s P ro g ram ,  ” 
Ibid. , 49 (December 1955), pp. 998-1021.
’’Eighty percen t  of the bil ls  enacted into law, one congressm an  has 
es t imated ,  originate in the executive branch.  ” Samuel P. Huntington, 
’’Congress ional  Response to the Twentieth Century, ” The Congress  and
American’s Future ,  David B. T rum an  (ed. ) (Englewood Cliffs,  N .J .  : 
P ren t ice -H a l l ,  1965), p. 23.
2 ” . . . Ranney and Kendall der ive  the four basic  p r inc ip les  of d em o c­
racy  which consti tute the ir  model — popular sovereignty ,  polit ical 
equality, popular consultation and m ajor i ty  ru le .  ” (Italics not original) 
C h a r le s  F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer, E m p ir ic a l  Democra t ic  
Theory  (Chicago: M arkham Publishing Company, 1969), p. 1SL
5than  C o n g re s s ,  then proponents  of in c re a se d  executive power may find 
suppor t  fo r  th e i r  a rgum en t  tha t  p re s id e n t ia l  pow er  should be expanded 
a t  the expense of an unresponsive  C o n g res s .  S im i la r ly ,  advocates  of 
con g ress io n a l  r e fo rm  m ay a rg u e  that  the s a m e  findings indicated a  need 
fo r  making C o n g re s s  m o re  re spons ive  to popu la r  opinion, while m a in ­
ta ining a m o re  n ea r ly  equal d iv is ion  of pow er  between the leg is la t ive
3
and executive b ra n c h e s .  In the absence  of e m p i r i c a l  inquiry,  such 
a rg u m e n ts  a r e  im p re s s io n i s t i c  and weak a t  b es t .  The pu rpose  of this  
study is to prov ide  the data  n e c e s s a r y  to i l lum inate  the m o re  gene ra l  
c o n t ro v e rsy  of co n g res s io n a l  and p re s id e n t ia l  r e fo rm .
In the next chap te r ,  the l i t e r a tu r e  of po l i t ica l  sc ience  will be s u r ­
veyed a s  it appl ies  to the question of whether  C o n g re s s  or  the P r e s i ­
dency a g re e s  m o re  often with the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion.
3
v. Davidson, Kovenock, and O ’L ea ry ,  op. cit.  , pp. 24 and 30 for  
a  d iscu ss io n  of r e fo rm  p ropos i t ions  under  the "ex ec u t iv e - fo rce "  and 
" l i t e r a r y "  th eo r ie s .
CHAPTER I
RESUME OF RELATED PROFESSIONAL LITERATURE
One long-s tanding  concern  of A m e r ic a n  po l i t ica l  sc ience  is the 
d e s c r ip t io n  of the r e p re s e n ta t iv e  ro le s  of C o n g res s  and the P r e s i ­
dency. The re la t iv e  pow ers  and s t r en g th s  of the se  inst i tu t ions to r e p ­
r e s e n t  the public will usually  have been  t r e a te d  in poli t ica l  sc ience  in 
one of two contexts .  E i th e r  w r i t e r s  have viewed the h i s to r ic a l  t r en d s  
of C o n g res s  and the P re s id e n c y ,  o r  they have intuitively a s c r ib e d  the 
p redom inance  of one inst i tution over  the o ther .  The a im  of th is  th e s is  
is to com pare  sy s tem a t ica l ly  the public r e c o r d s  of C o n g res s  and the 
P re s id e n c y  with availab le  ex p re s s io n s  of public opinion, in o rd e r  to 
p rovide  an e m p i r i c a l  b a s e  fo r  the contention that one o r  the o ther  a c t u ­
al ly  r e p r e s e n t s  the public m o re  accu ra te ly .
C hap te r  I su rv ey s  the l i t e r a tu r e  of the field a s  it appl ies  to the 
question a t  hand. The chap te r  is divided into th ree  sec t ions .  The 
f i r s t  outl ines the bas ic  dialogue in the ea r ly  l i t e r a tu r e  of m o de rn  p o l i ­
t ic s  concern ing  the app ro p r ia te  ro le  of r e p re s e n ta t iv e  inst i tu t ions.
The second p r e s e n t s  two m odern  th e o r ie s  of r e p r e s e n ta t i o n  which 
a l te rn a te ly  p r e s e n t  C o n g res s ,  o r  the P re s id e n c y ,  as  being the p r i n c i ­
pal  inst i tution of r e p re se n ta t io n  in A m er ic an  d em o cracy .  The th ird  
offe rs  an explanation of the way this r e s e a r c h  con tr ibu tes  to the e x i s t ­
ing l i t e r a tu r e  of the field. R
THE ROLE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE
The l i t e ra tu re  of eighteenth century  poli t ica l  philosophy contains
two divergent views of the appropr ia te  ro le  of rep re se n ta t iv e s  and
rep resen ta t iv e  institutions. One is found in the works of Edmund
Burke. Burke a rgues  that r ep re se n ta t iv es  ought not n ecessa r i ly
re f lec t  public opinion, though it be given s e r io u s  consideration.
Ra ther ,  the rep resen ta t ive  should act  as  t ru s te e  of the public welfare,
rep re se n t in g  according to his own bes t  judgment the in te re s t s  of the
4public he s e rv e s ,  as he in te rp re t s  those in te re s ts .
F o r  the follower of Burke,  who may be called an Meli t is t ,  " the 
findings of this thes is  a r e  not important,  for  he would not concern  
h im self  with the extent to which e i ther  Congress  or the P re s idency  
might re f lec t  d irec t ly  the expressed  will of the public. On the other 
hand, the l i t e ra tu re  of this topic a lso  offers  the "republican"  view 
which does consider  the question of r e p re se n ta t iv e s  ref lecting the pub­
lic will as  important.
The republican view is bes t  developed in the works of Jean  Jacques 
Rousseau  and Thomas Jefferson .  They argue that the appropr ia te  role 
of the r ep rese n ta t iv e  is that of delegate,  r a th e r  than t ru s tee .  The
"Your rep resen ta t ive  owes you, not his industry only, but his 
judgment; and he be t rays ,  instead of se rv ing  you if he s a c r i f i c e s  it to 
your opinion. " Edmund Burke to his B r is to l  constituents,  3 Novem­
b e r  1774 as appears  in John M. Swarthout and E rn e s t  R. Bar t ley  
(eds. ), M ate r ia ls  on A m er ican  National Government (New York: 
Oxford University P r e s s ,  1952), p. 254.
8delegate always ac ts ,  to the b es t  of his  abili ty, as  the se rvan t  of pub­
lic opinion, reflecting the pred i lec t ions  of the m a jo r i t ie s  of public
. . 5opinion.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the con t rove rsy  over the role  
of the rep resen ta t ive  continued. Both Alexis de Tocqueville and Ja m es
5
"As Rousseau  convincingly proved, sovereignty  is the one a t t r i ­
bute that by its nature cannot be delegated: to delegate is equivalent 
to giving it up. And it is a contradiction in t e rm s  to think of p a r t i c u ­
la r  wills  substituting for  the genera l  will. " J a m es  Burnham, Con- 
g r e s s  and the A m er ican  Trad i t ion  (Chicago: Henry Regnery,  195 9), 
p. 292.
,TEach of us puts his pe rson  and all his power in common under 
the sup rem e direc t ion  of the genera l  will. . . . ”
"T here  is often a g rea t  deal of difference between the will of all 
and the genera l  will, the la t te r  cons iders  only the common in te res t ,  
while the fo rm e r  takes pr ivate  in te re s t  into account,  and is no m ore  
than the sum of p a r t ic u la r  wil ls:  but take away f rom  these sam e wills  
the p luses  and m inuses  that cancel one another ,  and the genera l  will 
r em a in s  as  the sum of the d if ferences.  " Jean  Jacques Rousseau ,  The 
Social Contrac t  (1762, t ran s .  G .D .H .  Cole, E . P .  Dutton & Company, 
1947), ci ted by William Ebenstein  (ed. ), G rea t  Pol i t ica l  Thinkers  
(New York: Holt, R inehar t  and Winston, 1965), pp. 445, 449.
". . . [A]bsolute acquiescence in the decis ions of the m ajori ty ,  — 
the vita l  pr inciple  of republics ,  f rom  which there  is not appeal but to 
force ,  the vital  principle  and immediate  pa ren t  of despotism;.  . . . " 
Thomas Jefferson ,  F i r s t  Inaugural, 4 M arch  1801, Saul K. Padover  
(ed. ), Thomas Je ffe rson  on Dem ocracy  (New York: Mentor, 1958), 
p. 32.
"The f i r s t  principle  of repub lican ism  is, the le x -m a jo r i s  p a r t i s  
(the law of the majori ty)  is the fundamental law of every  society of 
individuals of equal r igh ts ;  to cons ider  the will of the society  enounced 
by the m ajori ty  of a single vote, as  s a c re d  as if unanimous, is the 
f i r s t  of all lessons  in importance,  yet the las t  which is thoroughly 
learn t .  " Thomas Jefferson ,  le t te r  to Baron  von Humboldt, 1817,
I b i d . , p. 34.
9B ry c e  com m ented  a t  length on the topic. Being m o re  o b s e rv e r s  than 
advoca tes ,  they saw, on one hand, that A m e r ic a n  d em o cracy  was 
s t reng thened  and invigorated by the p ro m in en t  influence of public op in ­
ion on pol i t ica l  dec is ion -m ak ing ,  and that, on the o ther,  that  this  
s o u rc e  of s t ren g th  might a l so  give r i s e  to what they t e rm e d  the 
ty ranny  of the m a jo r i ty .
TWO CONFLICTING THEORIES
In the l i t e r a tu r e  of twentieth  cen tu ry  po l i t ica l  s c ien ce ,  a  d is t inc t ly  
repub l ican  dialogue has e m erg e d  between the ’’e x e c u t iv e - fo rc e ” theory,  
on the one hand, and the ’’l i t e r a r y ” theory ,  on the o ther .
L i t e r a r y  Theory
The ’’l i t e r a r y ” theo ry  m a in ta ins  tha t  C ongress  a g r e e s  with the
7
m a jo r i ty  of public opinion at le a s t  as  often as  the P re s id e n t .  The 
chief  advocate of the l i t e r a r y  theo ry  is  A lfred  de G raz ia ,  who c la im s  
tha t ,  ’’C o n g res s  is s t i l l  able to leg is la te .  . . a t  l e a s t  a s  well  a s  the
v. Henry Reeve ( t r a n s . ), D e m o c racy in A m er ic a ,  by Alexis de 
Tocquevii le  (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1945), and J a m e s  B ry ce ,  The 
A m e r ic a n  Commonwealth  (New York: The M acm il lan  Company, 1906).
7
’’A ccord ing  to the advoca tes  of the l i t e r a r y  theory ,  C o n g res s  m u s t  
a s s e r t  its r ight to e x e rc i s e  ’a l l  leg is la t ive  pow ers .  ’ P o l ic ie s  should 
be init iated by C o n g ress  at l e a s t  as  often as  by the executive,  for  ’the 
p r i m a r y  b u s in e ss  of the le g is la tu re  in a d em o c ra t ic  republic  is to 
an s w e r  the big question of policy. ’” Ibid. , p. 349, c i ted  by Davidson, 
op. cit. , p. 20.
10
p res id en cy .  . . . " De G ra z ia  is  v e ry  concerned  for  f e a r  tha t  c a e s a r - 
i sm  and the c rea t io n  of a  b u re a u c ra t i c  m onarchy  will  c r u s h  the 
peo p le 's  po l i t ica l  r ig h ts  and th e i r  voice via C o n g res s .  R o g e r  D av id ­
son, et  al. , obse rve  that al though a P re s id e n t  r e p r e s e n t s  a l l  the 
people,  he can never  know a s  much as  any one c o n g re s s m a n  about 
people in a  given d i s t r i c t  o r  about all  the people in a l l  the d i s t r i c t s  
a s  does C o n g res s .  T h e re fo re ,  acco rd ing  to  the l i t e r a r y  theory ,  C o n ­
g r e s s  is b e t t e r  able to d i s c e r n  the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion, because
9
of b e t t e r  com m unication  with the people. F o r  th is  r e a s o n ,  P re s id e n t  
Will iam Henry H a r r i s o n  conceeded to C o n g res s  the abil i ty  to . . b e t ­
t e r  unders tand  the wants and w ishes  of the people.
g
Alfred de G raz ia ,  Congr e s s  and the P re s id e n c y  (Washington: 
A m e r ic a n  E n te rp r i s e  Ins t i tu te  fo r  PublicTPolicy R e s e a rc h ,  1967), 
pp. 82-83.
9
" F o r  the defender  of the l i t e r a r y  theory ,  the l e g i s l a to r ' s  l e g i t i ­
macy  as  the u l t im ate  policy m a k e r  r e s t s  on h is  n ea r  monopoly of the 
channels  of com m unica t ion  to the sovere ign  e lec to ra te .  Since the 
P re s id e n t  a lso  is e lec ted  by and re sp o n s ib le  to the e le c to ra te ,  th is  
monopoly is not total .  But the P re s id e n t  is the only e lec ted  official 
in the executive b ranch ;  his const i tuency is diffuse, his  m andate  
im p re c i s e .  C o n g res sm en ,  on the o ther  hand, a r e  spec if ic  and p r e ­
c i s e  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s ,  who 'n e c e s s a r i ly  and p ro p e r ly  r e f l e c t  the a t t i ­
tudes  and needs of th e i r  individual d i s t r i c t s .  " E r n e s t  S. Griffith, 
C o n g ress :  Its C o n tem p o ra ry  Role (New York: New York  Univers i ty
P r e s s ,  1951), p. 3, c i ted  by Davidson, op. ci t .  , p. 21.
%
10 "It is p re p o s te ro u s  to suppose that a thought for  a m om ent  could 
be en te r ta ined  that the P re s id e n t ,  p laced  at  the cap ita l ,  in the cen te r  
of the country ,  could b e t t e r  unders tand  the wants  and w ishes  of the 
people than the i r  own im m ed ia te  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s .  " W ill iam  Henry 
H a r r i so n ,  Inaugural  A d d re s s ,  c i ted by A r th u r  Schlesing'er ,  J r .  , 
C o n g re s s  and the P re s id en c y  (Washington: A m e r ic a n  E n te r p r i s e  
Insti tu te  fo r  Public Policy  R e s e a rc h ,  1967), p. 8.
11
Yet, few contem porary  poli t ical  sc ien t i s ts  cons ider  the l i t e ra ry  
theory  as valid. Instead, m os t  ag ree  with Arthur  Schlesinger ,  J r .  
who suggests  that the high w ate r  m a rk  of the l i t e r a r y  theory  was in 
the late 19th century, and that the execut ive-force  theory  offers a 
m ore  accura te  descr ip t ion  for  m ore  recen t  t im es .  ^
E xecu t ive -F o rce  Theory
The executive-force  theory maintains that P re s id e n ts  ag ree  m ore
12often with the m ajori ty  of public opinion than C ongress .  The 
theory  may be reduced to two proposit ions .  They a r e  (a) that Congress
’’The struggle among b ranches  of government is  p a r t  of the health 
of the A m erican  polity, and its continuation make dem ocracy  possible  
by enabling the e lec to ra te  to shift the weight of decis ion  in one d i r e c ­
tion or another according to the r e su l t s  des ired .  ” A r thu r  Schlesinger ,  
J r .  and Alfred de Grazia ,  C ongress  and the P re s idency  (Washington: 
A m er ican  E n te rp r i s e  Insti tute for Public Policy R esea rch ,  1967),
p. 18.
12 ”As the only official elected by the whole population, the P r e s i ­
dent is cons idered  the embodiment of the nation. L eg is la to rs ,  r e p ­
r e s e n t  pa r t ia l  and minori ty  in te re s ts ;  the P re s id e n t  r e p r e s e n t s  the 
’genera l  w i l l ’ of the community. ”
” . . . Theodore Roosevelt  saw the P re s id en t  as  a ’s tew ard  of the 
p eo p le ’; and, some y ea rs  before  his own elevation to the office, 
Woodrow Wilson sensed  its  rep resen ta t iv e  potentia l i t ies .  ’His is the 
only national voice in a f f a i r s ’, he dec lared  in his 1907 Columbia Uni­
v e r s i ty  lecture.  ’He is the rep resen ta t iv e  of no constituency, but of 
the whole people. ” ’ Davidson, Kovenock and O ’L eary ,  op. cit. , 
pp. 28-29.
12
r a r e l y  a g re e s  with the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion, and (b) P re s id e n t s
often ag ree  with the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion, In sup p o r t  of the f i r s t
p ropos i t ion ,  Samuel P. Huntington w r i te s  that C o n g re s s  M. . , has
defec ts  as  a r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  body, . . ” becau se  it is iso la ted  f ro m  the
opinions of the polity. He c i tes  the t ren d  toward d e c re a s in g  tu rnover
in co n g res s io n a l  m e m b e rsh ip  which puts  c o n g re s sm e n  out of touch
with a soc ie ty  undergoing unpreceden ted  technological  and soc ia l  
13change. J a m e s  B urnham  c h a rg e s  tha t  C o n g r e s s ’ T,non -d em o cra t ic
s t r u c t u r e ” (e .g .  , the ’’s en i l i ty ” rule)  has  failed to r e p r e s e n t  the c o m -  
14mon in te re s t .  J a m e s  M. B urns  thinks tha t  the r e a s o n  C o n g res s  has  
fa i led  to ” . . .  m i r r o r - a n d  ac t  on the se n t im en ts  of a popu la r  m a jo r i ty ,  ” 
is  tha t  u n d e r - s ta f fed  co n g re s sm e n  with m ult ip le  com m it tee  r e s p o n s i ­
b i l i t ie s  tend to favor  organized  in te re s t s  of p ro fe s s io n a l  lobbies over
13 "In 1897, fo r  each r e p re s e n ta t iv e  wrho had se rv e d  ten t e r m s  o r  
m o re  in the House, the re  w ere  34 r e p re s e n ta t i v e s  who had s e rv e d  two 
t e r m s  or  le s s .  In 1961, for  each t e n - t e r m e r  the re  were  only 1. 6 r e p ­
r e se n ta t iv e s  who had s e rv e d  two t e r m s  o r  l e s s .  ” George B. Galloway, 
H is to ry  of the United Stales  House of R e p re sen ta t iv e s  (House Docu­
m en t  246, E igh ty -seven th  C o n g ress ,  1st s e s s io n ,  1952), p. 31;
T. R ich a rd  W itm er ,  New York T im es ,  Dec. 27, 1963, p. 24, ci ted 
by Samuel P. Huntington, 1’C o n g ress io n a l  R esponses  to the Twentie th  
C e n t u r y , ” The C o n g res s  and A m e r i c a ’s F u tu re ,  David B, T ru m an  
(ed. ) (Englewood C lUi's, N . J . :  P re n t i c e -K a l l ,  In c . ,  1965), pp. 16,9.
14 ’’B ecause  of i ts  m a n y - la y e re d ,  labyrin th ine ,  non -d em o cra t ic  
in te rna l  s t r u c tu re ,  C o n g ress  se ldom  gives d i r e c t  or  isom orph ic  
ex p re s s io n  to the raw  popular  will .
’’F ro m  the point of view of r ig o ro u s  d e m o c ra t i s m ,  this is a 
g r ievous  fault,  bec au se  a governm ent  ought to r e p r e s e n t  or  e x p re s s  
only the ’c o m m o n ;’ ’national,  ’ or  ’g e n e r a l ’ i n t e r e s t . ” J a m e s  Burnham ,
C o n g res s  and the A m er ic an  T rad i t ion  (Chicago: Henry Regnery ,  1959),________
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the in te re s t s  of unorganized individual c i t izens .  Joseph  S. C la rk
a g re e s  that p r e s s u r e  f rom  organized groups,  and the tendency of the
sen io r i ty  ru le  to give com m ittee  cha irm ansh ips  to conserva t ives  have
16produced . . minority ,  not m ajor i ty ,  ru le .  . . ” in Congress .
W alte r  Dean Burnham notes that s e v e ra l  poli t ical  sc ien t i s t s  m a in ­
ta in  that C o n g r e s s ’ ’’p ro ced u ra l  d i s o r d e r s ” (e .g .  , sen ior i ty  ru le ,  and 
re fu sa ls  of committee  cha irm en  to r ep o r t  out b i l l s  they oppose), 
and ’’substantive i r re sp o n s ib i l i ty ” (e .g .  , co n g res sm en  being knowledge­
able about only a f rac t ion  of the is sues  being legis la ted,  and lack of
congress iona l  initiative) have made C ongress  increasingly  unrespon-
17sive to the m ajor i ty  will of the people. Finally,  the A m er icans  for
15 ” . . . [B]oth the House and the Senate a r e  defective as ’r e p r e s e n ­
t a t iv e ’ bodies.  And they both a r e  organized and managed so as  to 
yield to organized m inor i t ies  at  the expense of the g rea t  m ajori ty .  ” 
J a m e s  M. Burns ,  Congress  on T r ia l  (New York: H arper  and B ro th e rs ,  
1949), pp. 49, 65.
X 6’’The trouble with the C ongress  today is that it e x e rc i s e s  nega­
tive and unjust powers  to which the governed, the people of the United 
States ,  have never  consented. The h e a r t  of the trouble is that the 
power is exe rc ised  by minority ,  not m ajori ty ,  rule.  ” Joseph S.
C la rk ,  The Sapless B ranch  (New York: H a rp e r  and Row, 1965), p. 17.
17 ” . . . [F ]rom  (Woodrow) Wilson to Steven K. Bailey and J a m e s  M. 
B urns  a dist inguished line of poli t ical  sc ien t i s ts  has. . . a rg u ed  p e r ­
suas ive ly  that p re sen t  congress iona l  p rac t ic e s  and any kind of d e m o ­
c ra t ic  theory which includes the notion of responsib i l i ty  of r u l e r s  to 
the governed a r e  incompatible, and that C o n g r e s s ’ p ro ced u ra l  d i s ­
o r d e r s  and substantive i r re spons ib i l i ty  constitute a standing — and 
pe rhaps  inc reas ing  — danger to f ree  institutions in this country. ” 
W al te r  Dean Burnham, ”Has Congress  a F u t u r e ? ” Congress ional  
R efo rm ,  Joseph  S. C la rk  (ed. ) (New York: Thomas Y. Crowel C o m ­
pany, 1967), pp. 19-20.
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Consti tu t ional  Action (ACA) r a te d  tw o - th i rd s  of the co n g re s s io n a l
18l e ad e r sh ip  of 1968 as  m o re  conse rva t ive  than C o n g re s s  a s  a whole.
The fac t  tha t  the conse rva t ive  ACA r a t e s  m o s t  co n g re s s io n a l  l e a d e r s
a s  conse rva t ive  suppor ts  the p ropos i t ion  that  an ideological  b ia s  ex is ts
in the c o n g res s io n a l  le ade rsh ip .
In suppor t  of the second p ropos i t ion  tha t  P r e s id e n t s  often a g re e
with the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion, Sam uel P. Huntington o b se rv e s
tha t  each succeeding  ad m in is t ra t io n  b r in g s  f r e s h  blood and new ideas
f ro m  the people. The cons tant  tu rn o v e r  of p re s id e n t ia l  a d m in is t ra t io n s ,
he w r i te s ,  . . is  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  governm en t  along c l a s s i c  l ines .  . .
and is a  f a r  m o re  sens i t ive  r e g i s t e r  of changing c u r r e n t s  of opinion
19than is  (the low tu rnover  in) C o n g r e s s . Tt J a m e s  B urnham  notes that
18 ” . . .  (B)oth (House) Republican f loor  l e a d e r s  have h ig h e r - th an  - 
ave rage  ACA s c o re s  (as do four of the five D em o c ra t ic  com m it tee  
cha irm en) .
”Of the nine (Senate) f loor  l e a d e r s  and cha irm en ,  s ix  have ACA 
s c o r e s  higher  than ave rage .  . . . ” H e rb e r t  Jacob,  and R o b e r t  W eiss  - 
b e rg ,  E le m en ta ry  P o l i t i ca l  Analys is  (New York: M cGraw -Hil l ,  1970), 
pp. 193-4.
19 ”A continuous ad jus tm en t  of power  and au thori ty  takes  place  
within each adm in is t ra t ion ;  m a jo r  changes in the d is t r ibu t ion  of power 
take p lace  in every  adm in is t ra t io n .  The T ru m a n  A dm in is t ra t io n  r e p ­
re s e n te d  one combination of men, in t e r e s t s ,  and expe r ience ,  the 
E isenhow er  A dm in is t ra t ion  ano ther ,  and the Kennedy A d m in is t ra t io n  
yet a th ird .  E ach  t ime a new P re s id e n t  takes  office, the executive 
b ran ch  is invigorated in the sam e  way the House of R e p re se n ta t iv e s  
was invigorated by Henry Clay and his w es te rn  c o n g re s sm e n  in 1811.
A thousand new officials  descend  on Washington, coming f r e s h  f rom  
the people,  r e p re se n t in g  the d iv e r s e  fo rc e s  behind the new P re s id e n t ,
a number of w r i t e r s  have thought that because  a P re s id en t  is elected 
by the en t ire  e lec to ra te ,  he is m o re  nearly  rep re sen ta t iv e  of the g en ­
e r a l  will than a r e  m e m b e rs  of Congress .  Being elected on a regional
b a s i s  and exerc is ing  unequal powers,  co n g ressm en  a r e  al ledged to d i s -
20to r t  the genera l  will.
CONTRIBUTION OF THIS STUDY
It may be seen  f rom  the above su m m ary  of recen t  l i t e ra tu re  that 
although students of poli t ical  sc ience have theorized  about whether  
C ongress  or  P re s id en t s  ag ree  m o re  often with the m a jo r i ty  of public 
opinion (e .g .  , the execut ive-force  theory  vs. l i t e r a ry  theory c o n t ro ­
versy) ,  it does not appear  that anyone has a t tempted a sy s tem at ic  
investigation of that re la t ionship .  This study a t tem pts  to fill the gap 
with an em pir ica l  ana lys is  of whether Congress  or  P re s id e n ts  m ore  
often ag ree  with the m a jor i ty  of public opinion polls .
F u r th e r ,  it is hoped that the study may p re se n t  findings, which 
would suggest  whether Congress  or the P re s idency  is in g r e a t e r  need of
and bringing with them new demands, new ideas,  and new power.
H ere  truly is rep re sen ta t iv e  government along c lass ic  lines and of a 
s o r t  which Congress  has not known for decades.  ” Samuel P. Hunting­
ton, op. cit. , p. 17.
20 ”As p a r t  of the advance of d em o cra t i sm  in both belief  and p r a c ­
tice,  a p leb isc i ta ry  of num erica l  m a jor i ty  comes to s eem  the only 
p ro p e r  express ion  of the sovere ign  genera l  will. . . . The P res idency ,  
as  the office most  nearly  p leb isc i ta ry ,  is m ore  and m o re  felt  to be the 
p r im a r y  embodiment of the genera l  will, and thus p roper ly  dominent 
over  a l l  other poli t ical  m a g is t r a t e s  and institutions. " J a m es  Burnham, 
op. cit. , pp. 334-335.
r e fo rm  (in the republican context, noted above). F o r  example,  
although the advocates of congress iona l  r e fo rm  have suggested v a r i ­
ous schem es  for enhancing the ability of Congress  to re f lec t  the 
m a jor i ty  of public opinion, none has dem onstra ted  by sys tem atic  
em p ir ica l  analys is  that C ongress  w a r ra n ts  r e fo rm  m ore  than the 
p res idency .  ^
SUMMARY
Chapter  I has cons idered  the normative  question of whether r e p r e ­
sentat ives  ought to re f lec t  public opinion. Also cons idered  w ere  the 
theore t ica l  questions of (a) whether the execut ive-force  theory or l i t ­
e r a r y  theory co r rec t ly  d esc r ib es  existing re la t ionsh ips ,  (b) the con­
tr ibution of this s tu d y ’s sys tem at ic  em p ir ica l  ana lys is  to the l i t e ra tu re
21v. Joseph  S. C lark ,  ’’In ternal  R efo rm s  for C ongress ,  ” and 
’’Ex te rna l  Reform s for Congress ,  ” Congress :  The Sapless  Branch 
(New York: H arp e r  and Row, 1964), pp. 166-232. Joseph S. C lark ,  
(ed. ), Congress iona l  Reform  (New York: Thomas Y. Crowel C o m ­
pany, 1967). Roger  H. Davidson, David M. Kovenoch, and Michael 
K. O ’Leary ,  Cong re s s  in C r i s i s :  Po l i t ics  and Congress ional  Reform  
(New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc. , 1966). J a m es  Burnham, ’’The 
R efo rm  of C ongress ,  ” Congr e s s  and the A m erican  Tradit ion  (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery,  1959), pp. 271-278. Drew P ea rso n  and Jack  A n d e r ­
son, ’’Ten Modest P roposa ls ,  ” The Case Against Congress  (New York 
Simon and Schuster ,  1968), pp. 445-446. David B. T rum an ,  The 
C ongress  and A m e r i c a ’s Future  (Englewood Cliffs, N . J . :  P re n t ic e -  
Hall, Inc. , 1965), pp. 178-183. Samuel P. Huntington, ’’C o n g re s ­
sional Responses  to the Twentieth Century. ” Ibid. , pp. 26-31.
Stephen K. Bailey, The New Congress  (New York: St. M a r t i n ’s 
P r e s s ,  1966), pp. 100, 106. J a m e s  L. Sundquist, Po l i t ics  and Policy: 
The Eisenhower ,  Kennedy, and Johnson Years  (Washington, D .C .  : 
Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 506-537.
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of poli t ica l  sc ience,  and (c) the application of the findings for  d e t e r ­
mining the need for governmental  re fo rm .  In the next chapter ,  the 
l i t e r a ry  theory and the execut ive-force  theory will  be made o p e r a ­
tional for  sys tem atic  em p ir ica l  analys is .
CHAPTER II
SYSTEMATIC EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
In the p reced ing  chap ter ,  the l i t e r a tu r e  of po l i t ica l  sc ien ce  was 
su rveyed  in o rd e r  to gain p e r sp e c t iv e  on the question of whether  C o n ­
g r e s s  or  P r e s id e n t s  a g r e e  m o re  often with the m a jo r i ty  of public 
opinion. Chap te r  II c o n s id e r s  how the ques t ion  can be m ade  am enab le  
to sy s tem a t ic  e m p i r i c a l  m e a s u re m e n ts .  The chap te r  is divided into 
five sec t ions ,  including (a) definit ions,  (b) a s sum ption ,  (c) l im ita t ions ,  
(d) hypothesis ,  and (e) su m m ary .
DEFINITIONS
’’Public opinion” m eans  ” . . . th e  ex p re s s io n  by m e m b e r s  of publics
22on c o n t ro v e rs i a l  sub jec ts .  ” F o r  th is  study, the opera t iona l  d e f in i ­
tion of public opinion is the pe rcen tag e  m e a s u r e m e n t s  of a public opin­
ion poll  r ep o r t .
’’D ifference of a public opinion po l l” m eans  the d if fe rence  between 
the ”Yes, ” and ”No” p e rc e n ta g e s  of an opinion poll  r e p o r t ,  a f t e r  d i s ­
ca rd ing  the ”No Opinion” p e rcen tage .  F o r  example ,  if a  poll  shows
22 J .  W. Albig, ’’The D e te rm in an ts  of Public  Opinion, ” M odern 
Public  Opinion (New York: M cGraw -Hil l ,  1958), p. 112.
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" Y e s” 75%, ”No” 20%, and ”No Opinion” 5%, then the d if fe ren ce  is 
ca lcu la ted  by d isc a rd in g  the ”No Opinion” (5%) and su b tra c t in g  the 
l e s s e r  ”No” 20% fro m  the l a r g e r  ”Y e s” 75%, leaving a d if fe ren ce  of 
" Y e s ” 55%.
’’Public  i s s u e ” m eans a policy over which C o n g ress  and a P r e s i ­
dent d is a g re e ,  and fo r which a national public opinion poll r e p o r t  is 
ava ilab le . C o n g re s s io n a l -p re s id e n t ia l  d is a g re e m e n ts  a r e  taken  f ro m  
the ’’P re s id e n t ia l  B o x sco re , ” C o n g ress io n a l  Q u a r te r ly  A lm a n a c .
’’A r e a ” m ean s  one of the following s ix  g roups of c o n g re s s io n a l -  
p re s id e n t ia l  public is su e s :  health , education  and w e lfa re ; fo re ig n  
policy; e le c to ra l  re fo rm ;  lab o r; c iv il r ig h ts ;  and tax  and econom ic 
policy .
ASSUMPTION
N ational public opinion poll r e p o r t s  a r e  a s su m ed  to be the m o s t 
re l ia b le  m e a su re  of national public opinion ava ilab le . The a s s u m p ­
tion is b ased  on the h is to r ic a l  fac t  tha t po ll o rg an iza tio n s  m ade o v er
425 election  p red ic tio n s  betw een  1944 and 1953 with an av e ra g e  e r r o r
23of le s s  than th re e  p e rc e n t .  B etw een 1960 and 1970, the Gallup s u r ­
veys p red ic ted  the winning p a r ty  in ten  s u c c e s s iv e  e lec tio n s  with an
23 G. B. Galloway, The L eg is la t iv e  P r o ce ss  in C o n g ress  (New 
York: T hom as Y. C row el Company, 1953), p. 228.
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24a v e ra g e  e r r o r  of 1. 6%. M o reo v e r ,  the poll f o re c a s ts  w ere  w ithin
25one p e rc e n t  of the p re s id e n t ia l  vote c a s t  in 1960 and 1964.
Unlike e lec tion  fo re c a s ts ,  how ever, opinion poll r e p o r t s  about pub ­
lic is s u e s  have no d i r e c t  check on th e ir  re l ia b i l i ty .  One r e s u l t  is tha t 
poll o rgan iza tions  have been  accu sed  of using  in fe r io r  sam pling  a p p a r ­
a tu s  when conducting opinion su rv ev s  on public is s u e s .  S eym or L ip -  
se t ,  fo r  exam ple , com m ents  that, " [ s j tu d ie s  of n o n -e lec tio n  p a r ty  
p re fe re n c e s  a r e  often m ade with sm a l l  quota sa m p les  and hence a r e  
m uch le s s  re l ia b le  than an  e lec tion  study m ade with a b ig  p robab ili ty  
sam p le .
On the o ther hand, m a jo r i ty  posit ions  of poll r e p o r t s  have on n u m ­
e ro u s  occasions  ag ree d  with the posit ion  adopted in subsequen t le g is -  
27lation. Gallup c i te s  the following exam ples : r e - a r m in g  on a v a s t
24Gallup Opinion Index, R ep o rt  No. 5 9, May 1970, p. 15. 
v. Appendix F.
25Reo M. C h ris ten so n  and R o b e rt  O. M cW illiam s, Voice of the 
People  (New York: M cG raw -H ill,  1967), p. 530.
26 ’’The su rv ey  groups will devote an ino rd ina te  am ount of r e s o u r c e s  
to a g e n e ra l  e lection , s ince  if they tu rn  out to be rea so n ab ly  a c c u ra te  
they may use  th is  fact fo r  y e a r s  to com e a s  a m eans  of e l ic i t in g  b u s i ­
n ess  f ro m  c lien ts  who do not r e a l iz e  that they a r e  not buying the sam e 
r e s e a r c h  model as  that used  in the election , but a m uch in fe r io r  one. ” 
Seym our M. L ipse t,  ”A P r iv a te  Opinion on the P o lls ,  ” c ited  Ibid. , 
p. 563.
27 ’’Public opinion po lls  in re c e n t  y e a rs  have shown that the A m e r i ­
can public is f a r  ahead of its  le g is la to rs  on many m a t te r s  of so c ia l  
policy. ” Galloway, op. c it .  , p. 230.
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sc a le  (1935); p eace tim e  d ra f t ;  le n d - le a se ;  p a y -a s -y o u -g o  tax es ;
broaden ing  the tax b a s is ;  M a rsh a l l  P lan ; United N ations; so c ia l
s e c u r i ty ;  fe d e ra l  aid to education; in c re a s in g  the m in im um  wage;
28and governm ent housing p lans.
W hile opinion poll r e p o r t s  on public is su e s  m ay w ell be le s s  r e l i ­
ab le  than those fo r  e lec tions , poll r e p o r t s  a r e  m o re  r e l ia b le  m e a ­
s u r e s  of public opinion than the trad it io n a l  m e a s u re s  of l e t t e r s  f ro m  
co n s titu en ts , lobbying by sp e c ia l  in te re s t  g roups , and e d i to r ia ls  in 
n ew sp ap ers .  P o ll r e p o r t s  a r e  le s s  b ia sed , and consequently  m o re
re l ia b le ,  m e a s u re s  b ecau se  they in c o rp o ra te  random  sam pling  te c h -
29niques, while trad it io n a l m e a s u re s  do not. Random  techn iques a r e  
le s s  b ia sed  b ecau se  each c it izen  has  the sa m e  chance of having his 
opinion h ea rd  as  every  o the r  c itizen . The trad it io n a l  m ethods, on the 
o the r  hand, a r e  b iased  in favo r of those  c i t iz en s  who h ire  lobbyis ts , 
w ri te  th e ir  co n g ressm en , o r  a r e  e d i to rs  of n ew sp ap ers .
28 G eorge Gallup, "The F u tu re  T re n d s  of Opinion Sam pling, " The 
P o lls  and Public Opinion, N orm an  C. M eir  and H arold  W. S aunders  
(eds. ) (New York: H enry Holt and Com pany, 1949), pp. 219-20.
29 "The m o st re l ia b le  way to choose the individuals to be included 
in  a  sam p le  su rv ey  is to use som e random  m ethod of se lec tion .
"E x p er ien ce  in su rv ey  w ork  has d em o n s tra ted  tha t if, instead  
of se lec tin g  a t random , a su rv e y o r  t r i e s  to p ick  a r e p re s e n ta t iv e  
sa m p le  by choosing c e r ta in  people or p laces  tha t he b e l iev e s  a r e  r e p ­
re se n ta t iv e ,  a b ia sed  sam p le  w ill p robably  r e s u l t .  " E lea n o r  E. 
M acCoby and R o b e rt  R. Holt, "How Surveys A re  Made, " c ited  by 
C h r is te n so n  and M cW illiam s, op. c it .  , pp. 536-7.
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Public Opinion Polls
In o rd e r  to in c rease  the re a d e r  fs understanding of the polls , this 
sec tion  d iscu sse s  techniques of sy s tem a tic  polling. The study is 
based  on national opinion su rv ey s  made by the A m erican  Institu te  of 
Public  Opinion (AIPO); the National Opinion R e sea rc h  C en te r  (NORC); 
Louis H a r r i s ,  Inc. (H arr is ) ;  and the Opinion R e se a rc h  C orporation , 
P rin ce to n  (ORCP). Each survey  a ttem pts  to cons truc t a  m in ia tu re  of 
the en tire  populace of the nation by. sy s tem a tica lly  se lec ting  re sp o n ­
dents. F o r  the pu rposes of th is study, it is assum ed  that the NORC, 
H a r r is ,  and ORCP polling methods a r e  substan tia lly  the sam e-and
th e re fo re  as  re liab le  as  the AIPO or Gallup technique d iscussed  
30below. Gallup poll data account for the bulk of poll data used in 
th is  study.
The su rveys  a re  based on the concepts of " s t ra tif ica tio n "  and 
"random ness . " F o r  exam ple, s tra t if ica t io n  of the national population 
into its m ajor socio-econom ic groups or s t r a ta  and the random  s e le c ­
tion of a p roportionate  num ber of responden ts  from  each group is one
3 0 National Opinion R e se a rc h  C en ter (NORC): "NORC's sam ple 
is genera lly  based  on a c ro s s - s e c t io n  of 1, 300 in terv iew s. . . . " 
A m erican  A ssociation  for Public Opinion R esea rch , Public Opinion 
Q uarte r ly , Vol. XV (New York: Columbia U niversity  P re s s ) ,  p. 30.
Louis H a rr is  and A ssoc ia tes  (H arris) : One of the H a r r i s  su rveys  
used in th is study, specifica lly  the "LIFE poll. . . su rveyed a c r o s s -  
sec tion  of 4, 047 A m ericans . . . . " Life M agazine, Vol. 68, No. 1,
9 January  1970, pp. 102-6.
Opinion R e sea rc h  C orporation  P rin ce to n  (ORCP): The October 
1966 survey  used a sam ple of 2, 043 telephone ca lls ,  nationwide.
P o lls ,  Vol. II, No. 4, p. 77.
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way to red u ce  the expense but not the re l ia b i l i ty  of an  o th e rw ise
31p u re ly  random  poll. "S traw " po lls  which do not a t tem p t s t r in g e n t  
co n tro l of the sam ple  a r e  excluded f ro m  th is  study. S traw  po lls  a r e  
u sua lly  b ased  on ba llo ts  m ailed  in by the public , o r  "m an  in the 
s t r e e t "  in te rv iew s. Such a su rv ey  was the L i te r a ry  D igest poll of 
1936 which in c o rrec t ly  p red ic te d  a  54%-41% v ic to ry  by Landon over 
R ooseve lt, an e r r o r  of over 20%. ^
The Gallup technique e n ta ils  dividing the nation  into geographic  
un its  of equal population. One hundred  s ix ty  such  un its  a r e  s e le c te d  
a t  random  and ap p rox im ate ly  ten  in te rv iew s a r e  conducted in each, 
p rov id ing  a sam p le  of 1 ,500  re sp o n d e n ts .  The su rv ey  is in tended to 
r e f le c t  the opinions of the e n t i re  adu lt c iv ilian  population of the United 
S ta tes  living in p r iv a te  househo lds. About o n e - th ird  of the questions 
asked  co n cern  background in fo rm atio n  about the  responden t. T h is  
is  checked ag a in s t  census f ig u re s  to a s c e r ta in  w hether  the p ro p e r
31In o rd e r  to red u ce  t r a v e l  expenses  fo r  the in te rv ie w e rs ,  " . . .  
som e m ethod m ust be adopted to red u ce  the num ber of com m unities  
in which in te rv iew s a r e  taken. . . .  In se lec tin g  the coun ties  w here  
in te rv iew s w ill be taken, the su rv e y  d i r e c to r  can cut down the s a m p ­
ling e r r o r  by ’s t r a t i fy in g ’ the sam p le .  T h is  m eans  s im ply  that he 
w ill a r r a n g e  a l l  the counties of the country  in o rd e r  acco rd ing  to 
so m e c h a ra c te r i s t ic  (such a s  p e rc e n t  of N egro population), divide 
those  o rd e red  counties into s t r a t a  (high, m edium , and low), and 
s e le c t  sam p le  counties at random  w ithin each s t r a tu m , thus m aking 
s u re  that a p ro p e r  p ro p o rtio n  of counties with high, m edium , and 
low N egro populations will com e into the sam p le . " I b id . , p. 539.
32G eorge Gallup, The P u lse  of D em ocracy  (P r in ce to n , N. J .  : 
P r in c e to n  U niversity  P r e s s ,  1946), p. 36.
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p ro p o r t io n  of each  population group is p r e s e n t  in the sam p le .
A ccord ing  to Gallup, the ac c u ra c y  of the su rv ey  depends, in p a r t ,  
upon the s iz e  of the sam p le ,  but tha t in te rv iew s in ex c e ss  of a  p a r ­
t ic u la r  num ber (1, 5 00) do not p rov ide  a  s ign if ican t in c re a s e  in a c c u -  
33ra c y .  A ccord ing ly , G a llu p ’s "[n ja tional su rv ey  r e s u l t s  a r e  b ased
34on in te rv iew s  with a m in im um  of 1, 500 a d u l t s . "
T he p robab le  sam pling  e r r o r  fo r  m o s t p e rc e n ta g e s  given in Gallup
P o ll R e p o r ts  is c la im ed  to be w ithin  four p e rc e n t .  F o r  exam ple , if
a  poll r e p o r t  ind ica tes  60 p e rc e n t  of the  resp o n d en ts  favor a p ro g ra m ,
m o s t of the tim e the p e rce n tag e  that would have been  obtained, had
the whole population ac tua lly  been  in terv iew d, should v a ry  no m o re
than  64 p e rc e n t  to 56 p e rc e n t .  Although Gallup c la im s  his " [s ja m p les
of 1, 500 have a  to le ra n c e  of 3 to 4 p e rce n tag e  points 95 p e rc e n t  of the 
35t im e , " one m u st d iscoun t h is  c la im , b ecau se  th e re  is no known way
36to accoun t so p re c is e ly  fo r  p o ss ib le  e r r o r  in troduced  by s t ra t i f ic a t io n
33v. Appendix C, "The Gallup D esign  of the S am p le” fo r  a 
d e ta iled  d iscu ss io n  on how the Gallup o rgan iza tion  s e le c ts  its  
s a m p le s  fo r  polling.
34Gallup P o li t ica l  Index . R e p o rt  No. 2 (P r in ce to n : Gallup 
In te rn a tio n a l,  Ju ly  1965), p. 88.
35 . ,Ibid.
36 "The e r r o r s  in a sam p le  which has not been  se le c te d  by r a n ­
dom  m ethods cannot be e s t im a te d  in any p r e c i s e  way. " MacCoby 
and Holt, op. c i t .  (1962 edition), p. 489.
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N e v e r th e le s s ,  the poll su rv e y s  a r e  f a r  m o re  a c c u ra te  guages of 
public opinion than a r e  the t ra d it io n a l  m ethods d isc u sse d  below.
L e t te r s  f ro m  C onstituen ts
L e t t e r s  f ro m  cons tituen ts  a r e  one of the trad it io n a l w ays l e g i s la ­
to r s  have guaged the p o li t ica l  opinions of th e ir  co n s ti tu en ts . How­
e v e r ,  p o li t ica l  le t te r  w riting  is  often the p ro d u c t of a  p ro lif ic  m in o r ­
ity, and is likely to be a b ia sed  and u n re lia b le  index of public op in ­
ion. F o r  exam ple , in re sp o n se  to the question , ’’Have you ev e r
w ri t te n  your C o n g re s s m e n ? ” , only 19 p e rc e n t  of those  in te rv iew ed
37gave an a ff irm a tiv e  an sw er  (AIPO, 1965). In a study of the 1964 
e lec tion , Ph ilip  E. C o n v e rse ,  et a l .  concluded tha t ” . . . th e  la rg e  
bu lk  of l e t t e r s  to public o ffic ia ls .  . .c o m e s  f ro m  a tiny f ra c t io n  of the 
population, which tends to w ri te  v e ry  rep e ti t iv e ly .  . . . [0]n ly  about 
15 p e rc e n t  of the adult population  r e p o r t  e v e r  having w ri t ten  fro m  
the g r a s s r o o t s ,  two th ird s  a r e  com posed  by about 3 p e rc e n t  of the 
population.
.T h e re  is  som e ev idence that ex p erien ced  co n g re s sm e n  have 
le a rn ed  not to p lace  too m uch confidence in l e t t e r s  f ro m  c o n s t i tu ­
en ts .  Speaking of the 700 le t t e r s  he re c e iv e s  daily , one S enato r
37 In te rna tiona l Opinion R e s e a rc h  D ocum ents, Vol. I, No. 4, 
p. 75.
oo
P h illip  E. C o n v e rse ,  e t a l. , ’’E le c to ra l  Myth and R eality : 
The 1964 E lec tion , ” The A m e r ic a n  P o li t ic a l  Science Review, 
Vol. LIX, No. 2, June~19C5, pp. 32l7"332-5.
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r e m a rk e d  that, ’’The conventional w isdom  around  the S enate  is tha t
39th e re  a r e  many ex -S e n a to rs  who voted acco rd in g  to th e i r  m a il.  ”
S im ila r ly ,  R e p re se n ta t iv e  R o b e rt  J .  C o rb e tt  of P ennsy lvan ia  b ecam e
convinced tha t le t te r s  m is le a d  le g is la to r s .  A fte r  conducting two
opinion po lls  of the p o lit ica l v iew s of h is  co n s titu en ts  in 1946,
C o rb e t t  told the House, ”1 had been  judging opinion on the b a s is  of
unso lic ited  le t te r s  and te lephone c a l ls  f ro m  co n s ti tu en ts . L ike many
o th e rs ,  I tended to believe  tha t on a m a jo r i ty  of ques tions th a t  those
who w ro te , w ired  o r  te lephone re f le c te d  typ ica l opinion. They
sim p ly  did not do so  in  m o s t c a s e s .  R a th e r ,  they g en e ra lly  r e p r e -
40sen ted  vocal m in o r i t ie s .  ”
Lobbying by Specia l In te re s t  Groups
Special in te re s t  groups cu s to m a r i ly  h i re  lobby is ts  to s o l ic i t  f a v ­
o rab le  vo tes  fro m  co n g re s sm en . C o n g ressm en , in tu rn , r e ly  on 
lobby is ts  to fu rn ish  a rg u m e n ts  fo r  and ag a in s t  pending leg is la tion .
The lobby sy s tem , how ever, has  been  c r i t i c iz e d  b e c u a se  it  g ives 
” . .  . sm a ll  n u m bers  of indiv iduals who a r e  acu te ly  aw are  of th e ir  
exc lusive  needs. . . ” g r e a te r  po lit ica l influence than  th e i r  n u m bers
39F ra n c is  O. Wilcox, C o n g re ss .  The E xecutive, and F o re ig n  
P o licy , (New York: H a rp e r  and Row, 1971), p. 114.
40R o b ert  J .  C o rbe tt ,  c ited  by Galloway, op. c it .  , p. 229.
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41w a rra n t .  The m a jo r i ty  of c i t iz en s ,  who do not ,T. . .be long  to a
s tro n g  o rgan ization  with a  lobby in W ashington [, have]. . . lit t le
42chance of influencing g o v ern m en ta l p o lic ie s .  . . . 11 G eorge  Gallup 
m akes  an even m o re  dam aging  a rg u m en t (p resum ab ly  b ased  on s y s ­
tem a tic  e m p ir ic a l  r e s e a r c h )  by accusing  spokesm en  of labor  o rg a n i­
za tions , f a rm  le a d e r s ,  h eads  of b u s in e ss  a s so c ia t io n s ,  and o ffice rs
of v e t e r a n s ’ o rgan iza tions  of opposing the m a jo r i ty  view of th e ir  m em '
43b e r s  ”on m any o ccas io n s . ”
P r e s s
’’C o n g ressm en . . .u s e  th e ir  constituency  n ew sp a p e rs .  . . fo r  opin-
44ion in fo rm ation . . . ” on a  r e g u la r  b a s is .  L oca l p a p e rs  p rov ide  le g ­
i s l a to r s  with th e ir  only daily  feedback on g o vernm en t policy. C on­
sequently , public o ffic ia ls  tend  to ’’equate p r e s s  rea c tio n .  . .w ith
45public reac t io n . . . . ”
41 E. E. S ch a ttsch n e id e r ,  The S em iso v ere ig n  P eop le  (New York: 
Holt, R in e h a r t  and W inston, 1960), p. 35.
42D erw in  C a rtw rig h t,  ’’Public  Opinion P o lls  and D em o cra tic  
L ea d e rsh ip , ” Public Opinion and P ropaganda, D aniel Katz, e t al. 
(eds. ) (New York: H enry Holt and Com pany, 1960), p. 227.
43G eorge Gallup, ’’Q uestions and A nsw ers  on Selected  A spec ts  of 
Polling , ” Voice of the P e o p le , op. c i t . , p. 548.
44 ,B e rn a rd  C. Cohen, The P r e s s  and F o re ig n  Policy  (P rince ton :
P r in c e to n  U nivers ity  Press^~T96H), p.~T31L
45 D elm er  D. Dunn, Public O ffic ia ls  and the P r e s s  (Reading, 
M ass .  : A ddison-W esley , 1969), p. 167.
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It would be a  m is ta k e ,  how ever, to equate  p r e s s  opinion with pub ­
lic  opinion, fo r  no o ther  re a so n  than  n ew sp ap ers  a r e  b ia sed  in favo r 
of the p re ju d ic e s  of th e i r  e d i to rs  and p u b l ish e rs  who m ay o r  m ay not 
a g re e  with the m a jo r i ty  se n tim en t of s u b s c r ib e r s .  F o r  exam ple , an  
a d m in is t ra t io n  m ight r e le a s e  favo rab le  p r e s s  s to r ie s  to  se le c te d  
lo ca l n ew sp ap ers  in o rd e r  to c r e a te  an a u r a  of favo rab le  national 
public opinion fo r  i ts  p o lic ie s  fo r  the benefit of m e m b e rs  of C o n g re s s .  
Such m anipula tion  of the  p r e s s  p robab ly  h as  b een  p ra c t ic e d  s ince  the 
days of P re s id e n t  M adison  when an  E ng lish  v is i to r  r e p o r te d ,
It is  no s e c r e t  tha t som e ab le  p e rso n a g e  a t  W ashington 
w r i te s  l e t te r s  on the p o li t ic s  and sends them  to the  r e m o te s t  
c o rn e r s  of the Union, to ap p ea r  in th e ir  n ew sp ap ers ;  a f te r  
which, they a r e  co llec ted  in the a d m in is t ra t io n  n ew sp ap er  
a t  W ashington a s  te s te m o n ie s  of public opinion in the r e s p e c ­
tive  d i s t r ic t s  w here  they ap p e a r .  “*6
On the o th e r  hand, n ew sp ap ers  p robab ly  should  be given c re d i t  
fo r  helping to shape public opinion, fo r  opinion is  fo rm ed  in p a r t  by 
the in fo rm atio n  that a p p e a rs  in the p r e s s .  B u t th is  is a  d if fe ren t 
question  f ro m  w hether p r e s s  opinion m ay be in te rp re te d  s im u l ta n e ­
ously a s  re f le c t in g  public opinion.
46H a r r ie t  M artineau , Society in A m e r ic a ,  Vol. 3 (New York: 
S an d ers  and Otley, 1837), pp. 147-8, c ited  by D o ris  A. B ra b e r ,  
Public  Opinion, The P re s id e n t ,  and F o re ig n  P o licy  (New York: 
Holt, R in e h a r t  and Winston, 1968), p. 218.
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LIMITATIONS
T his  sec tio n  c o n s id e rs  the following five l im ita tio n s  encountered  
in exam ining  the question  a t hand: (a) defic iency  of opinion po lls  a s  
m e a s u re s  of public opinion, (b) lack  of co m p reh en s iv e  opinion poll 
r e p o r t  da ta  betw een 1947 and 1969, (c) lack  of da ta  on public is s u e s  
b e fo re  1947, (d) lack  of ran d o m n e ss  in p a ir in g  public i s s u e s  with 
public opinion poll r e p o r t s ,  and (e) lack  of in fo rm ation  on behind the 
s c e n e s  po lit ica l p r e s s u r e s  affecting  public i s s u e s .  Although li t t le  
can  be  done to c o r r e c t  these  d e f ic ien c ies ,  the r e a d e r  should a t  le a s t  
be  m ade aw are  of th e ir  ex is ten ce .
D efic ienc ies  of Public  Opinion P o lls
Public  opinion has four d im ensions  which p r e s e n t  d ifficu lties  in 
m e a su re m e n t  by polling: (a) m agnitude, (b) in tensity , (c) s a lien c e , 
and (d) in form ation .
47M agnitude . M agnitude is the a g g reg a te  m e a s u re  of d ire c t io n  o r
of an individual re sp o n d e n t 's  ap p ro v a l o r  d isa p p ro v a l of an  is su e . 
M agnitude is  e x p re s se d  a s  a p e rce n tag e  m e a s u re m e n t  in opinion poll 
r e p o r t s  (e. g. , 60% "Y es") and is the public opinion po ll m e a s u r e ­
m en t m o s t  com m only used  by p o li t ica l  an a ly s ts .  M agnitude m ay be 
affected  by changes in e i th e r  the p h ra s in g , o r  the p la cem en t of poll
47v. R o b e rt  E . Lane and David O. S e a r s ,  " D ire c t io n ,"  Public  
Opinion (Englewood C liffs , N. J .  : P re n t ic e - I Ia l l ,  1964), pp. 6-9 .
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ques tions  and a n sw e rs .  M agnitude can a lso  be  affected  by w hether
a n s w e rs  a r e  m ade by s e c r e t  ba llo t o r  not.
E x p e r ie n c e  has shown tha t v a r ia t io n  in the p h ra s in g  of in te rv iew
questions  about the sam e su b jec t m ay e l ic i t  s ign ifican tly  d if fe ren t 
48re s p o n s e s .  T h is  is b ecau se  ” . . .a n  opinion is  an  ’a n s w e r ’ tha t is  
given to a ’q u es t io n ’ in a given situa tion . When the question  o r  s i t u a ­
tion  v a r ie s  som ew hat, a som ew hat d if fe ren t re sp o n se  can be expected .
D iffe re n ces  in the w ording of questions m ay g iven d if fe ren t 
49re s u l t s .  . . . ” F o r  exam ple , the em otive p h ra s e  ”to m a in ta in  w orld  
p e a c e ” may have accounted  fo r the 32 p e rc e n t  s p re a d  betw een the d if ­
f e re n c e s  of 38 p e rc e n t  ’’Jo in ” and 70 p e rc e n t  ” Y es” in the two 
answ7e r s  below.
A fter  the w ar , would you like to se e  the United S ta tes  
jo in  som e kind of w orld  o rgan iza tion , o r  would you like to 
s e e  us s tay  ou t?  (NORC, 1/1945)
Jo in  64%
Stay out 26%
Undecided 10%
(D ifference 38% ’’J o in ” )
48 Hadley C a n tr i l  has identified  and d is c u s se d  eleven  p ro b lem s  
a s so c ia te d  with the w ording of poll qu es tio n s , and a r r a n g e s  them  
in the following th re e  groupings: (a) effect of context, (b) a l t e r ­
na tives  p re se n ted ,  and (c) dev iations f ro m  ’’o b jec tiv e” wording, 
v. Handley C a n tr i l ,  Gauging Public  Opinion (P rince ton : P r in c e to n  
U n ivers ity  P r e s s ,  1944), pp. 23-50.
49 Lane and S e a rs ,  op. c it, p. 13.
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Do you think the United S ta te s  should join a  w orld  o rg a n i­





(D ifference 70% "Y e s” )
E x p e r ien c e  a lso  has  shown tha t v a r ia t io n  in the p h ra s in g  of i n t e r ­
v iew  a n s w e rs  about the sa m e  su b jec t  m ay e l ic i t  s ign if ican tly  d i f f e r ­
en t r e s p o n s e s .  D ichotom ous a n s w e rs  (e .g .  , "Y es"  or  "No") m ay d i s ­
to r t  t ru e  opinion, fo r  the re sp o n d en t m ay be fo rced  to s u p p re s s  any 
qualif ica tions  he m ight o th e rw ise  vo ice  in m u lt ip le -ch o ice ,  o r  open- 
ended ques tions . F o r  exam ple , the in troduction  of the "About the 
s a m e "  ca teg o ry  may have accounted  fo r  the 9 p e rc e n t  s p re a d  betw een 
the  d if fe ren ce  of 62 p e rc e n t  "Y es"  and 53 p e rc e n t  "M o re"  in the two 
ques tions  below.
Do you think labo r unions should be  reg u la ted  to a g r e a t e r  
ex ten t by the F e d e ra l  G o v ern m en t?
Y es 62% No 20% D on 't know 18%
D uring  the next four y e a r s ,  do you th ink th e re  should 
be  m o re  regu la tion  or le s s  reg u la tio n  of labo r  unions, by 
the F e d e ra l  G overnm ent, than a t p r e s e n t?
M ore  5 3% About the sa m e  12% L e s s  16% No Opinion 19%
(AIPO 5 /3 /4 0 )5 l
A no ther difficulty  is tha t a  d ichotom ous an sw e r  about a  g e n e ra l  
is su e  m ay be a m is lead ing  index of public opinion about a specific
50 51C a rtw r ig h t ,  op. c it. , p. 230. C a n tr i l ,  op. c i t .  , p. 33.
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a s p e c t  of tha t m o re  g en e ra l  is su e .  F o r  exam ple , a f te r  W orld  W ar II,
,T[t]hosewho w ere  im p re s s e d  by the new e r a  of w orld  coopera tion
h e ra ld e d  by the po lls  w ere  rude ly  awakened when the po lls  got around
to  the B r i t i s h  loan. Although roughly  tw o - th ird s  of the population
favo r A m e r ic an  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  a  w orld  o rgan iza tion , only o n e - th ird
52approve of a  loan to B r i ta in .  ” T ha t is  to say , although the m a jo r ­
ity w as in favor of in te rn a tio n a l coopera tion  g en e ra lly ,  the m a jo r i ty  
w as opposed to a spec if ic  a s p e c t  of such  coopera tion , i. e. , the loan 
to B r i ta in .
On the o the r  hand, m u lt ip le -c h o ice ,  and esp ec ia lly  open-ended
a n s w e rs  allow the re sp o n d en t to e x p re s s  h im se lf  with g r e a te r  p r e c i -  
53sion. They a lso  aid the in te r p r e t e r  of poll r e p o r t s  by p reven ting  
h im  fro m  inadverten tly  confusing app ro v a l of one policy fo r  d is a p p ro ­
va l of p a r t ic u la r  a sp e c ts  of a conflic ting  policy. F o r  exam ple , TT[i]n 
June 1941, when asked  w hether they favo red  the United S ta te s  e n t e r ­
ing the w ar  ag a in s t  G erm any and Ita ly  o r  s tay ing  out, 29 p e rc e n t  of 
one sam p le  of the public sa id  that they favo red  A m e r ic a n  en try .  But 
when a s im i la r  sam p le  w as a sked  th is  question  with s e v e r a l  o ther
52C a rtw rig h t,  op. loc.
53 ’’When open-ended questions a r e  used , people e x p re s s  th e ir  
v iew s to g e th er  with any r e s e rv a t io n s  or con tingencies  which a r e  p r e s ­
en t in th e ir  m inds: when they a r e  p re se n te d  with a polling  question  
and asked  to choose one of the a l te rn a t iv e s ,  they m ay not have the 
opportunity  to e x p re ss  th e ir  r e s e rv a t io n s ,  u n less  spec if ic  additional 
questions a r e  asked  to b ring  them  out. M MacCoby and Holt, op. c it. , 
pp. 540-541.
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options, such  a s  supplying B r i ta in  with w ar m a te r ia l s ,  only 6 p e rc e n t
54favored  en te r ing  the w ar ag a in s t  G erm any  and Italy . (AIPO, 5 /1941)”
One difficulty in using m u lt ip le -ch o ice  a n s w e rs ,  how ever, is  that
b ia s  m ay be in troduced  by lis ting  n u m e rica lly  m o re  a l te rn a t iv e s  in
favo r  of one s ide  than ano ther , or by p re se n tin g  m o d e ra te  a l te rn a t iv e s
55fo r  one s ide and an ex tre m e  a l te rn a t iv e  fo r  the o ther.
E x p erien ce  has shown tha t v a r ia t io n  in the p la cem en t or  sequence 
of c lo se ly  re la te d  ques tions  m ay a l t e r  the m agnitude of the r e sp o n d e n t’s 
a n s w e rs .  T h is  is b ecau se  an in it ia l  an sw er  m ay com m it the r e s p o n ­
dent to a position  which logically  r e s t r i c t s  h is  choice of a n s w e rs  to 
subsequen t questions. F o r  exam ple , the 34 p e rc e n t  sp re a d  betw een 
the d if fe ren ces  of 10 p e rc e n t  ”No” and 44 p e rc e n t  ”No” in the fo llow ­
ing question  m ay be a t tr ib u ted  to p lacem en t. When asked  in itia lly , 
the question  p roduced  a d if fe ren ce  of 10 p e rc e n t  ”No. ”
At p re s e n t  m en betw een the ages  of 21 and 35 a r e  being 
d ra f ted . Should the law be changed so  tha t only m en betw een 
the ages of 18 and 23 would be included in the d r a f t?
But the above question  produced  a  d if fe re n ce s  of 44 p e rc e n t  ”No”
when it app ea red  on ano ther  b a llo t a f te r  the following question .
At p re s e n t ,  m en betw een the ages  of 18 and 21 a r e  not 
d raf ted . Do you think the law should be changed so  that 
m en betw een the ages  of 18 and 21 would be included in the 
d ra f t ,  along with those f ro m  21 to 3 5 ? ^
54 55Lane and S e a r s ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 13. C a n tr i l ,  op. c i t . ,  pp. 31-32.
^ I b i d .  , p. 29.
34
E x p e r ien c e  a lso  has shown th a t  v a r ia t io n  in  the p la cem en t of 
m u lt ip le -c h o ic e  a n s w e rs  m ay a ffec t the m agnitude of r e sp o n d e n t 's  
a n s w e rs .  T h is  m ay be b ecau se  when ". . . a  question  is  a  f a ir ly  c o m ­
p lica ted  one, th e re  is  a  tendency fo r  the re sponden t to s e le c t  the la s t ,  
m o re  e a s i ly  r e m e m b e re d ,  a l t e r n a t i v e . " F o r  exam ple , of the  two 
a n s w e rs  to the sa m e  question  below, which a p p e a rs  la s t  co n s is ten tly  
p o lls  the  h ig h e r  m agnitude of opinion.
W hich of th e se  two s ta te m e n ts  do you th ink is  c lo s e r  to 
the  t r u th ?
1. E ngland is  now fighting m ain ly  to  keep  h e r  pow er 
and w ealth .
2. England is now fighting m ain ly  to p r e s e r v e  d e m o c ­
ra c y  a g a in s t  the sp re a d  of d ic ta to rsh ip .  ^
E x p e r ie n c e  has  shown tha t the m agnitude of opinion m ay change 
s ign if ican tly  if the po ll b a l lo t is  f i l led  out in s e c r e t ,  and not by a  
po ll in te rv ie w e r ,  a s  is  n o rm a lly  dene. F o r  exam ple , the s e c r e t  
b a l lo t  m ay have accounted  fo r  the 20 p e rc e n t  sp re a d  betw een  the d if ­
f e re n c e s  of 29 p e rc e n t  "Y es"  and 49 p e rc e n t  "Y e s” in the a n s w e rs  to 
the sa m e  question  below.
Do you think Jew s have too m uch  pow er and influence in 
th is  co u n try ?
Yes No (D ifference)
In te rv iew  
S e c re t  B a llo t
56% 27% 29%
66% 17% 49%
57I b id . , p. 35.
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Hadley C a n tr i l  su g g e s ts  th a t som e resp o n d e n ts  a l t e r  th e i r  e x p r e s ­
s ions  of opinion when they su sp e c t  tha t a poll in te rv ie w e r  m ight d i s ­
a g re e  with th e ir  unspoken opinion. C a n tr i l  o b se rv e s  that ” [t]hese 
d if fe re n ce s  c a s t  som e doubt on the valid ity  of the r e s u l t s  obtained
by the in te rv iew  m ethod when the subj^ 3t fee ls  tha t h is  an sw er ,  if
58known, would affect h is p re s t ig e .  ’’
D esp ite  the d e f ic ien c ies  of p o lls  in m e a su r in g  m agnitude, po lls  
s t i l l  a p p e a r  to be le s s  m is lead in g  than the t rad it io n a l  m e a s u re s  of 
opinion fo r  d isco v er in g  the m a jo r i ty  opinion. W hile the t rad it io n a l  
m e a s u re s  above w ere  shown to be m is lead in g  on a rou tine  b a s is  
( e . g . , the S e n a to r ’s  a s s e r t io n  th a t th e re  a r e  m any e x -S en a to rs  who 
voted acco rd in g  to th e ir  m ail) ,  none of the exam ples  of defic ien t 
po lls  c ited  left any doubt a s  to what was the m a jo r i ty  opinion. M o re ­
ov er , the above exam ples  of c lo s e ly - r e la te d  po lls  w ere  se lec ted  
b e c au se  they r e p re s e n te d  e x t re m e s  in m agnitude v a r ie n c e ,  w h e re a s  
m o s t  o the r  c lo s e ly - r e la te d  p o lls  have le s s  v a r ie n c e  in m agnitude.
In tensity . In tensity  is  the d e g re e  of fee ling  which a responden t
59has about h is  poll an sw e r .  In tensity  is  se ldom  m e a su re d  fo r  poll
^ ° I b id . , p. 79 
59v. Ib id . ,  pp. 51-65; Dane and S e a r s ,  op. c it .  * p. 9; and 
Floyd H. A llport, "T ow ard  a S cience  of Public  Opinion, ’’ Public 
Opinion and P ropaganda, Daniel K atz, e t  a l .  ( e d s . ), (New York: 
H enry  Holt and Com pany, 1954), p. 60.
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a n s w e rs ,  but when it is  the re sponden t is  u sua lly  asked  to ind icate  
"S trong  A pproval, ’’ ’’Mild A pproval, ’’ "No Opinion, " "M ild D is ­
approval, " o r  "S trong A pproval. " Although in tensity  is  not usually  
m e a su re d ,  it is of g re a t  in te r e s t  to  the p o li t ica l  ana lys t.  M e a su re s  
of in tensity  on po li t ica l  i s s u e s  help  h im  to guage the w illingness  of 
people to su p p o rt  a  p a r t ic u la r  policy . Although the m agnitude index 
of opinion ind ica tes  that a  m a jo r i ty  fa v o rs  a  p a r t ic u la r  b ill ,  an  
in tensity  index m ight r e v e a l  that the app rova l is  only a token one,
and tha t not enough people a r e  willing to p a r t ic ip a te  in p o li t ica l  a c t iv -
6 0ity in o rd e r  to en su re  the su c c e s s  of the b ill .  Floyd H. A llp o r t  
no tes ,
F o r  exam ple , a re c e n t  nationwide sam p le  poll on b ir th  co n ­
t r o l  has rev ea led  tha t a su b s ta n tia l  m a jo r i ty  of the people a r e  
in favor of it. Yet leg is la tiv e  ac tion  supporting  it has not been  
g en e ra lly  fo rthcom ing , p robab ly  b ecau se  the d e s i r e  fo r  i t  was 
not suffic ien tly  in tense . That is .  . .n o t  fe l t  acu te ly  enough by 
the m e m b e rs  of th is  m a jo r i ty  to p r e s s  fo r  o rgan ized  ac tion  in 
opposition to a m in o rity  who have a v e ry  in tense  feeling  upon 
the o ther  s ide . °-^
Salience . Salience is the d e g re e  of im p o r ta n ce  that a  responden t
62a s s o c ia te s  with top ics under question . M e a su re s  of sa l ien ce  a r e
60 ". . . [O verw helm ing  support of a p ro p o sa l ,  in the se n se  tha t a 
la rg e  num ber of people s e le c t  it, does not n e c e s s a r i ly  m ean  a t  a ll  
that the people is in tense ly  anxious to have the p ro p o sa l  adopted. It 
m ay m ean  that m ost people know lit t le  o r  nothing about the d e ta ils  of 
the p ro p o sa l  but see  it as being re la te d  to so m e value which the}^ do 
accep t.  ’’ C a r tw rig h t,  op. c it .  , p. 229.
^  A llport, loc. c it. ^ L a n e  and S e a r s ,  op. c it. , p. 15.
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se ld o m  m ade, bu t when they a r e  the re sponden t is usually  asked  an 
open-ended  question  such as , ’’W hat kinds of things do you w o rry  
about the m o s t ? ”
Salience  is m o st relief--ly m e a s u re d  d ire c t ly ,  and not a s  a fu n c ­
tion  of m agnitude and in tensity . F o r  exam ple , suppose the m agnitude 
and in tensity  indices about an is su e  indicate  an  even sp li t  betw een 
”M ild A pprova l” and ’’Mild D isapprova l. ” A po li t ica l  a n a ly s t  would 
be unwise to think of the is su e  a s  not sa lien t ,  b ecau se  the choice 
betw een  the two a n s w e rs  m ay have been  d ifficu lt to m ake, and 
although people m ay not fee l in tense ly  about e i th e r  a n sw e r ,  they 
m ay tend to choose evenly betw een  them . H ow ever, the people may 
s t i l l  co n s id e r  the issu e  a s  v e ry  im p o rtan t,  and the p ru d en t p o li t ica l  
a n a ly s t  would investiga te  fu r th e r .
In fo rm ation . In fo rm ation  is the knowledge n e c e s s a ry  to e x p re s s  
an  ’’in fo rm ed , ” a s  opposed to an  ’’u n in fo rm ed ” opinion. One c r i t ­
ic ism  of opinion po lls  is that they in d isc r im in a te ly  m ix the two kinds 
of opinion, and hence po ll r e p o r t s  a r e  unworthy of s e r io u s  c o n s id e r a ­
tion  by p o lit ica l an a ly s ts .  D orw in  C a r tw r ig h t  a rg u e s  tha t, " . . .  it is  
doubtful that the ’a v e r a g e ’ m an would have su ffic ien t knowledge of 
m o s t  governm en ta l p ro b lem s  to be able  to m ake in te lligen t d ec is io n s
0 0
without sp e c ia l  in fo rm ation  and study. ” C a r tw r ig h t  su p p o rts  his
^ C a r t w r ig h t ,  op. c it. , p. 228.
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64p o s it io n  with exam ples  of popu la r  ignorance  of public a f f a i r s .
F r a n c i s  O. W ilcox a lso  e x p re s s e s  m isg iv ings  when he w r i te s ,
65. .  [pjublic opinion can be w rong — o r  a t  le a s t  illog ica l. ”
On the o ther  hand, th e re  is a  deductive a rg u m e n t that un in form ed
opinion is  a s  po lit ica lly  im p o rtan t as  in fo rm ed  opinion, and e m p ir ic a l
ev idence  that the uninform ed s h a re  the sa m e  opinion a s  the w e ll-
in fo rm ed . E. E . S ch a ttsch n e id e r  a rg u e s  tha t in a  d e m o cracy  a l l
opin ions count a s  equally  a s  do v o te s . He w r i te s ,
One im plica tion  of public opinion s tu d ie s  ought to be 
r e s i s te d  by a l l  f r ien d s  of f re ed o m  and d em o cracy ; the im p l i ­
ca tion  th a t  dem o cracy  is  a  fa i lu re  b ecau se  the people a r e  too 
ig no ran t to an sw er  in te lligen tly  a l l  the questions asked  by the 
p o l l s te r s .
T h e re  is no escap e  f ro m  the p ro b lem  of ignorance , 
b ec au se  nobody knows enough to run  the governm ent.
P re s id e n t s ,  s e n a to r s ,  g o v e rn o rs ,  judges, p ro fe s s o r s ,  
d o c to rs  of philosophy, e d i to rs  and the like a r e  only a 
l i t t le  le s s  ignoran t than the r e s t  of u s . 66
Hadley C a n tr i l  po in ts  out tha t the p r a c t ic a l  e ffec ts  of being  w e l l -  
in fo rm ed  a s  opposed to un in form ed  a r e  not a s  g re a t  a s  one m ight 
suppose . A fte r  com paring  w e ll- in fo rm e d  opinion w ith  uninform ed
64F o r  exam ple , . . QJn May 1945, Gallup r e p o r ts  th a t  only 41 
p e r c e n t  of the adult population knew what the T. V. A. is . . . . n 
C a r tw r ig h t ,  loc. c it.
65 F ra n c is  O. Wilcox, C o n g re s s ,  The E xecu tive  and F o re ig n  
P o licy  (New York: H a rp e r  and Row, 1971), p. 116.
66E lm e r  E. S ch a ttsch n e id e r ,  The S em iso v e re ig n  Peop le  (New 
Y ork: Holt, R in eh a r t  and Winston, 1960), pp. 135-7.
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opinion, he concludes,
No d if fe re n ce s  of opinion occu r  betw een p e rso n s  g en e ra lly  
w e ll- in fo rm ed  and those genera lly  uninform ed when both g roups 
a r e  equally  lacking in re l ia b le  s ta n d a rd s  of judgm ent, w here  
both g roups  have in com m on e sse n tia l ly  the sam e  s ta n d a rd s  of 
judgm ent, o r  w here w ish fu llf illm ent and p e r s o n a l  d e s i r e  cut 
a c r o s s  in fo rm ation  lines . ^
L ack  of C om prehensive  Po ll D ata
A second  l im ita tion  is  the ava ilab ili ty  of po ll da ta  and m atch ing
public is s u e s ,  1947-1969. Only 88 of 367 poll ques tions m atched
with the 881 public is s u e s  co llec ted . T h is  was b ec au se  m o s t  of the
poll questions did not m e e t  the re q u ire m e n t  of being ask ed  w ithin
one y e a r  of the tim e of the public is su e ,  and having a  po ll r e p o r t
d if fe ren ce  in ex c e ss  of 8 p e rc e n t .  The one y e a r  l im it  is  an  a r b i -
88t r a r y  a t tem p t to co n tro l  the e ffec ts  of changing public opinion,
69and o th e r  v a r ia b le s  in the r e s e a r c h  design , and a t  the sa m e  tim e 
e n su re  a  suffic ien t num ber of p o l l - is s u e  p a i r s  of m eaningful s t a t ­
is t ic a l  an a ly s is .  The 8 p e rc e n t  d if fe ren ce  l im it  was a r r iv e d  a t  by 
a s su m in g  the h ighest p robab le  sam pling  e r r o r  of + 4 p e rc e n t  a s  the 
s m a l le s t  d if fe ren ce  m a rg in  which has s ta t i s t ic a l  s ign ificance  a t  the
67C a n tr i l ,  op. c it. , p. 219.
68v. Lane and S e a rs ,  "S tab ility , " op. c i t . ,  p. 10.
69v. Donald T. C am pbell and Ju lian  C. Stanley, " F a c to r  J e o p a r ­
d iz ing  In te rn a l  and E x te rn a l V alidity , " E x p e r im e n ta l  and G u as i-  
E x p e r im e n ta l D esigns fo r  R e s e a rc h , (Chicago: Rand M cNally and 
Com pany, 1963), pp. 5-6 .
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. 95 level. No a t tem p t w as m ade to a l lo ca te  the "No Opinion" 
r e s p o n s e s  in poll r e p o r t s ,  and tha t p e rce n tag e  w as d is c a rd e d .  P o ll  
r e p o r t s  with m o re  than 20 p e rc e n t  "No Opinion" w ere  not u sed  s in ce  
they su g g es ted  opinion had not c ry s ta l iz e d .
S o m etim es  s e v e ra l  d if fe ren t su rv e y s  a r e  published  concern ing  
the sa m e  is s u e  during  the y e a r .  T h is  p rov ided  a  check  on the co n ­
s is te n c y  of the r e p o r t s .  In such  c a s e s ,  the a r i th m e t ic  m e an  of the 
re le v a n t  po ll r e p o r ts  w as used , in s tead  of a r b i t r a r i ly  p ick ing  one 
po ll r e p o r t  as  re p re s e n ta t iv e .
L ack  of D ata  on Public I s su e s
A th ird  lim ita tion  is tha t in fo rm ation  about C o n g re s s io n a l-  
P re s id e n t ia l  public i s s u e s  p r io r  to 1947 is  not re ad i ly  av a ilab le .
The re le v a n t  in fo rm ation  h as  b een  com piled  only s in c e  then in  the 
C o n g re s s io nal Q u a r te r ly  A lm anac.
L ac k  of R andom ness in Public I s su e  and P o ll  D iffe rence  P a i r s  
A fo u rth  l im ita tio n  is  th a t the sam p le  of C o n g re s s io n a l -  
P re s id e n t ia l  public i s s u e s  and po ll d if fe ren ce  p a i r s  is not a  ran d o m  
se lec tio n . The b a s is  of se le c t io n  of the i s s u e s  was the ava ilab ili ty  
of re le v a n t  poll data .
L ack  of Inform a t io n on Behind the Scenes
A fifth  l im ita tion  is tha t the sam p le  of C o n g r e s s io n a l -P re s id e n t ia l  
public is s u e s  used  fo r  th is  study does not n e c e s s a r i ly  include
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70im portan t behind the s c e n e s  po li t ica l  p r e s s u r e s  and m aneuvering . 
'Only the issu es  which ap p e a r  in the C ongressional Q u a r te r ly  
Almanac have been co n s id e red .
HYPOTHESIS
The p r im ary  question  asked  by th is  study is  whether C o n g ress  o r
71P re s id e n ts  ag ree  m o re  often with the public w il l .
70 . .  . (N)o one can e v e r  know how many proposa ls  the executive 
r e f ra in s  from  making b ecause  of expected congressional r e s is ta n c e  
The ten thousand. . . d r a s t ic  p ro p o sa ls  cooking away in ten thousand 
b u reau c ra t ic  heads in W ashington tha t the a t tac k e rs  (of trad ition) do 
not dare  even to embody in a b ill ,  do not dare  even to mention, 
because  the p ro p o sa ls  would not s tand  a  C hinam an’s ch an ce ’. 
W illm oore Kendall, The C o n serv a tiv e  Affirm ation (Chicago: Henry 
R egnery , 1963), pp. 30-31 a s  c i ted  by Davidson, op, c i t . , p. 19.
71 The polic ies on which C o n g ress  and P re s id en ts  a r e  in a g r e e ­
m ent have been om itted  fo r  they con tribu te  no insight a s  to the a b i l ­
ity of C ongress  to a g re e  with public opinion in com parison  to P r e s i ­
dents . Only the com parison  of d isa g re e m e n ts  with the re sp e c tiv e  
poll data can fu rn ish  the an sw e r  to the question  of re la tive  a g r e e ­
m ent. Table 1, below, p re s e n ts  the poss ib le  re la tionsh ips .
TABLE 1. POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS OF CONGRESS, PR E SI­
DENTS, AND THE MAJORITY OF PUBLIC OPINION






A g re e m e n ts  (=) and D isag reem en ts  (?0
C o n g re s s  = P re s id e n ts  
C o n g re s s  = P re s id e n ts  
C o n g re s s  P re s id e n ts  
P re s id e n ts  £ C o n g ress  
C o n g re s s  f  P re s id e n ts
Opinion M ajority  
Opinion M ajority  
Opinion M ajority  
Opinion M ajority  
Opinion M ajority
R elationsh ip  Nos. 1, 2, and 5 ( i .e .  , ”No Opinion” being a th ird  
position) a re  not re lev an t to th is study. The study concerns itself  
with Relationship  Nos. 3 and 4 a s  they a r e  the only ones for which
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A ccord ing ly , the hypo thesis  is  tha t C o n g re ss  and P re s id e n t s  a g re e
72equally  a s  often with the d if fe ren ce  of public opinion p o lls .  If 
r e je c te d ,  the hypothesis  w ill ind ica te  w hether C o n g re s s ,  o r  P r e s i ­
den ts  a g re e  m o re  often with the m a jo r i ty  of national public  opinion.
SUMMARY
C h a p te r  n  has co n s id e red  how the question  can  be  m ade am enab le  
fo r  sy s te m a tic  e m p ir ic a l  m e a su re m e n t .  Included w e re  the: (a) w o rk ­
ing defin itions, (b) a s su m p tio n  th a t  p o lls  a r e  the m o s t  r e l ia b le  index 
of public opinion av a ilab le , and (c) l im ita tio n s  both  due to  the  in h e r ­
en t sh o r tco m in g s  of po lls  and the  lack  of c e r ta in  da ta , and (d) d ev e l­
opm ent of the hypo thesis . In the next c h a p te r ,  the m ethods w ill be 
d isc u sse d  fo r  solving the question  of w hether  C o n g re ss  o r  P re s id e n ts  
a g re e  m o re  often with the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion.
the r e la t iv e  a b i l i t ie s  of C o n g re s s  and P re s id e n ts  to re sp o n d  to pub ­
lic  opinion can  be  m e a su re d .
72 F o rm a lly  s ta ted , the hypo thesis  is th a t the  p o s it io n s  of C o n g re ss  
and P re s id e n ts  a r e  independent of national public opinion p o ll  d i f fe r ­
en ces .
C H A PTE R  IH 
METHODS
In the p rece d in g  ch a p te r ,  the ques tion  of w hether  C o n g re s s  o r  
P re s id e n t s  a g re e  m o re  often with the  m a jo r i ty  of public  opinion w as 
o p e ra t io n a lized  in o r d e r  to  m ake it  am enab le  to  s y s te m a t ic  e m p i r i ­
c a l  a n a ly s is .  C hap ter  HI c o n s id e r s  the  m ethods  u sed  f o r  in v e s t ig a t­
ing the  question . The c h a p te r  is  d iv ided into fo u r  s e c t io n s ,  in c lu d ­
ing (a) r e s e a r c h  design , (b) s o u rc e s  of da ta , (c) p re d ic t io n s ,  and 
(d) su m m a ry .
RESEARCH DESIGN
The f i r s t  s te p  in te s t in g  the  hypo thesis  w as to com pile  a  l i s t  of 
881 c o n g re s s io n a l -p re s id e n t ia l  d is a g re e m e n ts  be tw een  1947 and 1969. 
T hen  a  co llec tion  w as m ade of 367 re le v a n t  na tional opinion po ll 
r e p o r t s  of the sa m e  tim e  p e r io d .  The th i rd  s te p  w as  to  m a tch  the  
88 po ll r e p o r t s  and c o n g re s s io n a l -p re s id e n t ia l  d is a g re e m e n ts  th a t 
o c c u r r e d  w ithin  one y e a r  of each  o th e r .  F in a lly , a  tabu la tion  w as  
m ad e  of the n u m b er  of po ll d if fe re n ce s  w hich a g re e d  with the p o s i ­
t io n s  of C o n g re s s ,  and of the n u m b er  of p o ll  d if fe re n c e s  w hich  a g re e d  
w ith  the posit ion  of P re s id e n ts .  T h is  d a ta  is  p re s e n te d  in s u m m a ry




Data on the positions of C ongress  is drawn p r im a r i ly  fro m  the 
" P re s id e n tia l  B oxscore , " C ongressional Q uarte r ly  Almanac (CQ), 
1947-1969. T here  one finds congress ional positions on p re s id e n tia l  
re q u e s ts  lis ted  as  favorable or unfavorable action as  taken by House 
com m ittee , House floor, Senate com m ittee , and Senate floor. F a v ­
orable  action includes passage  of a req u es t,  while unfavorable action 
includes e ither  voting down a req u es t  or taking no action on it (e .g . , 
holding hearings in com m ittee). "Since C ongress  does not always 
vote ’y e s ’ or ’no ’ on a proposal, CQ evaluates leg isla tive  action to
de term ine  whether com prom ises  amount to approval o r  re jec tio n  of
73the P re s id e n t ’s r e q u e s ts ."  In addition, im portan t b ills  orig inating 
in C ongress  a re  taken from  "Key Votes, " C ongressional Q uarte r ly  
Alm anac, 1947-1969.
Data on the positions of P re s id e n ts  a r e  drawn p r im a r i ly  fro m  the 
"P re s id e n tia l  B o x s c o re ,"  C ongressional Q uarte r ly  Alm anac, 1947- 
1969. The B oxscore lim its  itse lf  to specific  req u es t  fo r  leg isla tion  
made by a P res iden t.  It om its p roposa ls  by ad m in is tra tio n  officials; 
p res iden tia lly  endorsed , but not requested  m e a su re s ;  p res id en tia l  
suggestions not specifica lly  reques ted ; nom inations; and routine
73C ongressional Q uarte r ly  Serv ice , C ongressional Q uarte r ly  
Alm anac, vol. XXIII, 1967 (Washington, D. C. : C ongress iona l 
Q uarte r ly , Inc. , 1968), p. 166.
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ap p ro p ria tio n  re q u e s ts .  In addition, p re s id e n t ia l  ve toes  a r e  
obtained by r e f e r r in g  to "V e to es” in the Index, C o n g ress io n a l 
Q u ar te r ly  A lm anac. 1947-1969.
D ata on the pos it ions  of the m a jo ri ty  of public opinion a r e  draw n 
f ro m  the national opinion poll r e p o r ts  of the A m e ric a n  Ins titu te  of 
Pub lic  Opinion; the N ational Opinion R e s e a rc h  C e n te r ;  Louis  H a r r i s  
and A sso c ia te s ;  and the Opinion R e s e a rc h  C o rp o ra tio n , P rin ce to n ;
1947-1969. The poll r e p o r t s  m ay be found in the Gallup Opinion
75 76Index; Gallup Poll R e p o r ts ,  1935-1968; The Pub lic  Opinion
77 78Q u a r te r ly ; Opinion R e s e a rc h  C o rpo ra tion , P r in c e to n , R e p o r t ;
74v. Appendix D, "How the B o x sco re  W orks. "
7 5
A m eric an  In s ti tu te  of Public  Opinion, Gallup Opinion Index: 
R ep o rt  (P rince ton , N. J .  : Gallup In te rna tiona l,  1965-1969).
76Idem, Gallup P o ll R e p o r ts .  1935-1968 (P r in ce to n , N . J . :
AIPO, 1969): =
77A m e ric a n  A sso c ia tio n  fo r  Public  Opinion R e s e a rc h ,  The Public  
Opinion Q u ar te r ly  (P r in ce to n , N .J .  : Public Opinion Q u ar te r ly ,  Inc. , 
1957-1969).
78Opinion R e s e a rc h  C orn o ra tio n , P rin ce to n , R eport (P r in ce to n ,
N. J .  fO R C P i: =
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rrf t  o n  O l
Opinion N ew s; P o l ls ;  L ife ; and U .S . House R e p o r t  No. 2914 
(1956). 82
PREDICTIONS
Two poss ib le  ou tcom es m ay be an tic ipated  f ro m  the data  to be 
p re se n te d .  They m ay (a) give support to the hypo thesis  of equality , 
o r  (b) re v e a l  a d isp a r i ty  betw een  C o n g ress  and the P re s id e n c y  a s  
r e f le c to r s  of public opinion. If an equal o r  n e a r ly  equal num ber of 
poll d if fe ren ces  a re  in a g re e m e n t  with the posit ions  of C o n g ress ,  
and P re s id e n ts ,  then  the hypothesis will be accep ted  and the 
ex ecu tiv e -fo rce  theo ry , and l i t e r a r y  theory  w ill be shown to be 
equally valid.
If an  unequal num ber of poll d if fe ren ces  a r e  in ag re e m e n t  with 
the posit ions  of C o n g re ss ,  and P re s id e n ts ,  then the hypothesis  of 
equality  w ill be re je c te d  and only one of the r iv a l  th e o r ie s  will be
79N ational Opinion R e s e a rc h  C en te r ,  Opinion News (Denver, 
NORC, 1943-1969).
8 0In te rna tiona l Opinion R e s e a rc h  D ocum ents, P o lls  (A m sterdam , 
N ethe rlands: N. V. In te rna tiona le  U itgeversm an tschpp ij  "System en 
K eesing , " 1965-1969).
81 Louis H a r r i s  and A sso c ia te s ,  " H a r r i s  fo r  L ife, vol. 68. 
no. 1, 9 Ja n u ary  1970.
82 U.S. C o n g ress  C om m ittee  on G overnm ent O pera tions , "Public  
Opinion Survey to Influence P o s ta l  Rate L eg is la tio n , " 23d In te rm e d ­
ia te  R ep o rt  (Washington, D .C . : U.S. G. P .O .  , 1956).
47
shown to be  valid . If the ex e c u tiv e - fo rc e  theo ry  is  c o r r e c t ,  m o re  
po ll  d if fe re n ce s  w ill be in a g re e m e n t  w ith  the p o s i t io n s  of P r e s id e n t s ,  
than  of C o n g ress .  If the l i t e r a r y  theo ry  i s  c o r r e c t ,  m o re  po ll d i f f e r ­
e n c e s  w ill be in a g re e m e n t  with the p o s i t io n s  of C o n g re s s ,  than  of 
P re s id e n t s .
SUMMARY
C h ap te r  III has  c o n s id e re d  the m ethods u se d  in investiga ting  the 
question . Included w ere  the (a) r e s e a r c h  des ign , (b) s o u rc e s  of da ta , 
and  (c) p re d ic t io n s  of p o ss ib le  ou tcom es. In the  next c h a p te r ,  th e  
findings w ill  be d is c u s se d ,  and thus a n s w e r  the  ques tion  of w hether  
C o n g re s s  o r  P re s id e n ts  a g re e  m o re  often w ith the m a jo r i ty  of pub ­
lic  opinion.
CH A PTER IV 
FINDINGS
T he p reced in g  ch a p te r  co n s id e red  the m ethods used  in in v e s t ig a t­
ing the question  of w hether C o n g re ss  or  P re s id e n ts  a g re e  m o re  often 
w ith the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion. C h ap te r  IV d is c u s s e s  the f in d ­
ings of th is  r e s e a r c h .  The ch a p te r  is d ivided into five sec tio n s  
including (a) confo rm ity  of o b se rv a tio n s  to p red ic tio n , (b) i n t e r p r e t a ­
tion  of findings, and (c) su m m ary .
CONFORMITY OF OBSERVATIONS TO PREDICTIONS
T his  sec tion  c o n s id e rs  the ex ten t to which the findings obse rved  
con fo rm  to the p re d ic t io n s  of the p rev io u s  ch ap te r .
In Table 2 below, a C h i-S quare  G o o d n e ss -o f -F it  te s t  shows that 
th e re  is li t t le  re a s o n  to accep t the notion th a t  pos it ions  of C o n g ress  
and  the P re s id e n c y  concur equally often with public opinion. B ased  
on th is  data , the hypothesis  of equality  m ay be re je c te d .  F u r t h e r ­
m o re ,  the data  su g g es t that the ex e c u tiv e -fo rc e  theo ry  is  c o r r e c t  
b e c a u se  m o re  poll d if fe ren ces  a g re e  with the pos it ions  of P re s id e n ts  
(56), than of C o n g ress  (32). C o n v erse ly , the l i t e r a r y  theo ry  m a y b e  
re je c te d .  The findings obtained by c o r re la t in g  public opinion poll
d if fe re n c e s  with public is s u e s  is  su m m a r iz e d  in T able  2.
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TABLE 2. D IFFERENCE-ISSU E PAIRS CORRELATED WITH 88 




C o r re la te d
with:
C o n g ress  
n (%)
P re s id e n ts  
n (%)
2X
A c c e p t /
R e jec t
H ypothesis
E x ec u tiv e - 
F o rc e ,  o r  
L i te r a ry  
T heory
N = 88 32 (36%) 56 (64%) 6. 54* R e jec t E x ec u tiv e - 
F o rc e
df = 1 X 2 = 6 .5 4  > X 2 = 3.8410. 05
* p < 0. 05
INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS
T his  sec tio n  c o n s id e rs  two additional ques tions r a is e d  by the 
findings. One is w hether the e x ecu tiv e -fo rce  theo ry  holds its  ex p lan ­
a to ry  pow er a c ro s s  s e v e ra l  a r e a s  of public is su e , o r  w hether the 
l i t e r a r y  theory  m ight be valid  fo r  a t  le a s t  som e a r e a s .  A second 
question  is w hether the e x e cu tiv e -fo rce  theo ry  is  valid  as  the public 
e x p re s s e s  i tse lf  m o re  c le a r ly ,  tha t is , a s  the m agnitude of poll d if ­
fe re n c e s  in c re a s e s .
P ro b le m  of A re a s
This sec tion  c o n s id e rs  the re la t iv e  ab ility  of C o n g ress ,  and P r e s ­
idents to re f le c t  the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion acco rd in g  to the a r e a  
of the public is su e . Although the above findings indicate tha t P r e s i ­
dents  a g re e  m o re  often than C o n g ress  with the m a jo r i ty  of public
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opinion, ano ther  question  is w hether the ex e cu tiv e - fo rc e  theo ry  is 
valid  fo r  a l l  a r e a s  of public is su e . T hat is ,  a r e  P re s id e n t s  m o re  
sen s i t iv e  to the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion in each  of the a r e a s  of 
public is su e :  health , education and w e lfa re ; fo re ig n  policy; labo r; 
c iv il  r ig h ts ;  e le c to ra l  r e fo rm ; and tax and econom ic p o licy ?
The f i r s t  s tep  of investiga tion  was to ra n k  88 public is su e  and
8 3poll d iffe rence  p a i r s  acco rd ing  to a r e a  of the public is su e .  The 
second s tep  was to co n s tru c t  a h is to g ram  of tha t re la t io n sh ip  (v. 
F ig u re  2). The th ird  s tep  was to n o rm a lize  the h is to g ra m  in F ig ­
u re  2 to a  com m on sca le  by converting  the num ber of d i f fe re n c e - 
is su e  p a i r s  into p e rc e n tag e s  (v. F ig u re  3).
In the two a r e a s  of e le c to ra l  re fo rm , and health , education  and 
w e lfa re ,  the da ta  support the e x e cu tiv e -fo rce  theo ry . In the a r e a s  
of fo re ign  policy, labo r, c iv il r ig h ts ,  and tax  and econom ic policy, 
the da ta  a r e  inconclusive. Although inconclusive , the da ta  suggest 
tha t the e x e cu tiv e -fo rce  theo ry  may be valid  fo r  labo r i s s u e s ,  while 
the  l i t e r a r y  theo ry  may be valid  fo r  tax  and econom ic is s u e s .
The m a rg in a l  d iffe rence  by which C o n g ress ,  and P re s id e n ts  
a g re e  with the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion in each  of the s ix  a r e a s  of 
public is s u e s  is su m m a r iz e d  in the following tab le .
8 3v. Appendix A, M88 P o ll D if fe re n c e -P u b lic  Issu e  P a i r s  
(abridged). M
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Figure 2. Histogram of D ifference-Issue P airs According to Area
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Figure 3. Norm alized H istogram  of D ifferen ce-Issu e P airs According to Area
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TABLE 3. DIFFERENCE-ISSUE PAIRS CORRELATED WITH 6 
AREAS OF PUBLIC ISSUES, 1947-1969
6 A re a s  of 
Public  I s su e s N
C o n g ress  
n (%)
P re s id e n ts  
n (%) x 2
E x ec u tiv e - 
F o rc e ,  o r  
L i te r a r y  
T heo ry
H ealth, E ducation  
and W elfare
16 1 (7%) 15 (93%) 12. 25* E x e c u tiv e - 
F o rc e
F o re ig n  Policy 18 8 (44%) 10 (56%) 0. 22 Inconclusive
L ab o r 6 1 (17%) 5 (83%) 2 .66 Inconclusive
C ivil R ights 23 10 (43%) 13 (57%) 0. 39 Inc one lusive
E le c to ra l  R efo rm 8 0 (0%) 8 (100%) 8* E xecutive  - 
F o rc e
Tax and Econom ic 
P o licy
17 12 (71%) 5 (29%) 2 .7 3 Inconclusive
df = 1 X|? „  = 3 .841* ^ n nr- (J. Ub*p < 0. 0d
P ro b le m  of P o ll D iffe rences
T h is  sec tio n  co n s id e rs  the re la t iv e  ab ility  of C o n g ress ,  and P r e s ­
iden ts  to re f le c t  the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion acco rd ing  to the s iz e  
of the poll d iffe rence . Although the above findings indicate  tha t P r e s ­
iden ts  a g re e  m o re  often than C o n g ress  with the m a jo r i ty  of public 
opinion, an o th er  question  is w hether the ex ecu tiv e -fo rce  theory  is 
v a l id  fo r  a l l  s iz e s  of the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion. T hat is , a r e  
P re s id e n ts  m o re  sen s it iv e  than C o n g ress  to the m a jo r i ty  of public
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opinion for a l l  m agnitude of po ll d if fe ren ce ; w hether the m agnitude 
be m arg in a l ,  in te rm ed ia te ,  o r  v e ry  l a rg e ?
The f i r s t  s tep  of investigation  w as to ra n k  84 public is su e  and poll
84d iffe rence  p a i r s  acco rd ing  to the m agnitude of the poll d if fe re n ce s .
The second s tep  was to c o n s tru c t  a  h is to g ra m  of tha t re la t io n sh ip  
(v. F ig u re  4). An in te rv a l  of five 16. 8 p e rc e n t  in c re m en ts  was 
s e le c te d  as  it p roduced  the m ax im um  n um ber of da ta  poin ts without 
d es troy ing  the un iform  c u rv i l in e a r i ty  of the re la tio n sh ip . The th ird  
s tep  w as to n o rm alize  the h is to g ra m  in F ig u re  4 to a com m on sc a le  
by converting  the num ber of d i f fe re n c e - is su e  p a i r s  into p e rce n ta g e s  
(v. F ig u re  5).
In the in te rv a l  of m a rg in a l  poll d iffe rence  m agnitude (8-24. 8 p e r ­
cent), the da ta  a r e  inconclusive, but su g g es t  that the ex e cu tiv e -fo rce  
theo ry  and l i t e r a r y  theo ry  may be equally  valid , b ecau se  the d i s t r i ­
bution is  p e rfec t ly  divided (50 p e rc e n t  C o n g ress  vs. 5 0 p e rc e n t  P r e s ­
idents) in. th is in te rva l.  In the two in te rv a ls  of in te rm ed ia te  poll d i f ­
fe ren ce  (24. 9-41. 6 p e rce n t,  and 41. 7-58. 2 pe rcen t) ,  the da ta  support 
the ex ecu tiv e -fo rce  theory . In the th ird  in te rv a l of in te rm ed ia te  poll 
d iffe rence  m agnitude (5 3. 3-75. 2 p e rce n t) ,  the da ta  a r e  inconclusive, 
bu t sugges t that the ex ecu tiv e -fo rce  theo ry  m ay be valid . In the
84v. Appendix E, "84 Public Issue  and Poll D ifference P a i r s  
Ranked A ccording to the M agnitude of the D iffe rence. " Appendix E 
has  four is su e -d if fe re n c e  p a i r s  ( issue  nu m b ers  7, 43, 57 and 58) 
few er  than Appendices A and B b ecau se  p r e c i s e  p e rc e n tag e s  w ere  
unavailab le  in these  c a se s .
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Figure 5. N orm alized H istogram  of D ifferen ce-Issu e  P a irs A ccording to D ifference Magnitude
Percentage of Difference  
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in te rv a l  of v e ry  la rg e  poll d iffe rence  m agnitude (75. 3-92 pe rcen t) ,  
the data  a r e  inconclusive, but su g g es t  that the l i t e r a r y  theo ry  may 
be valid .
The m a rg in a l  d iffe rence  by which C o n g ress ,  and P re s id e n t  ag ree  
with the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion in each  of the five m agnitudes of 
poll d iffe rence  is su m m a r iz e d  in the following tab le .
TABLE 4. D IFFERENCE-ISSUE PAIRS CORRELATED WITH 5 
MAGNITUDES OF POLL D IFFER E N C E , 1947-1969
5 M agnitudes of 
P o ll  D iffe rence N
C o n g ress  
n (%)
P re s id e n ts  
n (%) x 2
E xecutive - 
F o rc e ,  o r  
L i te r a ry  
T heory
I
8. 0-24. 8% 20 10 (50%) 10 (50%) 0 Inconclusive
24 .9 -41 .6% 25 6 (24%) 19 (76%) 6. 76* Executive - 
F o rc e
41 .7 -58 .2% 22 4 (18%) 18 (82%) 8. 91* E x ecu tiv e- 
F o rc e
58 .3 -75 .2% 8 3 (37%) 5 (63%) 0.5 Inconclusive
75. 3-92. 0% 9 6 (67%) 3 (33%) 1. 0 Inconclusive
df = 1
*p < 0. 05 X 0.05 = 3' 841
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SUMMARY
C h ap te r  IV has co n s id e red  the findings which an sw e r  the question  
of w hether C o n g ress  o r  P re s id e n ts  a g re e  m o re  often with the m a jo r i ty  
of public opinion. The findings supported  the ex e cu tiv e -fo rce  th eo ry  
fo r  public is s u e s  t re a te d  a s  a  whole. In addition, the execu tiv e -  
fo rc e  th eo ry  w as accep ted  fo r  two public is su e  a r e a s  (e le c to ra l  
r e fo rm ;  and health , education  and w elfa re ) .  The ex e cu tiv e -fo rce  
th e o ry  was a lso  accep ted  fo r  two of th re e  in te rv a ls  of in te rm ed ia te  
po ll d if fe ren ce  m agnitude. The e x e cu tiv e -fo rce  and l i t e r a r y  th e o r ie s  
a p p e a r  to be  equally  valid  fo r  the in te rv a l  of m a rg in a l  poll d iffe rence  
m agnitude. In the next ch a p te r ,  conclusions w ill be d raw n f ro m  the 
above findings.
C H A PTER V 
CONCLUSIONS
T he p reced in g  chap te r  co n s id e red  the findings an sw e rin g  the q u es ­
t io n  of w hether C o n g ress  o r  P re s id e n ts  a g re e  m o re  often w ith  the 
m a jo r i ty  of public opinion. C h ap te r  V d raw s two conc lusions f ro m  
th e  find ings.
T he in it ia l  conclusion  is  tha t the question  under study  is  m o re  c o m ­
p lex  than the l i t e r a tu r e  of p o li t ica l  sc ien c e  would lead  us to  be liev e . 
A lthough the ex e cu tiv e -fo rce  th eo ry  w as accep ted  fo r  public i s s u e s  
taken  a s  a  whole, we a lso  ob se rv ed  th a t  n e i th e r  C o n g ress  n o r  the 
P re s id e n c y  was a  co n s is te n t r e f le c to r  of public opinion am ong the 
e igh t public is su e  a r e a s  m e a su re d .  Although da ta  on the  question  of 
a r e a s  w e re  not conclusive (p a r t ly  b ec au se  it was not the p r im a r y  q u e s ­
tio n  of study), the p rom inence  of the P re s id e n c y  in two a r e a s ,  and the 
r e la t iv e  equality  of the P re s id e n c y  and C o n g re ss  in the o th e rs  se em e d  
su ff ic ien t to sugges t that the r e p re s e n ta t iv e  quality  of e i th e r  in s t i tu ­
t ion  v a r ie d  acco rd in g  to the is su e  a re a .
One cu rious  footnote r e la te d  to the above o b se rv a tio n  is  tha t in 
th e  one a r e a  in which the P re s id e n t  has  the g r e a te s t  am ount of d i s ­
c r e t io n  (i. e, fo re ig n  policy) and in which one m igh t rea so n ab ly  expect
h im  to be  able  to lead public opinion the m o s t often, the P re s id e n c y
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and C ongress  tended to be c lo ses t  in th e ir  ability to re f lec t  public 
opinion. On the other hand, in the a re a  in which the leg is la tive  
b ran ch  has its g re a te s t  amount of d isc re tio n  (i. e. , tax and economic 
policy), the data showed a slight tendency fo r  C ongress  to re f lec t  
the m ajo rity  of public opinion m ore  often than the P res idency .
The prom inence of the P re s id en cy  in two m agnitudes of poll d i f fe r ­
ence and the re la tive  equality of C ongress  and the P re s id en cy  in the 
o the rs  suggest that the rep re se n ta t iv e  quality of C ongress  and P r e s i ­
dents also  v a r ie s  according  to the s ize  of public opinion m a jo r i t ie s .
It ap p ears  that when the m ajo rity  of public opinion is m arg ina l, 
C ongress  and the P re s id en cy  had an equally difficult tim e d is c e r n ­
ing which side of an issue  a slight m ajo rity  of public opinion might 
lie . This is what one might reasonab ly  expect with sm all d iffe rences 
of opinion. Although one a lso  might expect that as the m a jo rity  of 
opinion in c re a se s  that C ongress  and the P re s id en cy  would find it 
inc reasing ly  e a s ie r  to d isc e rn  the m ajo rity  position and ag ree  with 
it a t the sam e ra te ,  this did not prove to be the case . F o r  som e 
unknown re a so n  the P res idency  was able to ag ree  m ore  often with the 
in te rm ed ia te  s iz e s  of m a jo rity  of public opinion than was C ongress . 
S im ila r ly  one might a lso  expect the P re s id en cy , and C ongress  to 
ag ree  equally as often with the very  la rge  m a jo r i t ie s  of public op in ­
ion, as they a re  the m ost easily  d iscern ab le  and the m ost politically  
im portan t. Surpris ing ly  enough, when very  la rge  m agnitudes of poll
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d iffe ren ce  w e re  involved, C o n g re ss  had a  s l ig h t  tendency  to  a g re e  
m o re  often with the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion than  the P re s id e n c y .
The second  conclusion  is  th a t  sy s te m a tic  e m p ir ic a l  a n a ly s is  s u p ­
p o r ts  the contention  th a t  r e fo rm  in C o n g re s s  is  m o re  u rgen tly  needed 
than  r e fo rm  in the P re s id e n c y  in o r d e r  fo r  A m e r ic a n  d e m o c ra c y  to 
r e f le c t  m o re  a c c u ra te ly  the public w ill. T h is  conc lusion  is  b ased  
on the fac t  th a t the l i t e r a r y  th eo ry  w as  not accep ted  in any  of the 
m e a s u re m e n ts  m ade in  the s tudy, while the e x e c u t iv e - fo rc e  theory  
w as accep ted  in five m e a s u re m e n ts .
M ore  sp ec if ica lly ,  the study identified  two a r e a s  (i. e . , e le c to ra l  
r e fo rm , and health , education , and w elfa re )  out of s ix  in  w hich C on­
g r e s s  is  a t  its  p o o re s t  a s  a  r e f le c to r  of public opinion. O ne a p p l ic a ­
tion  of th is  finding m ight be a s  a  s ta n d a rd  to o r d e r  p r io r i t i e s  am ong 
the  m y riad  p ro p o sa ls  fo r  c o n g re s s io n a l  r e fo rm  ( e . g . ,  abo lition  of 
the  se n io r i ty  ru le ,  o v e rs ig h t  of the executive , cam p aig n  f in an c ia l  
d is c lo s u re ,  p e r s o n a l  f inanc ia l d is c lo s u re ,  im p lem en ta tion  of age
lim it ,  r e s ta te m e n t  of co n g re ss io n a l  e th ics ,  and m o d e rn ized  c o n g re s -
85s io n a l  in fo rm ation  s e rv ic e ) .  T ha t is ,  r e fo rm  p ro p o s a ls  m igh t be  
eva luated  in t e r m s  of th e ir  re la t iv e  u ti l i ty  in enhancing the ab ili ty  of 
C o n g re ss  to r e f le c t  the public  w ill in  the a r e a s  in w hich C o n g ress  
now does i ts  p o o re s t .
T h ese  w ere  am ong the top ics  d isc u sse d  in the  ad  hoc Senate 
C o m m ittee  fo r  C o n g ress io n a l R e fo rm  h e a r in g s ,  c h a ire d  by S en a to rs  
C h a r le s  M acM ath ias , J r .  (R-M d. ) and A diai E . S tevenson, II (D-Ill. ), 
3-5 D ecem b er  1972,
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SUMMARY
C h ap te r  V has draw n two conclusions f ro m  the findings. The 
f i r s t  is that the question  of w hether  C o n g re ss  o r  P re s id e n ts  a g re e  
m o re  often with the m a jo r i ty  of public opinion is  a  s im p lis t ic  one, 
fo r  n e i th e r  in s titu tion  co ns is ten tly  re f le c ts  public opinion am ong d if ­
f e re n t  public is su e  a r e a s  o r  poll d iffe rence  m agn itudes. The s e c ­
ond conclusion  is  tha t sy s te m a tic  e m p ir ic a l  an a ly s is  ind ica tes  that 
the C o n g ress  is m o re  in need of r e fo rm  than the P re s id e n c y  if the 
A m eric an  G overnm ent is to re f le c t  the  public w ill m o re  often than 
not. M ore sp ec if ica lly , two a r e a s  w ere  identified ( i . e . ,  e le c to ra l  
r e fo rm , and health , education  and w elfare)  in which C o n g re ss  r e f le c ts  
the public w ill the le a s t  often, and consequently  a r e  two a r e a s  (out 
of the s ix  th is  study investiga ted) for which co n g re ss io n a l  r e fo rm  
should have p r io r i ty .
APPENDIX A
88 POLL DIFFERENCE-PUBLIC ISSUE PAIRS (ABRIDGED)
Sym bols fo r  E n tr ie s
x  = in it ia ted
s  = sa m e
+ = in c re a s e  o r  e s ta b lish
= d e c re a s e  o r  ab o lish  
pd = poll d iffe rence
? = in fo rm ation  unavailab le
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HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE
Is su e  No. * / l s s u e /Y e a r pd % C o n g ress r P re s id e r
1. +Health In su ran ce /1 9 6 1 41 x ,p d
2. +Health In su ra n ce /1 9 6 4 27 x ,p d
3. +Health In su ran ce /1 9 6 8 40 x , pd
4. +Rat C on tro l/1968 19 x , pd
5. +Aid to School C onstruc tion /1957 57 x , pd
6. +Aid to School C o n s tru c tio n /1 9 6 0 40 x , pd
7. +Aid to School C ons truc tion /1963 ? x ,p d
8 . -Aid to  S eg reg a ted  Schools/1957 56 x, pd
9. -Aid to S eg reg a ted  Schools/1963 51 pd X
10. -fStudent L o an s /1 9 6 4 78 x, pd
11. -fSocial S ecu rity  B enefits /1964 15 x ,p d
12. + A n ti-P o v er ty  P ro g ra m /1 9 6 6 *17 x, pd
13. +W elfare R e fo rm /1 9 6 9 45 x ,p d
14. -fGuaranteed Incom e/1969 66 x ,p d
15. +Unem ploym ent In su rance /1965 13 x , pd
16. -fSummer C am p s/1 9 6 7 17 x , pd




Issue No. */I s su e /Y e a r  pd % Congress Presidents
17. -F o re ig n  M ilita ry  A s s i s ta n c e /  
1966 86 x, pd
18. +N on-M ilitary  F o re ig n  A id/1947 57 x, pd
19. +N on-M ilitary  F o re ig n  A id/1949 49 x , pd
20. +N on-M ilitary  F o re ig n  A id/1957 51 x , pd
21. +N on-M ilitary  F o re ig n  A id /1960 80 pd X
22. +N on-M ilitary  F o re ig n  A id/1960 80 pd X
23. +N on-M ilitary  F o re ig n  Aid/1967 73 pd X
24. +N on-M ilitary  F o re ig n  A id/1967 73 pd X
25. +N on-M ilitary  F o re ig n  A id/1967 32 x , pd
26. +Foreign  Aid/1966 10 pd X
27. +Foreign  Aid/1967 12 pd X
28. +U niversa l M il i ta ry  T ra in in g /  
1947 45 x , pd
29. +U niversa l M il i ta ry  T ra in in g /  
1948 41 x ,p d
30. + U niversal M ilita ry  T ra in in g /  
1950 61 x, pd
31. + Im m igration  by Skill/1964 29 x, pd
32. + Im m igration  by Skill/1965 40 x, pd
33. +USSR Wheat S a les /1962 29 x, pd
34. +Voice of A m erica /1 9 4 7 31 x, pd




35. +Job T ra in in g /1 9 6 9  84 x , pd
36. -+Strike C on tro l/1966  21 x , pd
37. + M inim um  W age/1947 47 x ,p d
38. +Minimum W age/1948 37 x ,p d
39. +Minimum Wage, O v ertim e /1 9 6 5  29 pd x
40. + D ay-C are  C e n te rs /1 9 6 9  34 x , pd




Issue No. * / ls su e /Y e a r  pd % Congress Presidents
41. + Gun Ban fo r M inors /1967 36 pd X
42. -t-Universal Gun L icensing /1968 49 x , pd
43.
?
+School In teg ra tion /1963  50-75 x, pd
44. +Open Housing/1966 13 pd X
45. +Open Housing/1967 20 pd X
46. +Open Housing/1967 19 pd X
47. +Open H ousing/1967 19 pd X
48. -fOpen Housing E nfo rcem en t/1967 20 pd X
49. +Open Housing F inancing/1968 26 pd X
50. +Voting R igh ts /1963 90 x, pd
51. -W ire tap /1968 38 x, pd
52. +Equal Em ploym ent O pportun ity / 
1949 16 pd X
53. +Equal E m ploym ent O pportun ity / 
1963 60 x, pd
54: + A nti-D iscrim ina tion , E m p lo y ­
m ent/1968 45 pd X
55. +Public A ccom odations/1963 16 x ,p d
56. +Civil R ights B ill /1966 17 pd X
57. +Lower Voting A g e /1954 16
9
-58 x, pd




0** I x, pd
*Issue  N um ber co r re sp o n d s  to num bered  is su e s  
E.
in A ppendices B an
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CIVIL RIGHTS (Continued)
Issu e  No. * / l s s u e /Y e a r  pd % C o n g ress  P re s id e n ts
59. -Voting Age/1968 31 x , pd
60. +D.C . Home R ule/1949 45 x ,p d
61. +D.C . N ational Suffrage/1954 68 x, pd
62. +D.C . Home R ule/1964 56 x , pd
63. +D.C . Home R ule/1965 56 x, pd
*Issue  N um ber c o r re sp o n d s  to num bered  is s u e s  in A ppendices B and 
E.
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ELEC TO R A L REFORM
Issue No. * /I s su e /Y e a r  pd % C ongress P residents
64. -^Campaign E xpenditu re  R eg u la -
tion /1966  54 x ,p d
65. -C am paign  E xpend itu re  C e i l in g /
1966 54 x 5pd
66. -L im it  C am paign C o n tr ib u t io n s /
1967 57 x ,  pd
67. -C am paign  E xpenditure  C e i l in g /
1967 29 x
68. ^C am paign C ontribution  R eg u la ­
tion /1967  29 x spd
69. ^C am paign  Eund R eporting /1968  43 x 3pd
70. + D irec t P o p u la r  E lec tio n  of
P re s id e n t /1 9 6 9  69 ^ p d
71. House T e rm /1 9 6 6  37 x 3pd
* Issu e  N um ber c o rre sp o n d s  to num b ered  i s s u e s  in A ppendices  B and 
E .
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TAX AND ECONOMIC POLICY
Issue No. */I s su e /Y e a r  pd % Congress Presidents
72. -P e r s o n a l  Income T ax/1947 14 x ,p d
73. -P e r s o n a l  Income T ax/1948 19 x, pd
74. -P e r s o n a l  Income T ax/1963 31 x, pd
75. s P e r s o n a l  Income T ax /1957 30 pd X
76. -P e r s o n a l  Income T ax /1980 90 pd X
77. -P e r s o n a l  Income T ax /1963 31 x ? pd
78. + P e rso n a l Income Tax/1965 80 pd X
79. -i-Personal Incom e T ax/1967 52 pd X
80. + P e rso n a l  Income T ax/1967 62 pd X
81. +Revenue S haring /1969 48 x, pd
82. +Defense Spending/1968 76 pd X
83. +Defense Spending/1969 14 pd X
84. +Space Spending/1967 27 pd X
85. +Space Spending/1969 15 x, pd
86. +National Debt L im it/195  3 38. 3 pd X
87. +P r ic e  & Wage C ontro l/1951 33 x ,p d
88. +P osta l R a tes /1 9 5 7 54 pd X
*Issue N um ber co r re sp o n d s  to num bered  is su e s  in A ppendices B and
APPENDIX B
88 POLL DIFFERENCE-PUBLIC ISSUE PAIRS (UNABRIDGED)
Sym bols for E ntries
H = House of R epresentatives
HC = House C om m ittee
S = Senate
SC = Senate C om m ittee
y = favorable action, yes
n = unfavorable action, no
= no action taken 
h = hearings only
s  = sam e
+ = in crea se  or abolish
= d ecrea se  or abolish
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M§AfcTH: EDUCATION AND WELFARE
1: ik fea lth -iiis tirance /iS lf ii: "E nac t a hea lth  in su ran ce  ^program
tiiicler the Social S ecu rity  S ystem  providing benefits  to  a l l -p e r -  
§8hs 65 and over who a r e  e lig ib le  fo r  so c ia l  se c u r i ty  o r - r a i l ro a d  
R etirem ent b e n e f i t s :Tf
He H s e  S ELQ; XVII, p. 95 .
h
AlPO, 9 June 1961: T’Would you favor o r  oppose having th e  
io c ia l  s e c u r i ty  tax in c re a se d  in o rd e r  to pay fo r  bid age  m e d i-  
6ai in s u r a n c e ? ”
avor Oppose No Opinion D iffe rence_= 41%
7% 26% 7% ROQ, XXV, p; 601.
3: „ .4-Ilealth Insurance^/1964: ” Enact a  hosp ita l in su ran ce  p ro g ra m
for. the aged  which would p ro te c t  ag a in s t the co s ts  of hosp ita l  and 
sk illed  nu rs ing  c a re ,  hom e hea lth  s e rv ic e s  and ou t-p a tien t  h o s ­
p ita l  d iagnostic  s e rv ic e s  and which wTould p rovide a b ase  whieh 
Related p r iv a te  p ro g ra m s  can  supplem ent. ”
He h Se s §i§; xx,- p.- §&.■
h n y ~
AlPO; © ctober 1964: M ed ica re  P ro g ra m :
■or Oppose No Opinion D iffe rence  = 2-7%
§8% 31% 11%
3: .4-Health.Insm-ance/.1968: ” P a s s  the Child Health- Act to p r o ­
vide com prehensive  m ed ica l c a re  fo r  every  needy m o th e r  and 
ftbr infant. ”
H SC S e.Q, XXIV,- p. 101;.
*ii§stte N um ber co r re sp o n d s  to num bered  is s u e s  in1 A ppendices A and
fe:
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE (gontmued)
I s su e  No. * / l s s u e /Y e a r
H a r r i s ,  1969: "A u n iv e rsa l  hea lth  in su ran c e  sy s te m , with 
both governm en t and p r iv a te  o rgan iza tions  involved, , , . ”
F av o r  Oppose Not Sure D iffe rence  = .40%
60% 2(f/o 20% jLife, Vol, 68, No.. 1,
^ J a n u a r y  197Q
4. +Rat C ontro l/1968 : "A pprop ria te  $20 m illion  in supp lem en ta l 
f is c a l  1968 funds to help ex te rm in a te  the r a t s  that in fest the 
s lu m s . "
HC H SC S ^ .yerage D iffe rence  = ip%
n n n n JJQ, XXIV, p, 112
H a r r i s ,  N ovem ber 1967: 11A F e d e r a l  p ro g ra m  to e x te rm in a te  
r a t s  in the s lu m s. "
E ffective Not E ffective Not S ure  D iffe rence  = 27%
60% 33% 7% R o lls , HI, No, 2, p.. 81 f
A verage P lu ra l i ty  = 27%
5. +Aid to School C onstruc tion /1957 : "A uthorize  $1. 3 b illion, 
a t  the ra te  of $325 m illion  annually fo r  four y e a rs  fo r  fe d e ra l  
g ran ts  to s ta te s  fo r  financing  school build ings. "
HC H SC S J1Q, XIII, p, 88
y n
AlPO, 10 F e b ru a ry  1957: "Some people say  tha t the F e d e ra l  
governm ent in W ashington should give financia l help to build  new 
public schools , e sp ec ia lly  in the p o o re r  s ta te s ,  O th e rs  say that 
th is  will m ean h igher taxes for everyone and that s ta te s  and 
local com m unities  should build th e ir  own schoo ls , How do you 
you rse lf ,  fee l — do you favor o r oppose F e d e ra l  aid to help 
build new public schoo ls . "
F av o r  Oppose No Opinion D ifference  = 57%
76% 19% 5% PQNS, 10 F e b ru a ry  1957
*Issue  N um ber co r re sp o n d s  to num bered  is su e s  in A ppendices A and 
E.
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6. +Aid to School C onstruc tion /1960 : ’’A uthorize  annual fe d e ra l
advances to local school d is t r ic t s  to pay up to half debt s e rv ic e  
(p rinc ipal and in te re s t)  on $3 b illion  of bonds to be issued  in the 
next five y e a rs  fo r  school cons truc tion . ”
HC H SC S CQ, XVI, p. 94
n n n n
AlPO, 19 F e b ru a ry  1960: ’’Some people say  tha t the F e d e ra l  
governm ent in W ashington should give f inanc ia l help to build 
new schoo ls , e sp ec ia lly  in the p o o re r  s ta te s .  O th e rs  say  that 
th is w ill m ean  h igher taxes  for everyone and tha t s ta te s  and local 
com m unities  should build th e ir  own schoo ls . How do you, y o u r ­
se lf ,  fee l — do you favor o r  oppose F e d e ra l  aid  to help build  new 
public s c h o o ls ? ”
F av o r  Oppose No Opinion D ifference  = 40%
65% 25% 10% PONS, 19 F e b ru a ry  1960
1 • +Aid t o School Cons t ruc tion /1963 : "P ro v id e  g ra n ts  to public
and p r iv a te  nonprofit in s titu tions  fo r t ra in in g  of sc ien tif ic ,  
eng ineering  and m ed ica l techn ic ians in tw o -y ear  c o lleg e - le v e l 
p ro g ra m s ,  covering  up to 5 0 p e rc e n t  of the co s t  of cons truc ting , 
equipping and opera ting  the n e c e s s a ry  academ ic  fa c i l i t ie s .  ”
HC H SC S CQ ? XIX, p. 85
h h
AlPO, 10 F e b ru a ry  1963: ’’W eight of public opinion now holds 
aid  should go to both public, p a ro c h ia l  schoo ls . ”
?
D iffe rence  = 51%-100% 
Gallup P o ll  R e p o r ts ,  
p. 354.
8. +Aid to S egregated  S ch oo ls /1957 : ’’E nact schoo l co n s tru c tio n  
b il l  without r e s t r ic t in g  p ro v is io n s  dealing with in teg ra tion . ”
HC H SC S CQ, XIII, p. 88
y n
*Issue  N um ber co r re sp o n d s  to num bered  is s u e s  in A ppendices A and 
E.
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AlPO, 11 F e b ru a ry  1957: "Some people say  tha t the F e d e ra l  
governm ent in W ashington should give f inanc ia l help to build 
new public schoo ls , e sp ec ia lly  in the p o o re r  s ta te s .  O th e rs  say  
th is would m ean  h igher taxes  fo r  everyone and that s ta te s  and 
local com m unities  should build  th e ir  own schoo ls . How about 
com m unities  in the South w here  white and co lo red  ch ild ren  a re  
s e p a ra te d ?  Should the governm ent help these  com m unities  — 
or re fu se  to help them  build s c h o o ls ? "
Aid all Schools D on’t Aid Segregated  Schools No Opinion 
73% 17% 10%
D iffe rence  = 56%
POQ, XXVI, p. 143.
9. -Aid to Segregated  S ch o o ls /1 9 6 3 : "E lim ina te  the p h ra se  
’se p a ra te  but e q u a l’ f ro m  the M o rr i l l  Land G ran t College Act. "
HC H SC S CQ, XIX, p. 90.
h
AlPO, 13 F e b ru a ry  1963: "If the F e d e ra l  governm ent in 
W ashington dec ides  to give money to aid education, should th is 
money go to a l l  public schoo ls , or should it be withheld fro m  
schools which fa il  to in teg ra te  white and negro  s tu d e n ts ? "
Go to a l l  public schoo ls  Not to se g re g a te d  No opinion 
72% 21% 7%
D iffe rence  = 51%
PONS, 13 F e b ru a ry  1973
10. +Student L oans/1964 : "A uthorize  fed e ra l ly  g u aran teed  s tu -  
dent loans. "
HC H SC S CQ, XX, p. 90
h y
♦Issue  N um ber co r re sp o n d s  to num bered  i s s u e s  in A ppendices A and
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H a r r i s ,  D ecem b er  1965: "C ollege S c h o la rsh ip s” (in the co n ­
tex t of being fed e ra l ly  sponsored).
A pprove D isapprove D ifference = 78%
89% 11% P o lls ,  HI, No. 2, p. 79
11. +Social S ecuritv /1964 : "To finance the (hospital in su ran ce  
p ro g ra m  fo r  over 6 5 -e rs ) ,  add one-fourth  of one p e rc e n t  to the 
so c ia l  s e c u r i ty  contribu tion  paid by em p lo y ers  and em ployees. ”
HC H SC S CQ, XX, p. 91
h n y
AlPO, 30 M arch  1965: "Would you be willing to have m o re  
m oney deducted fro m  your paycheck in o rd e r  to in c re a s e  so c ia l 
s e c u r i ty  benefits  to r e t i r e d  w o rk e rs ,  o r  n o t? "
Yes No D on’t Know D iffe rence  = 15%
52% 37% 11% Public  Opinion News S e r ­
v ice , 31 M arch  1965
12. + Antipoverty  P ro g ra m /1 9 6 6 :  "The Johnson A d m in is tra t io n ’s 
W a r  on P o v e r ty ’ re c e iv e d  an ap p ro p ria tio n  f ro m  C o n g ress  in 
1966 of $1, 612, 000. . . $138 m illion  le s s  than the P r e s id e n t ’s 
re q u e s t  and the am ount an tipoverty  offic ia ls  sa id  was the i r r e d u c ­
ible m in im um  needed fo r  continued p ro g re s s .  "
HC H SC S CQ, XXH, p. 250
y y y y
AlPO, 6 May 1966: "O vera ll ,  do you have a favorab le  or 
unfavorab le  opinion of the a n t i-p o v e r ty  p ro g ra m  nationw ide?"
F av o rab le  U nfavorable No Opinion D ifference  - 17%
48% 31% 21% P o lls ,  H, 2, p. 85
*Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu e s  in Appendices 'A and
E.
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13. +Nixon W elfare  P ackage/1969 : M essage  on W elfare  R eform ,
11 August 1989.
HC H SC S CQ, XXV, p. 120
h
AlPO, August 1969: N ixon’s w elfa re  p ro p o sa ls .
F av o rab le  U nfavorable No Opinion D ifference  = 45%
65% 20% 15%
14. +Guaranteed Incom e/1969: ’’R ev ise  w elfa re  sy s te m  to p r o ­
vide that the F e d e ra l  G overnm ent pay a b as ic  incom e to those  
A m erican  fam il ie s  who cannot c a re  fo r  th e m se lv e s ,  in w hichever 
s ta te  they live. ”
HC H SC S CQ, XXV, p. 120
y y y
H a r r i s ,  1969: ’’The Nixon w elfa re  plan — which would 
give every  fam ily  on w elfare  $1, 600 a y e a r  with a p ro v is io n  that 
anyone able to w ork e i th e r  e n te r  a job tra in in g  p ro g ra m  or get 
a  jo b .”
F av o r  Oppose Not Sure D ifference  = 66%
79% 13% 8% Life, loc. cit.
15. +Unemployment In su ran ce /1 9 6 5 : ’’S treng then  the unem ploy­
m ent in su rance  sy s tem  by provid ing  a p e rm an en t p ro g ra m  of fe d ­
e r a l  extended benefits  fo r  lo n g - te rm  unem ployed with su b s tan tia l  
w ork h is to r ie s .  ”
HC H SC S CQ, XXI, p. 111.
h
*Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu es  in Appendices A and
E.
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AlPO, 13 F e b ru a ry  1965: "How do you fee l about unem ploy­
m ent b e n e f i ts ?  Should the p er io d  during which unem ployed * 
w o rk e rs  can  co llec t  these  benefits  be extended, o r  n o t? "
Should be extended Should not No Opinion 
37% 50% 13%
D iffe rence  = 13%
P o lls ,  I, 2, p. 73
16. +Sum m er C a m p s /1967: "P ro v id e  funds fo r  the co n s tru c tio n  
of su m m e r  cam p ia c u i t ie  s fo r  a t le a s t  100, 000 c h ild re n  in 1968 
(included in S 1545, HR 8311)."
HC H SC S A verage  P lu ra l i ty  = 17%
n n n n
H a r r i s ,  14 August 1967: "Setting up m a ss iv e  s u m m e r  c a m p s ? "
E ffective  Not E ffective Not S ure  D iffe rence  = 25%
57% 32% 11% P o lls ,  III, 2, p. 81
H a r r i s ,  N ovem ber 1967: "Setting up m a ss iv e  s u m m e r  c a m p s ? "
E ffec tive  Not E ffec tive  Not Sure D iffe rence  = 9%
47% 38% 15%
*Issue  N um ber c o r re sp o n d s  to num bered  is s u e s  in A ppendices A and 
E .
FOREIGN POLICY
Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
17. -F o re ig n  M ilita ry  A ss is tan ce /1 9 6 6 : ”In an unusua l action, 
the Senate voted aTm ajoFcut in the P r e s id e n t ’s re q u e s ts  fo r  
fo re ig n  m il i ta ry  aid and s a le s  p ro g ra m s  July  27. It accep ted  an 
am endm ent chopping $100 m illion  off the au th o riza tio n  b ill ,  55 - 
37 (D 43-20; R I2 -17).
’’The A d m in is tra tion  asked  fo r  $917 m illion  fo r  f is c a l  1967. . , 
The final au tho riza tion  was fo r  $875 m illion . ”
CQ, XXII, p. 92
AlPO, 13 M arch  1966: ’’Which, if any of the k inds of fo re ign  
aid l is ted  on th is c a rd  do you f a v o r ? ” G PI, No. 10, p. 21
D iffe rence  = 86%
T ra in  te a c h e rs ,  build schools , p rovide b o o k s  65%
Build hosp ita ls , t r a in s  n u rs e s  and d o c to rs ,
p rov ide  m e d i c i n e .......................     61%
Help im prove fa rm in g  m ethods, provide fa rm
equ ipm en t...........................   61%
P rov ide  b i r th  con tro l i n f o r m a t i o n  43% \ = 92%
Send su rp lu s  fo o d .......................    41%
Help build fac to r ie s  and in d u s t r ie s ................................. 33%
Build highways and r a i l r o a d s .......................  21%
None of t h e s e .............................................................*............  4%
Help build m il i ta ry  s t r e n g t h  . .'  18% f = 6%
No o p in io n .................................................................................... 8% \ - _2%
18. +N on-M ilitary  F o re ig n  A id /1 9 4 7 : ’’R ehab ilita tion  aid to
E urope . ” (M arsha ll  P lan)
HC H SC S CQ, III, p. 534.
AlPO, 23 Ju ly  1947: ’’T hose who h ea rd  o r  re a d  of the M a r ­
sh a ll  P lan  w ere  asked: ’What is your opinion of the p l a n ? ” ’
F av o r  Oppose No Opinion D iffe rence  = 36%
57% 21% 22% POQ, XXVIII, p. 168.




Issu e No. * /Is su e /Y ea r
19. +N on-M ilitary  F o re ig n  A id /1 9 4 9 : "Aid to underdeveloped
a r e a s ."
HC H SC S CQ, V, p. 46.
h
NORC, M arch  1949: "In g en e ra l ,  do you think it  is  a  good 
policy fo r  the United S ta tes  to t r y  to help backw ard  c o u n tr ie s  in 
the w orld  to r a i s e  th e i r  s ta n d a rd  of living, or sh ou ldn ’t  th is  be 
any co n cern  to  our G o v ern m en t?"
Should Should not No Opinion D iffe rence  = 49%
72% 23% 5% POQ, XV, p . 39Q
20. FN on-M ilitary  F o re ig n  A id/1957: "A uthorize  $200 m illion  
for f is c a l  1958 and 1959 to be used  fo r  Middle E a s t  a id  p r o g r a m s . "
HC H SC S CQ, x m ,  p. 89.
AlPO, 3 F e b ru a ry  1957: "Would you approve o r  d isapprove  
if the United S ta tes  gave econom ic — that is  f inanc ia l — aid  to 
the  co u n tr ie s  in the Middle E a s t  a r e a  tha t a r e  f r iend ly  to the 
United S ta te s ? "
A pprove D isapprove N e ith e r ,  D on t’Know
70% 19% 11%
D iffe rence  = 51%
PONS, 3 F e b ru a ry  1957.
21. +N on-M ilitary  F o re ig n  A id/1960: "A p p ro p ria te  $700 m illion
fo r  D evelopm ent Loan Funds. "
HC H SC S CQ, XVI, p. 95.
n n y y




Issue No. */Is su e /Y ea r
AlPO, 2 July 1961: ’’H ere  is a l i s t  of i te m s  fo r  which P r e s i ­
dent Kennedy has asked  A m e r ic a n s  to make s a c r i f ic e s .  F o r
which of these  would you be willing to m ake s a c r i f ic e s ,  even if 
it  m ean t in c re as in g  your own t a x e s ? "
In c re a se d  Econom ic Aid O ther D ifference  = 80%
10% 90% PONS, 2 Ju ly  1961.
22* +N on-M ilitary  F o re ig n  Aid/1961: "P ro v id e  $1. 9 billion  p e r  
y e a r  fo r  lo n g - te rm  loans in f is c a l  y e a rs  1963 through 1966. "
HC H SC S CQ, XVIII, p. 97
y n y y
AlPO, 2 July 1961: See Note 51 (sam e poll)
23. +N on-M ilita ry  F o re ig n  A id /1967 : "A pprove a specif ic  p r o ­
g ra m  of in c re a se d  aid to Latin  A m e r ic a  by up to $1 .5  b illion, 
o r  about $300 m illion  annually  fo r  five y e a r s .  "
HC H SC S CQ, XXIII, p. 167.
n n n n
AlPO, 13 May 1967: " P re s id e n t  Johnson  has p roposed  that 
C o n g ress  se t  as ide  about $3. 1 b illion  fo r  aid to co u n tr ie s  in o ther 
p a r t s  of the w orld, of about 2 p e rc e n t  of the to ta l am ount of the 
annual budget. Would you like to see  th is am ount in c re a se d  or 
d e c re a s e d ?  "
In c re a se  D e c re a se  Same No Opinion 
7% 50% 31% 12%
D iffe rence  = 74%
GPI, No. 27, p. 17.
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24. +N on-M ilita ry  F o re ig n  A id /1967 : 1TA uthorize  a  U. S. c o n t r i ­
bution of up to $200 m illion , over four y e a r s ,  to new Special 
F unds of the A sian  D evelopm ent Bank. "
HC H SC S CQ, x x m ,  p. 166.
h
A lPO , 13 May 1967: v. Note 53 (sam e poll)
25. s  N on-M ilita ry  F o re ig n  A id/1967: "A pprop ria te  $4. 9 b i l ­
lion  fo r  fo re ig n  aid. "
HC H SC S CQ, XH, p. 95.
n n y y
AlPO , 3 F e b ru a ry  1956: "D uring  r e c e n t  y e a r s  C o n g ress  has  
ap p ro p r ia te d  (about) 4 b ill ion  d o l la rs  each  y e a r  fo r  co u n tr ie s  in 
o th e r  p a r t s  of the w orld  to help p rev en t  th e ir  going com m unis tic . 
Should C o n g ress  ap p ro p r ia te  the sa m e  am ount th is  y e a r  o r  n o t? "
F a v o r  Oppose No Opinion D iffe rence  = 32%
57% 25% 18% POQ, XXVn, p. 168.
26* -F o re ig n  Aid/1966: (HR 17788) "C o n g re ss  au tho rized  fo re ig n
aid  ap p ro p r ia tio n s  of $3. 5 b illion , m o re  than the P re s id e n t  asked  
for,- bu t when it cam e tim e on S ep tem ber 20 to a p p ro p r ia te  funds, 
the House was of a  d iffe ren t mind. It accep ted  an option to  send  
the b i l l  back  to com m ittee  with in s tru c tio n s  to m ake additional 
cu ts  to ta ling  10 p e rc e n t  in econom ic aid. The motion c a r r ie d  
n a rro w ly , 186-183 (D 70-175; R 116-8). The Senate in c re ase d  
the cu t and the final a p p ro p r ia tio n  was 15 p e rc e n t  below  the A dm in­
i s t r a t io n ’s re q u e s t .  Johnson opposed the m otion. "
HC H SC S CQ, XXII, p. 87.
y y y y




Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
AlPO, 1 A pril  1965: " P re s id e n t  Johnson has  p ro p o sed  that 
C o n g ress  s e t  as ide  about $3. 4 b illion  fo r  aid  to co u n tr ie s  in o ther 
p a r t s  of the w orld, o r  about 3 p e rc e n t  of the to ta l annual budget. 
Would you like to see  th is  am ount in c re ase d  o r  d e c r e a s e d ? "
D e c re a se d
49%
Kept Same No Opinion 
12%
D iffe rence  = 10% 
P o lls ,  I, 2, p. 77
27. + Foreign  Aid/1967: "A pprop ria te  $2. 5 b ill ion  fo r  econom ic 
a s s is ta n c e ,  and $600 m illion  lo r  m il i ta ry  a s s is ta n c e  in f is c a l  
y e a r  1968."
HC H SC S CQ, XXIII, p. 167.
n n y y
AlPO, May 1967: A d m in is tra tio n  p ro p o sa l  of $ 3 .1  b ill ion  
fo r  fo re ig n  aid.




D iffe rence  = 12%
28. -{-Universal M ilita ry  T ra in in g /1 9 4 7 : "U n iv e rsa l  m i l i ta ry
tra in in g . "
HC H SC S CQ, m ,  p. 535.
h h
NORC, May 1947: "Should ev e ry  ab le -bod ied  A m erican  
twenty y e a rs  old be re q u ire d  to go into the A rm y o r  Navy fo r  one 
y e a r ?
Yes No D on’t Know D iffe rence  = 33%
65% 32% 3% NORC R e p o rt  No. 35,
p . 44.
*Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu e s  in Appendices A and
E.
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29. -{-Universal M il ita ry  T ra in in g /1 9 4 8 : "U niversa l m il i ta ry  
tra in ing . "
HC H SC S CQ, IV, p. 51
y n n
AlPO, Jan u ary  1948: "In the fu tu re , do you think ev e ry  a b le -  
bodied young m an (who has not a lre ad y  been  in the a rm e d  fo rc es )  
should be re q u ire d  to take m il i ta ry  o r  naval tra in in g  fo r  one y e a r ?
Yes No No Opinion D iffe rence  = 41%
65% 24% 11% POQ, XV, p. 393.
30. -{-Universal. M il ita ry  T ra in ing /195  0 : "E n ac t u n iv e rsa l  m il i ta ry
tra in ing . "
HC H SC S CQ, VI, p. 34.
h
AlPO, A ugust 1950: "In the fu tu re , do you think eve ry  a b le -  
bodied young m an (who has not a lre ad y  been in the a rm e d  fo rc e s )  
should be r e q u ire d  to take m il i ta ry  o r  naval tra in in g  fo r  one y e a r?
Yes No No Opinion D iffe rence  = 61%
78% 17% 5% POQ, XV, p. 393.
31. -i-Immigration by Skill/1964: "L ift b a r s  of d isc r im in a tio n  
ag a in s t  those seeking en try  into the United S ta te s , p a r t ic u la r ly  
those with m uch-needed  sk i l ls  and those joining th e ir  fa m il ie s .  "
HC H SC S CQ, XX, p. 93
h h




Issue No, * /ls su e /Y e a r
AlPO, 25 July  1965: ’’The c u r r e n t  im m ig ra tio n  law r e s t r i c t s  
the num ber of p e rso n s  com ing fro m  so m e  co u n tr ie s  m ore  than 
o th e rs .  This  is ca lled  the ’q u o ta ’ sy s te m . Would you favor o r  
oppose changing th is law so tha t people would be adm itted  on the 
b a s is  of th e ir  occupational sk i l ls  r a th e r  than on the b a s is  of the 
country  they com e f r o m ? ”
F av o r  Oppose No Opinion D iffe rence  = 29%
51% 32% 17% G P I, No. 3, A ugust 1965,
p. 14.
32. + Im m igration  by Skill/1985: "G ra n t f i r s t  p re fe re n c e  to those
with sk il ls  or a t ta in m en ts  e sp ec ia lly  advantageous to our soc ie ty . ”
HC H SC S CQ, XXI, p. 104.
n n n n
AlPO, 25 Ju ly  1965: ’’Im m ig ra n t  should: ’Have occupational 
s k i l l s .? ” ’
V ery  Im portan t Not v e ry  Im p o rtan t No Opinion 
71% 21% 8%
AlPO, 25 July 1965: ’’’Country  w here  he w as b o r n ? ” ’
V ery  Im p o rtan t Not v e ry  Im p o rtan t No Opinion 
33% 56% 11%
P o lls ,  Vol. I, No. 4, p. 72.
H a r r i s ,  D ecem b er  1965: ’’Im m ig ra t io n  b ased  on individual 
sk il l  r a th e r  than country  quota. ”
A pprove D isapprove D iffe rence  = 40%
70% 30% P o lls ,  III, No. 2, p. 79.




Issu e No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
33. +USSR W heat S a les /1962 : ’’L ausihe  am endm ent to p roh ib it  
( fu rn ish ing  of a id  under  the F o re ig n  A ss is ta n c e  Act or) sa le  of 
g ift of su rp lu s  a g r ic u l tu ra l  com m odities  under PL  480 to any 
countx-y known to be dom inated  by Com m unis n o r  M a rx ism . ”
HC H SC S CQ, XVIII, p. 76.
n
A lPO , 24 O ctober 1963: ’’R u ss ia  w ants to buy wheat f ro m  
the U .S . Do you approve o r  d isapp rove  of our se lling  su rp lu s  
w heat to R u s s i a ? ”
A pprove D isapprove No Opinion D iffe rence  = 29%
60% 3(fe 9% P o lls ,  Vol. I, p. 52.
34. +Voice of A m erica /1 9 4 7 : ’’F o re ig n  In form ation  P ro g r a m ” 
(Voice of A m erica ) .
HC H SC S CQ, HI, p. 534.
y y y
A lPO , D ecem ber 1948: ”It has  been  suggested  tha t the 
United S ta tes  should spend a s  m uch money in te lling  our s id e  of 
the s to ry  to E urope and the w orld  a s  R u s s ia  spends in telling h e r  
s id e .  Do you a g re e  or d i s a g re e ?  ”
A g re e  D isa g re e  No Opinion D iffe rence  = 31%
58% 27% 15% POQ, XXV, p. 303.




Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
35. +Job T ra in ing /1969 : "P ro v id e  m a jo r  expansion of job t r a i n ­
ing and day c a re  fa c i l i t ie s  under new bas ic  incom e p ro g ra m . "
HC H SC S CQ, XXV, p. 120.
h
H a r r i s ,  1969: "Expanded job tra in ing  p ro g ra m s  fo r  d i s ­
advantaged g r o u p s ."
F av o r  Oppose Not Sure D iffe rence  = 84%
90% 6% 4% L ife , op. loc.
36. +Strike C on tro l/1966 : "P ro v id e  effective m eans  fo r  dealing 
with s t r ik e s  tha t may cause  i r r e p a r a b le  dam age to the national 
in te re s t .  "
HC H SC S CQ, XXII, p. 113.
H a r r i s ,  16 O ctober 1967: "Do you favo r  or oppose the r ig h t  
of defense w o rk e rs  to s t r i k e ? "
F av o r  Oppose Not Sure D iffe rence  = 21%
34% 55% 11% P o lls ,  III, No. 4, p. 83.
37. +Minimum W age/1947: " In c re a se  m in im um  wage. "
HC H SC S CQ, III, p. 535.
h h
AlPO, 14 June 1947: "At the p re s e n t  t im e the m in im um  
(lowest) wage that can  be paid to w o rk e rs  in ev e ry  s ta te  in m ost 
b u s in e sse s  and in d u s tr ie s  is 40<? an hour. This m eans  that a l l  
p e rso n s  working in such b u s in e s s e s ,  in ev e ry  s ta te ,  including 
young people who have never  worked b efo re , cannot be paid le s s  
than 40£ an hour. Would you approve o r  d isapprove  of ra is in g  
th is  m in im um  to 65£ an h o u r? "




Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
Approve D isapprove No Opinion D iffe rence  = 47%
71% 24% 5% POQ, XXVI, p. 293.
38. +Minimum W age/1948: ’’In c re a se  m in im um  w age” fro m
$0. 40 to $0. 70 (S 2032), o r  $0. 60 (S 2386).
HC H SC S CQ, IV, p. 51.
h h
AlPO, 14 F e b ru a ry  1948: ’’Would you d isapprove of ra is in g  
th is  m in im um  (wage of 40£ /hour)  to 75£ an h o u r ? ”
Approve D isapprove No Opinion D ifference  = 37%
66% 29% 5% POQ, XXVI, p. 293.
39. +Minimum Wage O v ertim e /1 9 6 5 : ’’Amend the (F a ir  L abor
S tandards)  A ct to r e s t r i c t  ex cess iv e  overtim e  w ork  through 
paym ent of double tim e. ”
HC H SC S CQ, XXI, p. 111.
n h
AlPO, 13 F e b ru a ry  1965: ’’The law re q u ir e s  tha t o v er tim e  
r a te s  be paid a t the ra te  of t im e -a n d -a -h a lf .  Would you favor 
o r  oppose in c reas in g  th is  to r e q u ire  ov e r tim e  to be paid a t double 
the re g u la r  r a t e ? ”
■ F av o r  Oppose No Opinion D iffe rence  = 29%
31% 60% 9% P o lls ,  Vol. I, No. 2,
p. 73.
40. +D ay-C are  C e n te rs /1 9 6 9 :  ’’P rov ide  m a jo r  expansion  of. . . 
d a y -c a re  fac i l i t ie s  under new bas ic  incom e p ro g ra m . ”
HC H SC S CQ, XXV, p. 120.
h




AlPO, Ju ly  1969: ’’F e d e ra l  funds fo r  d a y -c a re  c e n t e r s ? ”




Issue No. */Is su e /Y ea r
41. +Gun Ban fo r  M ino rs /1 9 6 7 : " P ro h ib it  the sa le  of handguns 
to any p e rso n  under 21, and the sa le  of r i f le s  and shotguns to 
those  under  18. "
HC H SC S CQ, XXIH, p. 169.
h h
AlPO, 27 August 1967: "Which of these  th re e  p lans would 
you p re fe r  fo r  the use  of guns by p e rso n s  under  the age of 18 — 
forb id  th e ir  use  com plete ly , put s t r i c t  r e s t r ic t io n s  on th e ir  u se , 
o r  continue a s  a t  p re s e n t  with few r e s t r i c t i o n s ? "
F o rb id  S t r ic t  R e s tr ic t io n s  Continue a s  Now No Opinion 
31% 53% 14% 2%
D ifference = 36%
GPI, No. 27, p. 18.
42. -t-Universal Gun Licensingr/1968: "R equ ire  the licens ing  of
a l l  ow ners of f i r e a r m s .  "
HC H SC S CQ, XXIV, p. 105.
n n n n
A lPO, August 1967: "Would you favor o r oppose a  law 
which would re q u ire  a p e rso n  to obtain a police p e rm i t  befo re  
he o r  she could buy a  g u n ?"
F a v o r  Oppose No Opinion D iffe rence  = 49%
73% 24% 3% P o lls ,  m ,  No. 3, p. 82.
43. -fSchool In teg ra tion /1963 : " P e rm i t  the A tto rney  G enera l to 
in it ia te  su its  aga in s t local public schoo ls  b o a rd s  or public co lleges 
on w ri t ten  r e c e ip t  of a com plain t of ex is ting  seg reg a tio n , if c o m ­
p la in an t is unable to do so h im self , and if he d e te rm in e s  that 
such a  su it  would fu r th e r  the o rd e r ly  p ro g re s s  of d eseg reg a tio n
in public education. "
HC H SC S CQ; XIX, p. 90.
y h




Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
H a r r i s ,  O ctober  1963: f’Should the law guaran tee  N egroes 
equal r ig h ts  to  whit people in teg ra ted  s c h o o lin g ? ”
?
Y es, w hites nationwide D iffe rence  = 50%-75%
75% POQ, XXXI, p. 486.
44. +Open H ousing/1966: ” E nact leg is la t io n  to p ro h ib it  d i s c r im ­
ination  on the b a s is  of r a c e  o r  re lig ion  in  the sa le ,  r e n ta l  o r  
f inancing of a l l  dwelling units  by ow ners , b ro k e r s  and lending 
co rp o ra tio n . ”
HC H SC S A verage  D iffe rence  = 13%
y y h n  CQ, XXII, p. 109.
ORCP, S ep tem b er  1966: ”Would you be fo r  o r  ag a in s t  new 
F e d e ra l  laws to p rev en t  d isc r im in a tio n  a g a in s t  N egroes in h o u s in g ? ”
F o r  A gainst No Opinion D iffe rence  = 24%
30% 54% 16% (Whites) P o lls ,  HI, 4, p. 91.
H a r r i s ,  10 O ctober 1966: "A ttitudes tow ard  open-housing  
law. ”
F av o r  Oppose D iffe rence  = 2%
49% 51% (Whites) POQ, XXXI, p. 491.
45. +Open H ousing/1967: "A uthorize  the A tto rney  G enera l to 
support en fo rcem en t e ffo r ts  in the proh ib ition  of housing d i s ­
c r im in a tio n  when he has re a so n  to be lieve  tha t a g e n e ra l  p a t te rn  
o r  p ra c t ic e  of d isc r im in a t io n  e x is ts .  ” (Civil R igh ts  M essage ,
15 F e b ru a ry  1967).
HC H SC S A verage  D iffe rence  = 19.5%
h CQ, XXIII, p. 168.




Issue No. * /Is su e /Y ea r
ORCP, June 1967: F av o r  new open housing laws
Yes No No Opinion D ifference  = 20%
31% 51% 18% (Whites)
AIPO, 29 M arch  1967: 1TOf 58% who knew what 'open housing ' 
m eant: Would you like to see  C o n g ress  p a s s  an 'open housing ' 
b i l l  o r  r e je c t  i t ? ”
P a s s  R e jec t  No Opinion D iffe rence  = 19%
35% 54% 11% POQ, XXXI, p. 491.
46. +Open H ousing /1967: "P ro h ib i t ,  in 1968, d isc r im in a tio n  in 
(1) the sa le  o r  re n ta l  o f lio u s in g  by p e rso n s  who do not occupy the 
housing, and (2) a l l  housing fo r  five o r  m o re  fa m il ie s .  "
HC H SC S CQ, XXIII, p. 167.
h
AIPO, 29 M arch  1967: "Would you like to see  C o n g ress  p a s s  
an 'open hou s in g ’ b ill  o r  r e je c t  i t ? "  — asked  of those knowing 
m eaning of open housing = 58%
P a s s  R e jec t  No Opinion D ifference  = 19%
35% 54% 11% GPI, No. 22, p. 15.
47. -hOpen Housing/1967: " P ro h ib i t  d isc r im in a tio n  in the sa le  
and ren ta l  of a ll housing in 1969. "
HC H S SC CQ, XXIII, p. 167.
h
AIPO, A pril  1967: "Would you like to see  C o n g ress  p a s s  an 
'open h o u s in g ’ b il l  or r e je c t  i t ? "  — asked  of those  knowing the 
m eaning  of open housing = 58%
P a s s  R e jec t  No Opinion D iffe rence  = 19%
35% 54% 11% POQ, XXXI, p. 491.
*Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu e s  in Appendices A and
E.
93
CIVIL RIGHTS (Continued) 
I s su e  No, * / l s s u e /Y e a r
48. +Open Housing: E nfo rcem en t/1967 : "A uthorize  the S e c re ta ry  
(of Housing and Urban Developm ent) to is su e  c e a s e -a n d -d e s is t  
o rd e r  if a voluntary  solution is not found. "
HC H SC S CQ, X X in , p. 168.
h
ORCP, 17 M ay-10 June 1967: "Would you be fo r o r  aga in s t 
new F e d e ra l  laws to p rev en t d isc r im in a tio n  ag a in s t N egroes in 
h o u s in g ?"
F o r  A gainst No Opinion D iffe rence  = 20%
31% 51% 18% (Whites) P o lls ,  III, p. 91.
49. +Open Housing F inancing/1968: "A pprop ria te  $11. 1 m illion  
in f is c a l  1969 funds to a d m in is te r  the f a i r  housing p ro v is io n s  of 
the 1968 Civil R ights Act. "
HC H SC S CQ, XXIV, p. 105.
y y
H a r r i s ,  5 June 1967: "A ttitudes tow ard  open-housing la w ."
F a v o r  Oppose D iffe rence  = 26%
37% 63% (Whites) POQ, XXXI, p. 491.
50. +Voting R ights/1963: "P ro h ib i t  the application , by s ta te  o r  
local offic ia ls , of d iffe ren t te s ts ,  s ta n d a rd s ,  p ra c t ic e s  o r  p r o ­
ce d u re s  fo r  d iffe ren t app lican ts  seek ing  to r e g i s t e r  in a  fe d e ra l  
e lection . "
HC H SC S CQ, XIX, p. 90.
y h




Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
H a r r i s ,  O ctober 1963: ’’Should the law g u aran tee  N egroes 
equal r ig h ts  to white people in v o t in g ? ”
Yes No and No Opinion D iffe rence  = 90%
95% 5% (Whites) POQ, XXXI, p. 486.
51. -W ire tap /1968 : ’’R epea l p ro v is io n s  of the C r im e  C on tro l and 
Safe S tre e ts  Act of 1968 (T itle  III) which p e rm it te d  eavesdropping  
and w iretapping  by fed e ra l ,  s ta te  and local a u th o ri t ie s  in a 
v a r ie ty  of s itua tions . ”
HC H SC S CQ, XXIV, p. 105.
H a r r i s ,  1969: ’’In c re a se  pow er fo r fe d e ra l  governm ent to 
tap  te le p h o n e s .”
F av o r  Oppose Not Sure  D iffe rence  = 48%
25% 63% 12% Life, op. loc.
52. +Equal Opportunity Em ploym ent/1949: ’’P ro h ib i t  d i s c r im -  
ination in em ploym ent (FEPC ). P re s id e n t  in favor.
HC H SC S A verage D ifference  = 15.5%
y y CQ, V, p. 46.
AIPO, 16 Jan u ary  1949: ’’One of T ru m a n ’s p ro p o sa l  co n ­
c e rn s  unem ploym ent p ra c t ic e s .  How f a r  do you yo u rse lf  think 
the F e d e ra l  governm en t should go in req u ir in g  em p lo y ers  to 
h ire  people without r e g a rd  to th e ir  r a c e ,  re lig ion , co lo r, or 
n a t io n a l i ty ? ”
All the Way 
34%
D ifference  = 18% 
POQ, XXXII, p. 146.
P a r t  of the Way None of the Way
8% 44%
D on’t Know 
14%




Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
AIPO, 29 A p ril  1949: "How fa r  do you y o u rse lf  think the 
F e d e ra l  governm ent should go in req u ir in g  em p lo y ers  to h ire  
people without r e g a rd  to ra c e ,  re l ig io n ,  co lo r , o r  n a t io n a l i ty ? tT
A ll the Way 
34%
None of the Way Leave to S ta tes
2%
D epends/N o Opinion 
19%
D ifference  = 13% 
POQ, XXXII, p. 146.
53. +Equal E m ploym ent/1963 : "E s ta b lish  a fe d e ra l  F a i r  E m ploy­
m ent P ra c t ic e s  C o m m iss ion  and m ake it app licab le  to both 
em ployees and unions. "
HC H SC S CQ, XIX, p. 90.
H a r r i s ,  O ctober 1963: "Should the law guaran tee  N egroes 
equal r ig h ts  to  white people in job o p p o r tu n it ie s? "
Yes, W hites, nationwide D iffe rence  = 60%-80%
80% POQ, XXXI, p. 486.
54. + A n ti-D isc r im in a tio n , E m p loym ent/1968: "E m pow er the
E qual Em ploym ent Opportunity C om m ission  to is su e , a f te r  an 
a p p ro p r ia te  hearing , an o rd e r  re q u ir in g  an offending em ployer 
or  union to ce ase  its  d isc r im in a tin g  p ra c t ic e s  and to take c o r r e c ­
tive action. "
HC H SC S CQ, XXIV, p. 105.
y
ORCP, 17 M ay-10 June 1967: "In dealing with unions, do you 
think governm ent agenc ies  should get tougher in re q u ir in g  them 
to accep t N egroes as  m e m b e rs ,  o r  a r e  unions doing enough now ?"
Get Tougher Doing Enough Now No Opinion
19% 53% 28% (Whites)




Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
"Do you think governm ent should ge tougher in req u ir in g  
com panies to h ire  N egroes , o r  a r e  com panies doing enough n o w ?”
Get Tougher Doing Enough Now No Opinion
13% 69% 18% (Whites)
A verage  D ifference  = 45% 
P o lls ,  III, p. 90.
55. +Public A ccom odations/1983: ”The Senate C o m m erce  C o m ­
m ittee , to which the public accom odations sec tio n  (Title II) had 
been r e f e r r e d  as  a s e p a ra te  b ill , O ctober 8 approved  a b ill  in c o r ­
p o ra ting  the A d m in is tra t io n ’s req u es t .  F o r  r e a s o n s  of s tra teg y , 
i t  was not fo rm ally  re p o r te d .  ” CQ, XIX, p. 334.
’’G uaran tee  all c i t iz en s  equal a c c e ss  to the s e rv ic e s  and 
fac i l i t ie s  of ho te ls , r e s ta u ra n ts ,  p laces  of am u sem en t and r e ta i l  
e s tab lish m en ts .  ”
HC H SC S CQ, XIX, p. 910.
y h
AIPO, 10 S ep tem ber 1963: ’’How would you fee l  about a  law 
which would give a l l  p e rso n s  — Negro as  well a s  white — the 
r igh t to be se rv e d  in public p laces  such  as  ho te ls ,  r e s ta u ra n ts ,  
th e a te rs ,  and s im i la r  e s tab lish m e n ts .  Would you like to see  
C o n g ress  p a s s  such a law, o r  n o t ? ”
Yes No No Opinion D iffe rence  = 16%
54% 38% 8% P o lls ,  I, 1, p. 51.
56. +Civil R ights B ill/1966 : HR 14765, S 3296, b ased  on P r e s i ­
d e n t ’s C ivil R ights speech , 28 A pril  1966.
HC H SC S CQ, XII, p. 109.
y y h n




Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
AIPO, Aug. 1966: ’’A dm in is tra tio n  pushing in teg ra tion  too f a s t ? ’




D iffe rence  = 17%
GPI, No. 17.
57. -Voting A ge/1954: ’’P ro p o se  18-y e a r -o ld  su ffrage . ”
HC H SC S CQ, X, p. 41
y n
AIPO, M arch  1954: ”Do you think tha t p e rso n s  18, 19, and 
20 y e a rs  old should be p e rm it te d  to vote, o r  n o t ? ”
?
Yes No, No Opinion D iffe rence  = 16%-58%
58% 52% P o l l s , III, p, p. 73.
58. -Voting Age/1955: ’’P ro p o se  low er voting age. ”
HC H SC S CQ, XI, p. 62.
AIPO, M arch  1954: ”Do you think that p e rso n s  18, 19, and 
20 y e a r s  old should be p e rm it ted  to vote, o r  n o t ? ”
?
Yes No, No Opinion D iffe rence  = 16%-58%
58% 42% P o lls ,  III, 1, 1. 73.
59. -Voting A ge/1968: ’’P re s id e n t  Johnson, June 27, asked  
C o n g ress  to approve and subm it fo r  ra t if ic a t io n  by th re e  q u a r ­
t e r s  of the s ta te  le g is la tu re s  an am endm ent to the C onstitu tion 
to low er the m in im um  voting age to 18. ”
HC H SC S CQ, XXIV, p. 490.
h
*Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu e s  in Appendices A and
E.
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Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
AIPO, M arch  1967: ”Do you think that p e rso n s  18, 19, and 
20 y e a rs  old should be p e rm it te d  to vote, o r  n o t ? ”
Yes No No Opinion D iffe rence  = 31%
64% 33% 3% GPI, No. 22, p. 13.
60. +D.C. Home R u le /1 9 4 9 : ,TTHome R u le ’ fo r  the D is t r ic t  of
Colum bia. ”
HC H SC S CQ, V, p. 46.
h y y
AIPO, 6 August 1949: ”At p re se n t ,  people who live in 
W ashington, D .C . cannot vote fo r  th e ir  city offic ials s ince  they
a r e  appointed by the P re s id e n t  of the United S ta tes . Do you
think the people of W ashington should e lec t th e ir  city offic ials  — 
o r should they continue to be appointed by the P r e s id e n t ? ”
C itizens  E le c t  Appointed No Opinion 
65% 20% 15%
D iffe rence  = 45%
PONS, 6 August 1949.
61. +D.C. National Suffrage/1954: ”G r a n tD .C .  national suffrage ,
HC H SC S CQ, X, p. 41.
n
AIPO, 27 F e b ru a ry  1954: ”At p re se n t ,  people whose p e r m a ­
nent home is in W ashington, D .C . cannot vote in national e l e c ­
tions. Do you think th is should be changed so they can vote in 
national e le c t io n s ? ”
Should be changed Should not No Opinion 
80% 12% 8%
D ifference  = 68%
PONS, 27 F e b ru a ry  1957.
*Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu e s  in Appendices A and
E.
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62. +D.C. Home R u le /1 9 6 4 : ’’A uthorize ’home r u l e ’ fo r  D .C
HC H SC S CQ, XX, p. 94.
H a r r i s ,  S ep tem ber 1963: ’’Home ru le  fo r D .C . (vo ters  o n ly ) .’
F av o r  Oppose No Opinion D iffe rence  = 56%
66% 10% 24%
63. +D.C. Home R u le /1 9 6 5 : ’’C re a te  a re p re se n ta t iv e  local gov'
e rn m e n t fo r  the D is tr ic t .  T
HC H SC S CQ, XXI, p. 107.
n n y y
H a r r i s ,  23 S ep tem ber 1965: ”As you know, the city of 
W ashington, D .C . , can vote in P re s id e n t ia l  e lec t io n s , but it 
does not e lec t  its  own G overnm ent. C o n g ress  is soon going to 
vote on w hether o r  not to give the city of W ashington home ru le . 
Would you favor or oppose home ru le  fo r  W ashington, D .C . ? ”
F av o r  Oppose Not Sure  D iffe rence  = 56%
66% 10% 24% P o lls ,  III, No. 2, p. 76.




Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
64. +Campaign E xpenditure R egu la tion /1966 : "L im it  cam paign 
con tribu tions to each candidate and the co m m ittee s  w orking on 
his behalf  to no m ore  than $5, 000 fro m  a  single so u rce  in any 
ca len d a r  y e a r .  "
HC H SC S CQ, XXII, p. 110.
h n
AIPO, 1966: "Would you favo r  o r  oppose a  law which would 
put a l im it  on the to ta l am ount of money which can  be spen t fo r
. . .  a candidate in his cam paign for public o f f ic e? "
F av o r  Oppose No Opinion D iffe rence  = 54%
72% 18% 10% P o lls ,  III, p. 79.
65. -C am paign R egulation Ceiling: "R epea l a l l  ex is ting  ce ilings  
on to ta l expend itu res  of cand idates  fo r  fe d e ra l  offices. "
HC H SC S CQ, x x n ,  p. 110.
h n
AIPO, 1966: "Would you favor o r  oppose a law which would 
put a  l im it  on the to ta l am ount of money which can be s p e n t . . . 
by a candidate in h is  cam paign fo r  public o f f ic e? "
F av o r  Oppose No Opinion D iffe rence  = 54%
72% 18% 10% P o lls ,  III, No. 3, p. 79.
66. -L im it  C am paign C o n tr ib u tio n s /1 9 6 7 : "L im it  to ta l cam paign 
con tribu tions of any individual to any sing le  candidate  to $5, 000. "
HC H SC S CQ, XXIII, p. 171.
h y y




Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
AIPO, June 1967: ’’Would you favor o r  oppose a  law which 
would put a l im it  on the to ta l am ount of money which can  be spent 
f o r . . . a  candidate in h is  cam paign fo r  public o f f ic e ? ”
F av o r  Oppose No Opinion D ifference  = 57%
75% 16% 11% P o lls ,  III, p. 79.
67. -C am paign Expenditure C eiling /1967: ’’R epeal the a r b i t r a r y  
l im its  on the to ta l p e rm is s ib le  expend itu res  of candidates for 
fe d e ra l  office. ”
HC H SC S CQ, XXIII, p. 171.
h y y
AIPO, June 1967: ’’Would you favor or  oppose a law which 
would put a  l im it  on the to ta l am ount of money which can be spent 
. . .b y  a candidate in his cam paign  fo r  o f f ic e ? ”
F av o r  Oppose No Opinion D ifference  = 57%
73% 16% 11% P o lls ,  III, No. 3, p. 79.
68. +Campaign C ontribution  Regulation/1967: ’’P ro h ib i t  c o r p o r a ­
tions which have contacts  with the fe d e ra l  governm ent f ro m  co n ­
tr ibu ting  to s ta te  and loca l e lec tion  cam paigns. ”
HC H SC S CQ, X X m , p. 171.
h y y
AIPO, August 1966: ’’Should c o rp o ra tio n s  be allowed to 
m ake cam paign c o n tr ib u t io n s? ”
Yes No No Opinion D iffe rence  = 29%
27% 56% 17% GPI, No. 14.




Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
69. +Campaign C ontribution Regulation/1968: "An A d m in is tra tio n -  
backed b ill  (HR 11233) to provide com prehensive  changes in p o l i t ­
ical cam paign rep o rtin g  r e q u i r e m e n t s . . . . "
HC H SC S CQ, XXIV, p. 659.
y
AIPO, 1968: L im it  cam paign  spending.
F av o r  Oppose No Opinion D ifference  = 43%
66% 24% 10%
70. + E lec to ra l  R efo rm /1969 : "Adopt the d i re c t  e lection  approach  
to e le c to ra l  re fo rm . "
HC H SC S CQ, XXV, p. 122.
y y h
AIPO, N ovem ber 1968: "Amend the C onstitu tion  to abolish  
the E le c to ra l  College, and rep la ce  it with d i re c t  e lection . "
Yes No No Opinion D ifference = 69%
81% 12% 7%
71. +House T e r m s /1 9 6 6 : "Amend the C onstitu tion  to prov ide  a 
fo u r -y e a r  te rm  of office fo r  m e m b e rs  of the House of R e p re s e n ta ­
t ives . "
HC H SC S CQ, XXII, p. 107.
h h
AIPO, 13 Jan u ary  1966: "How would you fee l about changing 
the te rm s  of m e m b ers  of the House of R ep re sen ta t iv e s  from  2 
y e a r s  to 4 y e a rs .  Would you favor or oppose th i s ? "
F av o r  Oppose No Opinion D ifference  = 37%
61% 24% 15% P o lls ,  Vol. II, No. 1,
p. 74.
*Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu e s  in Appendices A and
E.
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Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
72. - P e r sonal Income Tax/1947: HR 1 ”An ac t  to reduce  ind i­
vidual income tax paym en ts . ”
HC H SC S P re s id e n t  CQ, IH, p. 376.
y y veto
AIPO, 29 M arch  1947: "Do you co n s id e r  the am ount of 
income tax which you have to pay as  too high, too low, o r  about 
r i g h t ? ” Asked of income tax  p a y e rs  only.
Too high Too low About r ig h t  No Opinion 
54% 0% 40% 6%
D ifference = 14%
POQ, XXVIII, p. 161.
73. -P e rs o n a l  Income T ax/1948: ’’Income tax red u c tio n ” HR 
4790”
HC H SC S P re s id e n t  CQ, IV, p. 51.
y y y y veto
AIPO, 27 M arch  1949: ”Do you co n s id er  the am ount of 
incom e tax which you have to pay as  too high, too low, o r  about 
r i g h t ? ”
Too high Too low About Right No Opinion 
57% 1% 38% 4%
D ifference = 19%
POQ, XXVII, p. 161.
74. -P e rso n a l  Income T a x /1 9 63: ’’Reduce p e rso n a l  incom e tax 
r a te s  fo r 1963 to a range of 18. 5 p e rc e n t  to 84.5  p e rce n t ,  with 
a co rrespond ing  drop in the withholding ra te .  ”
HC H SC S CQ, XIX, p. 92.
n n h
♦Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu e s  in Appendices A and
E.
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Is su e  No. * / l s s u e /Y e a r
AIPO, 29 S ep tem ber 1963: ’’Have you h ea rd  o r  read  about 
the Kennedy p roposa l to reduce income t a x e s ? ” T hose who w ere  
inform ed w ere  asked: ’’How do you, yourse lf , f e e l?  Do you 
favor or oppose a cut in income taxes n o w ?”
F av o r  cut Oppose cut No Opinion D ifference  = 31%
60% 29% 11% POQ, XXVIII, p. 164.
75. s  P e rso n a l  Income Tax/1957: ’’Continue incom e ta x es  a t 
existing r a te s .  ”
HC H SC S CQ, XIII, p. 92.
AIPO, 24 A pril  1957: ”Do you cons ider  the am ount of p e r ­
sonal income tax you have to pay a s  too high, too low, o r  about 
r i g h t ? ”
Too high Too low About r ig h t No opinion 
61% 0% 31% 8%.
D ifference  = 30%
POQ, XXVIII, p. 161.
76. + PersonaI  Income T ax /1 9 6 0 : ’’Tax as o rd in a ry  incom e any 
gain rea l ized  by the sa le  of d ep rec iab le  p e rso n a l  p ro p e r ty ,  to the 
extent of the d ep rec ia tion  deduction p rev iously  taken  on the 
p ro p e r ty .  ”
HC H SC S CQ, XVI, p. 98.
n n
AIPO, 15 A pril 1959: ”Do you co n s id e r  the am ount of p e r ­
sonal income tax you have to pay a s  too high, too low, o r  about 
r ig h t?
*Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu e s  in Appendices A and
E.
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Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
Too high Too low About r ig h t  No Opinion 
51% 1% 40% 8%'
D ifference  = 90%
POQ, XXVIII, p. 161.
77. -P e rs o n a l  Incom e T ax/1963: "Reduce p e rso n a l  income tax 
r a te s  fo r  a l l  of 1964 to a range of 15.5 p e rce n t  to 71 .5  percent, 
with a d rop  in the withholding ra te  to 13. 5 p e rc e n t  effective 
Ju ly  1, 1964. "
HC H SC S CQ, XIX, p. 92.
y y h
AIPO, 29 S ep tem ber 1963: "Have you h ea rd  o r  read  about 
the Kennedy p ro p o sa l  to reduce  income ta x e s ? "  Those who 
w ere  inform ed w ere  asked: "How do you, yo u rse lf  fe e l?  Do you 
favor or oppose a cut in income taxes now ?"
F av o r  cut Oppose cut No opinion D iffe rence  = 31%
60% 29% 11% POQ, XXVII, p. 164.
78. + P e rso n a l Income T ax/1965: "S trengthen the sy s tem  by
in c reas in g  the am ount of wages sub jec t to taxation  and inc reas ing  
the am ount of the tax. "
HC H SC S A verage  D ifference = 80%
h CQ, XXI, p. 111.
AIPO, 11 May 1966: "How do you, yourse lf , fee l — would
you favor o r  oppose an income tax; in c re a se  a t th is  t im e ? "
F av o r  Oppose No Opinion D ifference = 60%
16% 76% 8% P o lls ,  II, No. 2, p. 86.
*lssue Number corresponds to numbered issu e s  in Appendices A and
E.
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Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
AIPO, 15 A pril 1966: nDo you co n s id e r  the am ount of 
F e d e ra l  income tax which you have to pay a s  too high, about 
r igh t,  o r  too lo w ? ”
Too high About r igh t
52% 39%
Too low No opinion 
0% 9%
D ifference  = 100%
P o lls ,  II, No. 2, p. 82.
79. + P e rso n a l Income Tax /1 9 6 7 : "Im pose a  su rch a rg e  of 10 p e r ­
cent on the inco H I G l iab il i t ie s  of individuals , exem pting p e r ­
sons in the low est income b ra c k e ts ,  effective Oct. 1, 1967 .”
HC H SC S A verage D ifference = 52%
h CQ, XXIII, p. 174.
AIPO, January  1967: ’’P re s id e n t  Johnson has asked C on­
g r e s s  to p a s s  a b ill  that would in c re a se  p e rso n a l  income taxes .
If p assed , it would m ean  that fo r  every  $100 now paid in income 
tax es ,  th e re  would be an additional 10 p e rc e n t  su rc h a rg e ,  o r  $10. 
Would you like to see  C o n g ress  p a ss  th is  b il l  o r  r e je c t  i t ? ”
P a s s  R e jec t No opinion D ifference  = 54%
18% 72% 10% P o lls ,  III, No. 4, p. 77.
AIPO, Ju ly  1967: ’’The suggestion  has been  m ade that income 
taxes be in c re a se d  to help pay fo r  the w ar in V ietnam . Would 
you favor o r  oppose an income tax in c re a se  fo r th is p u r p o s e ? ”
F av o r  Oppose No opinion D ifference = 50%
25% 70% 5% P o lls ,  III, No. 3, p. 81.
80. +Tax Surch a rg e /1 9 6 7 : ’’Im pose a 10 p e rc e n t  su rc h a rg e  on 
incom e tax l iab il i t ie s  of individuals. ”
HC H SC S A verage  = 62%
h CQ, XXIII, p. 174.
*Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu es  in Appendices A and
E.
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Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
ORCP, 7-11 O ctober 1966: "If som ething  m ust be done to 
halt inflation — would you favor ra is in g  fe d e ra l  income taxes or 
would you favor cutting down fed e ra l  governm ent sp en d in g ?"
(Omit)
R a ise  taxes Cut spending Both N either O ther No opinion
7% 71% 8% 6% 2% 6%
D ifference  = 72%
P o lls ,  n , 4, p. 77.
ORCP, 7-11 O ctober 1966: "As a way to con tro l inflation — 
would you favor or oppose ra is in g  p e rso n a l  income ta x e s ? "  
Sam ple = 2, 043. Telephone, nationwide.
F av o r  Oppose No opinion D iffe rence  = 62%
12% 74% 14% P o lls ,  II, 4, p. 77.
AIPO, 23 N ovem ber 1966: "The suggestion  has been made 
tha t incom e taxes be in c reased  to help pay for the w ar in V ietnam  
— would you favor or  oppose an income tax in c re a se  fo r  th is  
pu rpose  ? "
F av o r  Oppose No opinion D ifference  = 54%
19% 73% 8% P o lls ,  n, 4, p. 71.
AIPO, May 1966: " In c rease  in income t a x e s . "
F av o r  Oppose No opinion D ifference  = 60%
16% 76% 8%
81. +Revenue Sharing/1969: "E nac t a re v e n u e -sh a r in g  plan to 
r e tu rn  percen tag e  of p e rso n a l  income tax to s ta te s  on b a s is  of 
each s ta te 's  sh a re  of national population, ad justed  of the s ta te 's  
revenue effort. "
HC H SC S CQ, XXV, p. 119.
h
*Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu es  in Appendices A and
E.
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Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
H a r r i s ,  1969: "Giving any su rp lu s  funds which the fe d e ra l  
governm ent may have a f te r  the w ar in V ietnam  to the s ta te s  
accord ing  to a f a i r  fo rm ula . "
F av o r  Oppose Not s u re  D ifference  = 48%
67% 19% 14% L ife , loc. cit.
82. +Defense Spending/1968: "C o n g ress  (Oct. 11). . . com pleted  
ac tion  on. . . (HR 18707) ap p rop ria ting  $71, 869, 828, 000 fo r the 
D ep artm en t of Defense in f isc a l  1969. . . .  As enacted, HR 18707 
was $5, 204, 172, 000 under the A d m in is tra t io n ’s req u es t .  "
HC H SC S CQ, XXIV, p. 577.
n
AIPO, July  1969. : "T h e re  is m uch d iscu ss io n  as  to the 
am ount of money the governm ent in W ashington should spend for 
national defense and m il i ta ry  p u rp o ses .  How do you feel about 
th is : so you think we a r e  spending too l i t t le ,  too much, o r  about 
the r ig h t am o u n t?"




D ifference  = 76% 
G PI, No. 50, p. 11.
83. +Defense Spending/1969: "C o n g ress  ap p ro p r ia te d  $69. 6 
b illion fo r  defense in f isca l  y ea r  1970 (down fro m  $71. 8 billion
in 1969, b iggest cut s ince  1954). P re s id e n t  req u es ted  $75. 3
billion. "
HC H SC S CQ, XXV, p. 455.
y y y y
*Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu e s  in Appendices A and
E.
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I s su e  No. * / l s s u e /Y e a r
AIPO, July 1969: Defense spending.
Too li t t le  Too m uch About r ig h t No opinion 
8% 52% 31% 9%
D ifference = 14%
GPI, No. 50, p. 11.
84. +Space A p p ro p r ia tio n s /1 9 6 7 : "C o n g ress  ap p ro p r ia ted  
(HR 12474) $4. 6 b illion  fo r  space  p ro g ra m  for f isca l  y e a r  1968.
It was a cut of $511 m illion  f ro m  the req u es t ,  la rg e s t  cut to date , 
f i r s t  tim e space  ap p ro p ria tio n  fe ll below $5 billion  since  1962. "
HC H SC S CQ, XXIII, p. 83.
y y y y
AIPO, M arch  1967: Im portan t to b ea t  R u ss ia  to the moon.
Yes No No opinion D ifference  = 27%
33% 60% 7% G PI, No. 22, p. 19.
85. +Space A p p ro p r ia tio n s /1 9 6 9 : " F is c a l  y e a r  1970 a p p ro p r ia ­
tion fo r  space  r e s e a r c h  and technology = $3. 9 b illion, o r  cut of 
$300 m illion  fro m  f isc a l  y e a r  1969, low est ap p ro p r ia tio n  since  
f is c a l  y e a r  1963. "
HC H SC S CQ, XXV, p. 92.
y y y y
AIPO, F e b ru a ry  1969: In c rease  funds fo r space  r e s e a r c h ?
In c re a se  Sam e Reduce No opinion D ifference  = 15%
14% 41% 40% 5% GPI, No. 45, p. 17.
86. +National Debt L im it/1953 : " In c re a se  national debt lim it. "
HC H SC S A verage  D iffe rence  = 38.3
y y h CQ, IX, p. 89.
*Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu es  in Appendices A and
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Issu e  No. * / l s s u e /Y e a r
AIPO, 6 F e b ru a ry  1953: "If the new C o n g ress  finds that it 
cannot ba lance the budget fo r  th is  y ea r  and a t the sam e tim e 
reduce  income taxes , which do you think it should t ry  to do f i r s t ? "
Cut taxes Balance budget No opinion 
26% 67% 7%
D ifference  = 41%
POQ, x x v m ,  p. 162.
AIPO, 27 M arch  1953: "Some m e m b e rs  of C o n g ress  argue 
that fed e ra l  income taxes  should be cut 10 p e rc e n t  beginning th is 
July  1. O th ers  a rgue  tha t incom e taxes should not be cut until 
the budget is balanced . With which s ide  do you a g r e e ? "
Cut taxes B alance budget No opinion 
25% 69% 6%
D ifference  = 44%
POQ, XXVIII, p. 163.
AIPO, 21 June 1953: "Some m e m b e rs  of C o n g ress  say that 
fe d e ra l  income taxes should be cut beginning in Ju ly . O thers  
say  that income taxes should not be cut until Jan u ary  to help 
balance the budget. With which side do you a g r e e ? "
Cut taxes B alance budget No opinion 
29% 59% 12%
D ifference  = 30%
POQ, XXVIII, p. 163.
87. + P rice  & Wage Control/1951: "S trengthen  wage and p r ic e
co n tro ls .  "
HC H SC S CQ, VII, p. 67.
n n n n
*Issue N um ber co rre sp o n d s  to num bered  is s u e s  in A ppendices A and
I l l
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Issue No. * /ls su e /Y e a r
AIPO, 15 N ovem ber 1950: "It has been suggested  that both 
p r ic e s  and wages ( s a la r ie s )  should be " f ro zen "  — that is , kept 
from  going any h igher. This m eans  that wages cou ldn’t go up 
and p r ic e s  cou ldn’t go up. Do you think th is is a good idea o r  a 
poor id e a ? "
Good F a i r  P oo r No opinion D ifference = 33%
63% 8% 22% 7% POQ, XV, p. 179.
88. ^-Increase P o s ta l  R a tes /1957 : "R aise  posta l r a te s  to in c re a se  
revenues  by $641 m illion  a y e a r .  ’’
HC H SC S CQ, x m ,  p. 91.
y y h
AIPO, 3 M arch  1957: "The p ro p o sa l,  which the U .S. P ost 
Office D epartm en t has under cons idera tion , to boost the f i r s t -  
c la s s  m a il  f rom  the p re se n t  th re e  cen ts  to five cen ts . . . . To 
help put the U.S. P o s t  Office D ep a rtm en t on a paying b a s is ,  
would you favor o r  oppose in c re as in g  the r a te  f ro m  3 to 5 c e n ts ? "
F av o r  Oppose No opinion D ifference = 54%
20% 74% 6% PONS, 3 M arch  1957.
*Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu es  in Appendices A and
E.
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THE GALLUP DESIGN OF THE SAMPLE*
* Gallup Opinion Index, R e p o rt  No. 52 (P rinceton : 
national, O ctober 1969), pp. 26-27.
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DESIGN OF THE SAMPLE
The design of the  sample is tha t  of a replicated p rob­
ability sample down to  the  block level in the case of 
urban areas and to segments of townships in the case 
of rural areas.
After stratifying the  nation geographically and by size 
of com m unity  in order to insure conform ity  of the 
sample with the  latest available estimates by the Cen­
sus Bureau of the  d istribution of the adult population, 
abou t 320  different sampling locations or areas were 
selected on a strictly random  basis. The interviewers 
had no choice whatsoever concerning the part of the 
city or coun ty  in which they  conducted  their inter­
views.
Approxim ately  5 interviews were conducted  in each 
such random ly selected sampling point. Interviewers 
were given maps of the  area to  which they  were as­
signed, with a starting poin t indicated, and required 
to  follow a specified direction. A t each occupied 
dwelling unit, interviewers were instructed to  select 
respondents by following a prescribed systematic 
m ethod  and by a male-female assignment. This pro-, 
cedure was followed until the  assigned num ber of 
interviews was com pleted .
Since this sampling procedure is designed to  produce 
a sample which approxim ates  the  adult civilian pop­
ulation (21 and older) living in private households in 
the  U.S. ( tha t  is, excluding those in prisons 2 nd hos­
pitals, hotels, religious and educational institutions, 
and on military reservations), the survey results can 
be applied to  this population  for the purpose o f  pro­
jecting percentages in to  num ber of people. The m an­
ner in which the  sample.is drawn also produces a sam­
ple which approxim ates  the popula tion  of private 
households in the  United States. Therefore, survey 
results can also be projected in term s of num ber of 
households when appropriate .
SAMPLING TOLERANCES
In interpreting survey results, it should be borne in 
mind th a t  all sample surveys are subject to sampling 
error, tha t  is, the  ex ten t  to  which the results may 
differ from  w hat w ould  be obtained if the  whole 
population surveyed had been interviewed. The 
size of such sampling errors depends largely on the 
num ber of interviews.
The following tables may be used in estimating the 
sampling error of any percentage in this report. The 
com puted  allowances have taken into account the 
effect of the sample design upon sampling error. 
They may be interpreted as indicating the range (plus 
or minus the figure shown) within which the results 
of repeated samplings in the same time period could 
be expected to  vary, 95 per cent of the time, as­
suming the same sampling procedure, the same inter­
viewers, and the  same questionnaire.
Table A shows how much allowance should be made 
for the  sampling error of a percentage.
The table would be used in the following manner: 
Let us say a reported  percentage is 33 for a group 
which includes 1500 respondents. Then we go to 
row “ percentages near 30"  in the table and go across 
to the column headed " 1 5 0 0 ."  The num ber  at this 
point is 3, which means th a t  the  33 per cen t obtained 
in the  sample is subject to  a sampling error of plus or 
minus 3 points. A nother  way of saying it is tha t  very 
probably (35 chances o u t  of 100) the average of re­
peated samplings would be somewhere between 30 
and 36, with the  most likely figure the  33 obtained.
In comparing survey results in tw o samples, such as 
men and w om en, the  question arises as to  how large 
must a difference between them  be before one can be 
reasonably sure th a t  it reflects a real difference. In 
tables B and C, the  num ber of points which must be 
allowed for, is such comparisons, is indicated.
Tw o tables are provided. One is fo r  percentages near 
20 or 80; the  o ther for percentages near 50. For 
percentages in between, the  error to  be allowed for is 
between tha t  shown in the  tw o tables.
Here is an example of how  the tables would  be used: 
Let us say th a t  50 per cent of men respond a certain 
way and 40 per cent of wom en respond th a t  way also, 
for a difference of 10 percentage po in ts  between 
them. Can we say with any assurance th a t  the  10- 
po in t difference reflects a real difference between 
men and wom en on the question? The sample con­
tains approxim ately  750 men and 750 w om en.
Since the  percentages are near 50, we consult Table B, 
and since the tw o samples are abou t 750 persons each, 
we look for the num ber in the colum n headed " 7 5 0 ” 
which is also in the row designated " 7 5 0 ."  We find 
the num ber 6 here. This means th a t  the  allowance for
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error should be 6 points, and tha t  in concluding tha t  
tfie percentage among men is somewhere between 4 
30d 16 points higher than the percentage among w o­
men we should be wrong only about 5 per cent of the 
time. In o ther  words, we can conclude with con­
s id e ra b le  confidence that a difference exists in the 
direction observed and th a t  it am ounts  to  at least 4
percentage points.
If, in another case, men's responses am o u n t  to  22 per 
cent, say, and w om en 's  24 per cent, we consult Table 
B because these percentages are near 20. We look in 
the column headed " 7 5 0 "  and see th a t  the  num ber is 





















Recommended Allowance for  Sampling Error of a Percentage
In Percentage Points 
(at 95 in 100 confidence level)* 







































































The chances are 95 in 100 th a t  the  sampling error is n o t  larger th an  the figures shown.
TABLE B R ecom m ended Allowance for Sampling Error of the  Difference
In Percentage Points 
(at 95  in 100 confidence level)* 
Percentages near 20 or percentages near 80
Size of the  Sample 750 600 400  200
750 5
600 5 6
400 6 6 7
200 8 8 8 10
TABLE C Percentages near 50
Size of the Sample 75 0  600 400  200
750 6
600 7 7
400 7 8 8
200 10 10 10 12
The chances are 95 in 100 th a t  the  sampling error is no t larger than the  figures shown.
APPENDIX D
HOW THE BOXSCORE WORKS*
"The item s tabulated  in the B oxscore  included only the 
specif ic  leg is la tive  re q u e s ts  contained in the P r e s id e n t ’s 
m e ssa g e s  to C o n g ress  and o ther  public s ta tem en ts .
"Excluded f ro m  the B oxscore  a re  p ro p o sa ls  advocated 
by the Executive B ran c h  o ffic ia ls , but not spec if ica lly  by 
the P re s id e n t ;  m e a s u re s  endo rsed  by the P re s id e n t  but 
not req u es ted  by him ; nom inations; and suggestions that 
C o n g ress  cons ider  or study p a r t ic u la r  top ics, when le g ­
is la tiv e  action is not req u es ted .
"Routine ap p ro p ria tio n  re q u e s ts ,  which provide funds 
fo r  r e g u la r  continuing G overnm ent opera tions , a r e  excluded. 
A ppropria tion  re q u e s ts  fo r  specific  p ro g ra m s ,  how ever, 
which the P re s id e n t  indicated in sp ec ia l  m e ssa g e s  o r  o ther 
com m unications w ere  im portan t in h is  o v e r -a l l  leg is la tiv e  
p ro g ra m , a re  included.
"Since the B oxsco re  fundam entally  is a tab u la r  c h e ck ­
l is t  of the P re s id e n t ’s p ro g ra m , p re se n ted  in n e i th er  
g r e a te r  nor le s s  de ta il than is found in P re s id e n t ia l  m e s ­
sa g es ,  the individual re q u e s ts  n e c e s s a r i ly  d iffer c o n s id e r ­
ably from  one another in th e ir  scope and im portance . "
♦C ongressional Q u ar te r ly  S erv ice , C o n g ress io n a l Q u a r te r ly  A lm a n ac , 
Vol. XXIII, 1967 (Washington, D .C . : C o n g ress io n a l Q u arte r ly ,
Inc. , 1968), p. 166.
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APPENDIX E
84 POLL DIFFERENCE-PUBLIC ISSUE PAIRS RANKED 
ACCORDING TO THE MAGNITUDE OF THE DIFFERENCE
Issu e  No. * /
Po ll  D iffe rence  % C o n g ress  (C) or P re s id e n ts  (P) A greeing
8 ................................
9 ................................
1 0 ................................  2 6 /P
1 1 ................................
1 2 ................................  2 7 /P
1  3 ................................  1 5 /P ;  44/C
1 4 ................................  72 /C ; 83/C
1 5 ................................  1 1 /P ;  8 5 /P
1 6 ....... ......................... 52 /C ; 5 5 /P
1 7 ................................  1 2 /P ;  1 6 /P ;  56 /C
1 8   .........
1 9 ................................  4 /P ;  46 /C ; 47 /C ; 73/C
2  0 ................................  45 /C ; 48/C
2  1 ................................  3 6 /P
2 2 ................................




Issue no. ♦ /




2 6 ................................... 49/C
2 7 ................................... 2 /P ;  84/C
2 8 ...................................
2 9................................... 31 /P ; 33/P; 39/C; 6 8 /P
3 0................................... 75/C
3 1  34/P ; 59 /P ; 74 /P ; 7 7 /P
3 2 ................................... 2 5 /P
3 3................................... 8 7 /P
3 4 ................................... 4 0 /P
3 5 ...................................
3 6................................... 41/C
3 7 ................................... 38 /P ; 7 1 /P
3 8 ................................... 5 1 /P ;  86/C
3 9...................................
4  0....................... ...........  3 /P ; 6 /P ; 3 2 /P
4  1................................... 1 /P ; 2 9 /P
4 2 ...................................
♦Issue Number corresponds to numbered is su e s  in Appendices A and
B.
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Issue N o .♦ /
P o ll D ifference % C ongress (C) or P residents (P) A greeing
4 3................................... 6 9 /P
4 4 ...................................
4 5   13/P ; 28 /P ; 54/C; 6 0 /P
4 6...................................
4 7 ................................... 3 7 /P
4 8 ................................... 8 1 /P
4  9................................... 19 /P ; 4 2 /P
5  0...................................
5  1...................................... 9/C; 2 0 /P
5 2 ...................................  79/C
5 3 ...................................
5 4 ................................... 64 /P ; 65/P; 88/C
5 5 ...................................
5  6 ................................... 8 /P ; 62/P ; 6 3 /P
5 7 ................................... 5 /P ;  18/P ; 66/P ; 6 7 /P
5 8 ...................................
5  9...................................
6  0................................... 5 3 /P
6 1................................... 3 0 /P
6 2 ................................... 80/C
6 3...................................
♦Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu es  in Appendices A and
B.
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Issue No. * /
P oll D ifference % C ongress (C) or P resid en ts (P) A greeing
6 4 ...................................
6 5 ...................................
6 6 ................................... 14 /P
6 7 ...................................
6 8 ................................... 6 1 /P




7  3................................... 23/C; 24/C
7 4 ...................................
7 5 ...................................
7  6................................... 82/C
7 7 ...................................
7 8 ................................... 10 /P
7 9...................................
8  0 ................................... 21/C; 22/C; 78/C
8  1 ...................................
82 ...................................
83 ...................................
*Issue Number corresponds to numbered issu es  in Appendices A and
B.
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Issue  No. * /
P o ll  D iffe rence  % C o n g ress  (C) o r  P re s id e n ts  (P) A greeing
8 4 .............. ....................  3 5 /P
8 5 ...................................
8  6................................... 17/C
8  7...................................
8 8  .
8  9.............. ....................




RECORD OF GALLUP POLL ACCURACY*
* Gallup Opinion Index, R eport No. 52, (P rince ton : Gallup I n te r ­
national, O ctober 1969), pp. 26-27.
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- 6 . 8 Roosevelt1
1938 54.0 Democratic 50.8 Democratic + 3.2 Democratic
1940 52.0 Roosevelt 55 .0 Roosevelt - 3 . 0 Roosevelt
1942 52.0 Democratic 4 8 .0 Democratic + 4 .0 Democratic1
1944 51.5 Roosevelt 53 .3 3 Roosevelt - 1 . 8 Roosevelt
1946 58.0 Republican 54.3 Republican +3.7 Republican
1948 44 .5 Truman 49.9 T ruman - 5 . 4 T ruman4
1950 51 .0 Democratic 50.3 Democratic + 0.7 Democratic
1952 K1 OU 1 . u Eisenhower 55.4 Eisenhower - 4 . 4 Eisenhower
1954 51.5 Democratic 52.7 Democratic - 1 . 2 Democratic
1956 59.5 Eisenhower 57.8 Eisenhower + 1.7 Eisenhower
1958 57.0 Democratic 56.5 Democratic + 0.5 Democratic
1960 51.0 Kennedy 50.1 Kennedy + 0.9 Kennedy
1962 55.5 Democratic 52.7 Democratic + 2.8 Democratic
1964 64 .0 Johnson 61.3 Johnson + 2.7 Johnson
1966 52.5 Democratic 51.9 Democratic + 0.6 Democratic
1968 43 .0 Nixon 43.5 Nixon - 0 . 5 Nixon
Average Deviation for seventeen national elections, percentage points = 2.6 
Average Deviation for seven national elections through 1948, percentage points = 3.9  
Average Deviation for ten national elections since 1948, percentage points = 1.4
In every instance, these figures were published the Sunday before the Tuesday election.
Copies of the final release in each case can be obta ined  for a small charge for the pho tos ta t .
1 Average error on major party  candidates = 6.6 percentage points.
2 Final report  said Democrats would win control of the House, which they did 
even though the Republicans won a majority of the popular vote.
3 Civilian vote 53.3, Roosevelt soldier vote .5 -  53.8 Roosevelt. Gallup final 
survey based on civilian vote.
Average error on major party  candidates = 4.8 percentage points.
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